Kennesaw State University

DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University
Doctor of Business Administration Dissertations

Coles College of Business

Summer 8-21-2017

Built to Last: Exploring Family Strategy in Dynastic
Business Families
Mark William Auger
Kennesaw State University

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/dba_etd
Part of the Strategic Management Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Auger, Mark William, "Built to Last: Exploring Family Strategy in Dynastic Business Families" (2017). Doctor of Business
Administration Dissertations. 35.
http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/dba_etd/35

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Coles College of Business at DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Doctor of Business Administration Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State
University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@kennesaw.edu.

TITLE
BUILT TO LAST: EXPLORING FAMILY STRATEGY
IN
DYNASTIC BUSINESS FAMILIES

by
Mark W. Auger

A Dissertation
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of
Doctor of Business Administration
In the
Coles College of Business
Kennesaw State University
Kennesaw, GA

i

Copyright Page

© 2017
Mark W. Auger
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

ii

SIGNATURE PAGE

iii

DEDICATION

To my best friend and wife, Tish,
Our children, Sydney and Hannah,
My parents, Gail and Richard
And, my outlaws,
Louise and Bud, may he rest in peace.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This dissertation represents the final written and successful outcome of my seventhousand-hour doctoral journey. My deep desire to investigate the social and economic realities
of business family life inspired this voyage. This enquiry also became an exploration of self.
The Kennesaw State University Doctorate of Business Administration program awakened
in me a profound sense of respect for the scientific community. Their contributions are too often
underappreciated and misunderstood. It takes grit, not just intellect, to scientifically discover.
Humility pervades my thoughts as I realize these past three and half years were but a scientific
mise en bouche. I truly know now that I don`t know. And that`s ok and very exciting! Learning is
a lifelong endeavor and opportunity.
Vital and extraordinary contributors helped to make my scientific expedition possible.
They kept me marching toward my stated goals. To all of you, I am eternally grateful for your
friendship, your wisdom, your insights, and your encouragement. Let me next acknowledge
some of these remarkable persons.
I am deeply grateful to my dissertation committee. My co-chairs and mentors, Dr.
Torsten Pieper and Dr. Joe Astrachan, who bestowed their confidence upon me to explore for
family strategy in dynastic business families. This process was often an ambiguous and
frustrating exercise. As a young researcher, this was terra nova populated with distractions and
cul-de-sacs. You both offered unrelenting encouragement and critical guidance to find my way

v

and stay the course. The time and effort of Dr. Andrea Calabrò to review my work and challenge
my ideas were most welcome and invaluable in reaching this outcome. Thank you.
Professors Neal Mero and Joe Hair, your availability, dedication, and passion for higher
learning in a rigorous and fun way was most inspiring. I was fortunate to have you by my side.
To the many global scholars who came to share their knowledge and passion for research and
higher learning during our doctoral seminars: the privilege was mine. Dr. Juanne Green, Sobia,
and Amy, thank you for always giving your best to make sure the program ran smoothly. Bravo!
To my dear Cohort 6 colleagues, thank you for the hospitality you extended to your
Canadian classmate. I got to learn and appreciate many cultural facets of the American southeast.
A special salute to my friends Jerry, Jimmy, Cori, and Bob for the many great drinks, meals,
assignments, and conversations we shared together.
The generosity of the business family members who participated in this research made
this dissertation possible. To have made themselves available and as informative as they were
was amazing. All were unbelievable hosts and very much engaged in this research process.
Thank you for your trust. I am most obliged to Olivier de Richoufftz, president of the Business
Families Foundation, for expressing very early on an interest in my research topic, and making
some valuable introductions to the dynastic business family community.
My dear friends Anastasia, Alan, Claudia, Daniel, Greg, Guy, James, Janet, John, Karim,
Karin, Keith, Jean-Francois, Julie, Lori, Miville, and Nancy, Steve, and Wendy, each of you in
your own unique and timely way offered me a loving and helping hand. Thank you for putting a
smile on my face and breaking my many moments of solitude.
Finally, this research project has reinforced my deep belief in the power of the family. To
grow as a family is to know that empowering and bonding our individualities are sources of

vi

happiness and resilience. My parents, my wife, and my best friend, Tish, and our daughters,
Sydney and Hannah, have empowered and loved me throughout this journey. Thank you for
blessing me with your love and understanding.

vii

ABSTRACT
Built To Last: Exploring Family Strategy
In
Dynastic Business Families
By
Mark W. Auger
Dynasties entwine family and fortune. They are organizational longevity outliers. Society
offers a conflicting view of dynasties. On one hand, dynasties are associated with conflict,
divisiveness, conspicuous consumption, and entitlement. On the other hand, dynastic business
families employ people, produce and innovate products and processes, and give to community.
Linked to values and enacted by strategic leaders, strategy organizes and mobilizes capital
toward goals attainment. The firm-centric perspectives of the strategic management and family
business strategy literatures overlook the systematic investigation of family strategy as a means
of perpetuation. This grounded theory influenced study explores the components of a family
strategy. Interview data were collected and analyzed by theoretically sampling North American
and European dynastic business family members and representatives. The family strategy
construct is clarified and conceived as an emergent business family strategy process theory.
Strategically fitted between family and fortune, family values, business family strategic
leadership, goals setting, resources, systems of organization, and goals monitoring and
attainment compose the dynastic business family strategy. A family strategy perspective provides
insights about how socioemotional endowments may originate beyond the family firm, and how
a family strategy is an antecedent to fortune-related strategies. This research project may open
viii

research pathways in the areas of business family strategic leadership, succession planning in the
family governance system and the family office, and business family goals monitoring processes.
Keywords: business families, dynasty, entwinement, family strategy, fortune, longevity, survival
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
“Difficult as it is, strategy is not an illusion. We cannot avoid the
discipline without penalty in the future” (Hoffman, 2014, p. 474).
Dynastic families are family groups acting to ensure the continuity of their influence for
time immortal. The Windsor, Kennedy, or Rothschild families exemplify royal, political, and
business dynastic families. Dynastic families are often connected to ongoing conflict and tragedy
(Billig, 2002; Gordon & Nicholson, 2010). Yet, dynastic families produce many benefits as
steady employers, innovators, and benefactors. For example, creator of the international banking
system, the Rothschilds still serve, 200 years later, the capital and advisory needs of
communities, businesses, and governments through 2,800 employees in 43 countries (Ferguson,
1998; Rothschild & Co., 2015). Also, with their origins set in 19th-century Germany, the Siemens
and Boehringer dynastic families are two more examples of creating great engineering and
medical innovations with much influence on a global scale (Bennedsen & Foss, 2015).
Dynastic families live much longer when compared to other institutions. The average
lifespan of S&P 500 companies is 25 years and declining (Morris, 2014). From a 2005 database
of seven million European companies, Stadler (2011) found that the average company age is 12.3
years; and in the case of large corporations, the average age is 48 years. These findings are
consistent with the research on century-old living companies conducted by de Geus (1997).
However, contrary to the generally shorter-lived companies, centenarian living organizations
were identified as proficient managers of adaptation and change via a combination of financial
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conservatism, environmental sensitivity, self-awareness and sense of community, and avid
organizational learning (de Geus, 1997).
Similar to Morris (2014) and Stadler (2011), Daepp, Hamilton, West, and Bettencourt
(2015) calculated from a database of over 25,000 publicly traded North American companies that
the typical average half-life of these companies, regardless of business sector, is about ten years.
According to Daepp et al. (2015), the likelihood of a company surviving 100 years is 0.0045%,
and 0% for 200 years. However, these historical data and predictions do not match observed
longevity in the dynastic realms. INSEAD estimates there are 5,500 bicentenary family
businesses worldwide (Bennedsen, 2015). The DuPont and Molson families, founded in 1802
and 1782, respectively, evidence the possibility of surviving beyond the 200-year mark, and the
Kikkoman`s Mogi family, started in 1603, living beyond 300 years. The existence of dynastic
families is partly recognized by the exclusive membership of the French association of Les
Hénokiens, which groups 41 bicentenary family firms from around the world, and the British
Tercentenarians Club of 300-year-old family firms (Hénokiens, 2015; Wallop, 2013).
Scholars are particularly interested in the factors explaining their longevity (Napolitano,
Marino, and Ojala, 2015). After all, dynastic families are among the longest-living entities in the
world (O`Hara, 2004) and they provide incredible historical windows on the origins and
evolution of extreme persistence and survival. Extreme exemplars make for richer and
diversified data to build more clearly defined constructs and more robust theory (Eisenhardt &
Graebner, 2007). Dynastic business families represent such extreme cases. With complex
organizational configurations, dynastic business families are more likely to show unique family
dynamics compared to a simpler first-generation family business (Steier et al., 2015). Are entities
of extreme longevity, like dynastic business families, more than just a statistical error? How can
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we explain the persistence of dynastic families? Is it mere luck? Or perhaps the result of an
intended "family strategy"? Strategy comprises a plan and the processes developed and
implemented to realize the family`s long-term vision. Werner Siemens, the 19th-century German
industrialist, gives us a glimpse into possible elements of a dynastic family strategy, as he spoke
of his family business in imperial terms:
My leading idea …was to found a lasting firm which perhaps later would become under
our sons' leadership a world firm like the Rothschilds, among others, and could find fame
in the world for our name. For this great plan, the individual, if he finds it a good idea,
must be ready to make personal sacrifice (Sabean, 2008, p.2).
From a review of 30 years of business history and management literature on business
longevity, Riviezzo, Skippari, and Garofano (2015) found that environmental and organizational
characteristics, the founder`s personal traits, and the business succession process were the
principal factors affecting business longevity. The content analysis of 142 journal articles
revealed that business longevity is commonly defined in terms of firm mortality, failure, decline
or bankruptcy, growth, and success. Longevity was measured principally in years, and whether
the firm was still operating or no longer existed as a legal entity. Only 17 articles studied
businesses with a longevity greater than 100 years. The business succession process articles were
generally associated with family firms (Riviezzo et al., 2015). Finally, a very diverse set of firmlevel organizational characteristics, such as different strategic choices (e.g., modes of entry,
focus on exploration and/or exploitation, diversification, internationalization, alliances, mergers
and acquisitions), innovation; corporate governance models, organizational structure,
organizational culture and values, organizational age, and organizational size were identified
(Riviezzo et al., 2015). Notably absent from their review was research on the influence of family
dynamics as a business longevity factor, which further raises the need to study family strategy.
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Family business longevity generally concerns survival of a single business as opposed to
survival of the owning family. Although family and business co-evolve (Kepner, 1983), the
family business literature focuses mostly on the longevity of the founder`s business (Drozdow,
1998; Salvato, Chirico, & Sharma, 2010). While later family generations often maintain
ownership in the original business, some families may behave as an enterprising family by
exiting a business by liquidation, sale, or transformation to redirect their family capital to other
value-creating interests (Habbershon & Pistrui, 2002; Zellweger, Nason, & Nordqvist, 2012).
Salvato, Chirico, and Sharma (2010) examined the entrepreneurial recycling (business exit and
entrepreneurial renewal) (Mason & Harrison, 2006) of the Italian Falck Group, founded in 1906,
as it evolved from a family controlled steel producer to a present-day renewable energy
generator. Another example of such transgenerational entrepreneurship (Zellweger, Nason, &
Nordqvist, 2012) includes the Haniel Group, founded in 1756, which transformed itself from a
coal mining and trading company to a modern-day diversified investment company with 680
family shareholders (Haniel, 2016). The family strategy components and processes guiding these
business families' transformations for longevity are neglected in the literature.
Longevity orientation, values, and entrepreneurship are also associated with family
business longevity. Looking and thinking into the future for continuity and with perseverance
describes a dominant family logic influencing all its business activities (Lumpkin and Brigham,
2011) and reinforcing the importance of planning and forecasting as a firm-level strategic
function (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2005). Family, business, and shared family business values,
considered an inimitable resource (Barney, 1991), positively influence family firm longevity
(Koiranen, 2002; Tàpies and Moya, 2012). Family values become a source of competitive
advantage and longevity for the family firms (Tàpies and Moya, 2012).
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Entrepreneurship explained via many constructs is also considered necessary for family
business longevity (Aldrich & Cliff, 2003). Transgenerational entrepreneurship describes a
family mindset, which encompasses the best in terms of family and business attitudes, beliefs,
and values new financial and social value streams across generations (Habbershon, Nordqvist,
and Zellweger, 2010; Zellweger et al., 2012). Jaskiewicz, Combs, Sabine, and Rau (2015)
advanced the theory that entrepreneurial legacy nurtures transgenerational entrepreneurship and
business family longevity. Entrepreneurial legacy is a firm-level construct representing the
family`s narratives of past entrepreneurial achievements and resilience (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015).
Entrepreneurship and its many facets, longevity orientation, and values, as presented
above, are connected to family business longevity with a number of shortcomings. The research
is mostly focused on a single family-single firm configuration, with the exception of
transgenerational entrepreneurship. The research rarely looks at family firms beyond the fourth
generation. Finally, we have limited family level knowledge about the types of strategizing
(Johnson, Melin, and Whittington, 2003) to develop and to maintain longevity orientation and
transgenerational entrepreneurship. This is important as transgenerational entrepreneurship
assumes the presence of processes to use and develop family resources and capabilities for
entrepreneurial activity (Zellweger et al., 2012).
Strategic management researchers typically do not investigate dynastic business families
to identify or explain factors of longevity (Astrachan, 2010). The strategic management literature
usually examines the makeup of and the relationships between the firm's financial performance,
its competitive advantages, and its industry (Furrer, Thomas, Goussevskaia, 2008)1. For
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example, Stadler (2007) studied firms' attributes to assess whether these generated extraordinary
relative performance to industry peers. From their mixed sample of 40 European family and nonfamily firms with an age of 100 years and more, Stadler (2007) found that exploitation before
exploration, business diversification, continuously recalling their mistakes, and conservative
change management were factors associated with their enduring outperformance. Unfortunately,
their research did not tease out whether or not these enduring success attributes are more or less
prevalent within family controlled firms or a business family ownership group.
Family business strategy research does not extend into the family unit to identify a
distinct family strategy and its associated strategic management processes (Astrachan, 2010;
Chrisman, Chua, and Sharma, 2005; Harris, Martinez, and Ward, 1994; Sharma, Chrisman, and
Chua, 1997). Family influence on the firm's goal setting, strategic planning, and strategy
implementation processes, in the pursuit of financial and non-financial goals, is a wellestablished perspective (Astrachan & Jaskiewicz, 2008; Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, and Barnett,
2012; Kotlar & De Massis, 2013; La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999;
Zachary, 2011). For instance, the seminal study of large family controlled businesses conducted
by Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005) showed that family occupied ownership and management
roles set firm strategy, determine strategic priorities, and develop capabilities enabling them to
"survive their success" and succeed for decades. Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005) offered five
family controlled corporate strategies (brand builders, craftsmen, operators, innovators, and deal
makers). However, Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005) do not elucidate the possibility that the
business family may have a family level strategy with its distinct strategic management process
aligning with its chosen business strategy. The lack of consideration of a higher order family
strategy is a general shortcoming of the family business literature.
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Strategic management is important for business (Crook, Ketchen, Combs, and Todd,
2008). What about for family? Since ancient times, strategy is a central component for all types
of organizations (Cummings, 1993). Strategy is key as there is ample evidence demonstrating
that the right strategic choices, for a given environment, positively shape organizational
performance (Barreto, 2010; Certo, Lester, Dalton, and Dalton, 2006; Crook et al., 2008;
Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985; Pearce, Robbins, and Robinson, 1987). For businesses, firm leadership
formulates, implements, and evaluates strategies linking vision, resources, and capabilities to
create and sustain competitive advantage in the pursuit of returns (Barney, 1991; Eisenhardt &
Martin, 2000; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Nag, Hambrick, and Chen, 2007; Teece, Pisano,
and Shuen, 1997; Teece, 2007). Given strategic management's usefulness, a family strategy may
also be helpful to coordinate, to focus, and to sustain family efforts in family goals' attainment
while ensuring alignment of family and corporate visions.
Family strategy research may shed light on whether dynastic business families are the
product of intentionality, not of randomness, or a statistical prediction (Daepp et al., 2015; Konz
& Katz, 2000). A family strategy could be driven by dynastic goals such as maintaining family
unity (Pieper, 2007), dynasting to build, maintain, and grow power and resources within the
family lineage (Loy, 2010), or ensuring an entrepreneurial legacy (Jaskiewicz, Combs, and Rau,
2015). Exploring the components of family strategy is where this research departs on many
levels from extant work.
First, the unit of analysis is the business family (Moores, 2009). Some scholars consider
conducting research at the family level a superior level of analysis to follow and measure
business family longevity as family capital evolves beyond a core business into business
constellations (Korom, Lutter, and Beckert, 2015; Zellweger et al., 2012). Studying the business
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family responds to the call for family business research focused on the family to better
comprehend the impact of family dynamics on family business (Astrachan, 2010; Dyer, 2003;
Dyer & Dyer, 2009; James, Jennings, and Breitkreuz, 2012). Business family strategy is such a
family dynamic (Nordqvist & Melin, 2010; Nordqvist, 2012). Studying dynastic business
families' family strategy, unlike paleontology and fossils, is an opportunity to understand the
ecologies of these families' past, their evolution, and their current place in the world as living and
influential social groups. Dynastic business families represent the evolution of at least four
continuous and controlling generations of familial social and economic positions, status, and
influences (Sjogren, 2011).
By investigating family strategy, this study explores the concept of strategic fit at the
family level as opposed to the firm level (Lindow, Stubner, and Wulf, 2010). Strategic fit is
defined as the vertical and horizontal alignments of organizational strategies (Kathuria, Joshi,
and Porth, 2007). Strategic fit is important to optimize strategic choices, which benefits
organizational performance and longevity (Powell, 1992; Kathuria et al., 2007). Furthermore, fit
or alignment is important in family business, because unlike non-family firms, family businesses
need to achieve fit between family, the family ownership group, and the business or businesses.
By studying dynastic business families, this research project seeks to explain whether or not the
components of a family strategy align chaotically, in a laissez-faire manner, or with intent on the
part of family strategists. Management of strategic fit may help balance organizational intricacies
between the family, the business, and the environment further extending the business family's
longevity (Kathuria et al., 2007; Van de Ven, Andrew, and Drazin, 1985).
This proposed study revisits the family strategy concept used in anthropology and
population demographics. Family historians use strategy to describe decision-making processes
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within the family unit (Hareven, 1991) and understand "social continuities and change” (Hareven
& Plakans, 2001; Moen & Wethington, 1992, p.238) in the context of agrarian and pre-industrial
societies. Family strategies are defined as "the implicit rules guiding the behavior of men,
women and children; the actions undertaken for the good of the family" (Moch, Folbre, Smith,
Cornell, and Tilly, 1987, p.113) as related to migration, marriage, fertility, work, and education
(Forster & Ranum, 2002). Family strategy is not clearly integrated with the functional strategies
(e.g., marriage, migration) to the higher-level goals of family survival, prosperity, social status,
or family vision in a dynastic timeframe. Generally, the current conceptualization of family
strategy is criticized as being poorly specified and operationalized because the research process
lacks transparency including the respondents' actual strategic motivations, and assumption that
the family behaves as a unitary actor (Engelen, Kok, & Paping, 2004; Kok, 2002; Moen &
Wethington, 1992; Viazzo & Lynch, 2002; Yildirim, 2002).
Another interesting investigative avenue of this study involves the possibility of defining
a grand family strategy. For firms, grand strategy represents a comprehensive general approach
to guide major actions to realize its objectives over a period of five years (Pearce II, 1982). In the
case of a country, a grand strategy encompasses all of the aspects of a statesperson's power and
influence to balance the means and ends of a nation for decades or even centuries through peace
and conflict (Kitchen, 2010; Posen & Ross, 1997). The grand strategy literature provides an
analytic framework to identify organizational strategic priorities, choices, and subsequent actions
over a long-term horizon. However, grand strategy scholars have yet to examine its application at
the family level. This research may be a first attempt at developing a grand strategy framework
in the context of dynastic business families.
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How strategy is different in business families (Harris et al., 1994) remains open for
further investigation. This research sheds light on the following questions: Is there a dynastic
family strategy that binds family and all its activities? What are the components of a family
strategy? This grounded theory influenced study proposes to reveal and analyze the components
of family strategy and consider how family strategy evolves within a dynastic business family
(Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). A family strategic management framework could
emerge from this research and supplement dynastic business family longevity research. Such a
framework could provide ground for future research on the antecedents, processes, and contexts
to develop an effective family strategy.
This theory-building study analyzes multiple dynastic families operating in different
industries and geographies, with varying levels of family involvement. Semi-structured
interviews are conducted with informed dynastic business family members or representatives
who are connected with an active ownership stake in one or more businesses. Active ownership
means continuous legal ownership of the business or businesses for a least four successive
generations of the same family lineage.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the relevant
organizational longevity and business family literatures. Next, the main extant family business
strategy literature is examined and discussed. Chapter 3 details the research design including the
suitability of the grounded theory approach for this study. Data sources and sample
characteristics are presented. This research project`s results and data analysis are presented and
discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes this project by proposing a dynastic business family
strategy conceptual framework. The theoretical and practical implications of the framework are
examined. Finally, areas of future research and the study`s limitations are outlined.
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CHAPTER 2 DYNASTIC BUSINESS FAMILIES AND FAMILY STRATEGY
To make important discoveries anywhere in science, it is necessary
not only to acquire a broad knowledge of the subject that interests
you, but also the ability to spot blank spaces in that knowledge.
Deep ignorance, when properly handled, is also a superb
opportunity (E. O. Wilson, 2013, p.177).
2.1 The Literature Review and the Grounded Theory Approach
This study uses the grounded theory approach (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss,
1967). This approach is characterized by the iterative process of data collection and data
analysis enabling the researcher to generate theoretical insights in a nonlinear fashion
(Pieper, Smith, Kudlats, and Astrachan, 2015). Importantly, the constant comparison of
emerging insights among the data with previously established findings supporting the
emergence of new concepts to build theory is distinctive to the grounded theory approach
(Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton, 2013). When undertaking a grounded theory inquiry, there
are competing scholarly views regarding the necessity of a literature review (Dunne,
2011). The root of the discord is not about the obligation to conduct a review, but rather
the review’s timing and the comprehensiveness (Dunne, 2011).
The original grounded theory school (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) opposes a literature
review prior to data collection for fear of tainting the researcher`s view of the
phenomenon under investigation (Glaser & Holton, 2004; Glaser & Holton, 2007; K.
Locke, 1996). Glaser and Holton (2007) explain, "…a good GT (Grounded Theory)
analysis starts right off with regular daily data collecting, coding and analysis. The start is
not blocked by a preconceived problem, a methods chapter or a literature review" (Glaser
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& Holton, 2007, p.57). This position holds that the researcher's "ability to generate
concepts from data and to relate them according to normal models of theory in general"
(Glaser & Holton, 2004) may be hampered by a literature review.
The alternative perspective, as espoused by Suddaby (2006), Charmaz (2014), and
(Gioia et al., 2013), is to incorporate the literature prior to entering the research field.
This perspective is employed in this project for many reasons. First, situating business
families and family strategy in the current literature provides an understanding of the
importance of family dynamics and dynastic business family longevity. Second,
reviewing prior scholarly achievements on family strategy helps identify the concept's
shortcomings, and lays the path for the value of this study. To avoid reinventing the
wheel, this literature review minimizes the odds of duplicating existing research (Dunne,
2011). Finally, to review the relevant bodies of literature is an opportunity to
contextualize the study and inform the researcher's thinking on many possible research
and interview questions (Charmaz, 2014).
It is unrealistic to expect human beings to enter the research setting as blank slates
devoid of prior knowledge and experiences (Suddaby, 2006). Doing a literature review
does not imply that prior conceptions equate preconceptions (LaRossa, 2005). The
literature review is not meant as a cognitive straight jacket limiting creativity to
predetermined ideas and hypotheses. But, keeping biases in check is needed as "some
combination of knowing and not knowing amounts to another fine balancing act that
allows for discovery without reinventing the well-ridden wheels" (Gioia et al., 2013).
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2.2 Dynastic Longevity
Dynasty describes "a) a succession of rulers of the same line of descent; or b) a
powerful group or family that maintains its position for a considerable time" (MerriamWebster, 2015). The key ideas linked to a dynasty are successive leadership and a
powerful group or family acting to maintain a position for a long time. The MerriamWebster dictionary defines longevity as characteristic of a long life span (MerriamWebster, 2015). For dynasty and longevity, the Merriam-Webster dictionary does not
quantify "a considerable time" or "a long lifespan." But the consensus from both
definitions is that to attain the status of dynasty takes time and power to effect one`s
position.
An organizational entity that persists beyond one hundred years is potentially
exhibiting dynastic longevity. According to Daepp et al. (2015), it is very rare for a firm
to survive beyond one hundred years, and statistically impossible to do so beyond two
hundred years. Yet, current evidence suggests it is possible (Hénokiens, 2015). A case in
point is the international association of Henokiens, which has a membership of 44
bicentenary family controlled companies. One of its members, Fabrica d'Armi Pietro
Beretta, is a manufacturer of finely crafted firearms whose family control dates back to
the 15th century. Below, the relevant organizational longevity literature is reviewed,
which provides partial explanations for entities surviving beyond 100 years.
The term dynasty is applied to political (Dal Bó, Dal Bó, and Snyder, 2009;
Feinstein, 2010), royal and noble (Schama, 1986), artistic (Geiringer, 1954), and dynastic
business families. The family business literature assigns the dynasty label to family firms
after the successful transfer of the family ownership to the fourth generation (Jaffe &
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Lane, 2004; Sjogren, 2011). The family business literature is generally biased toward
anchoring a family dynasty with the existence of a single-family business. Landes (2006)
defined a family business dynasty as one that has undergone at least three successive
generations of family control. Another family business dynasty definition refers to the
structure of a multi-generational family keeping its family fortune together within a
single business or jointly owned investments (Hutcheson, Lane, and Jaffe, 2003).
Dynasting is described "as the act of building, maintaining, and growing the
power and resources of the business within the family lineage" (Loy, 2010, p.76). The
dynasting process begins at the family`s second generation at which point it qualifies as
an emerging dynasty (Loy, 2010; Sjogren, 2011). Making it to the fourth generation
labels the family as a mature dynasty (Sjogren, 2011). The dynasting process, although
not presented as such, may conceivably be a type of family strategy.
Dynasting is further reinforced by the dynastic motive. The family perceives their
firm as a capital asset as well as a symbol of their heritage, along with values and
traditions to be bequeathed (Berrone, Cruz, and Gomez-Mejia, 2012). The continuance of
a dynasty as a form of organization is commonly desired by business families (Jaffe &
Lane, 2004). From an economic modeling perspective, the dynastic motive explains that
the founder`s firm is a form of intergenerational inheritance. The firm is a savings vehicle
to preserve, not consume, the founder's life accomplishments (Casson, 1999). The
founder expects future generations to act as good stewards of his firm`s vision. A narrow
interpretation of the founder`s vision by his family heirs may limit their strategic choices
and consequently shorten the firm`s lifespan and their own finances (Casson, 1999).
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The possibility that a business family strategic management process exists or is
useful to achieve a dynastic status is non-existent in the literature. This is surprising
considering that the term dynasty entails leadership and the management of family
resources for a long time. The mix of people, resources, time, and purpose are essential
strategic elements. In a family setting, these elements raise the plausibility of a family
strategic process necessary to holistically set and keep a course, and achieve the family's
desired outcomes. Next, some of the relevant organizational longevity research is
highlighted identifying explanatory factors for long-term survival.
2.2.1 The concept of organizational longevity.
Longevity concerns what makes things live or last longer, or longer than
expected. Organizational longevity does not imply immortality; rather, longevity refers to
organizational durability or continuance (Montuori, 2000). The organization is viewed as
a living entity subjected to environmental changes. The length of time an organization
remains in existence defines organizational longevity. Therefore, the organization has
starting and ending points.
The birth and death of an organization is the subject of much scholarly debate
about what constitutes the moments of formation and termination (Mayfield, Mayfield,
and Stephens, 2007). For example, does the organization die upon dissolution,
bankruptcy, or industry exit? Does an organization leaving an industry to enter a new one
result in death and a rebirth? The lack of definitional consensus on organizational
longevity has given rise to multiple streams of literature, to name a few, dealing with
organizational persistence, failure, mortality, death, decline, retrenchment, downsizing,
survival, and failure (DeTienne, Shepherd, and De Castro, 2008; Mellahi & Wilkinson,
15
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2004). The concept of longevity is not always clear cut. The issue of what is persisting or
lasting can be ambiguous (Akin, 2000). Is it a human life, values, identities, a legal entity,
a brand, or the organization's internal workings that serve as a unit of analysis to assess
organizational longevity (Krell, 2000)? Importantly, the organizational longevity
literature overlooks the family as a subject.
There is no single perspective unifying the business longevity literature
(Napolitano et al., 2015). There is disagreement on which variables are appropriate to
assess longevity. Multiple variables such as industry sector, company size and age,
institutional, cultural, and historical contexts were examined and found to produce
inconsistent results (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004).
Performance and survival are understood as distinct constructs (Meyer & Zucker,
1989). A surviving organization does not imply a high level of economic performance or
competitive outperformance. Contrary to the laws of the marketplace, underperforming
organizations can persist for long periods of time. Organizational persistence is studied
primarily in younger organizations and the entrepreneur level. For instance, looking at the
survival of new ventures, Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, and Woo (1997) advance the thesis that
firm-specific performance thresholds, influenced by the entrepreneur`s human capital,
determine the entrepreneur`s exit. What does this mean? If the threshold is low, can the
firm persist, despite below-industry performance? In the case of a new business, the firm
performance thresholds are influenced by the characteristics of the entrepreneur`s formal
education, previous entrepreneurial experience, psychic income derived from
entrepreneurship, and his or her switching costs between the venture and alternate
employment. In an experimental research design, De Tienne, Shepherd, and De Castro
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(2008) explored the factors that contribute to small high-tech entrepreneurs' decisions to
persist with a failing organization. The authors found that the entrepreneurs' diversity of
extrinsic motivations, in terms of personal investment, collective efficacy and previous
organizational success, result in different performance thresholds for business exit.
Persistence research reinforces the view that organizational survival has many individual
and organizational dimensions. However, the persistence research has yet to focus on
family and its attributes, like age or family membership, as important characteristics
influencing organizational longevity. Therefore, studying family strategy in dynastic
business families may add to our knowledge of organizational persistence and ways for
assessing organizational longevity.
2.2.2 Organizational factors influencing longevity.
This review shows strategy is not just a plan or a perspective, but also an
ensemble of integrative mechanisms supporting organizational longevity directly or
indirectly. The longevity literature reviewed gravitates around integrative mechanisms
dealing with vision, socialization, adaptation, and structures. Strategy relates "to the longterm prospects of the company and has a critical influence on its success or failure"
(Agarwal & Helfat, 2009, p. 281). However, strategic mechanisms are studied principally
at the firm level.
Strategy connects a firm's vision to resources and capabilities, and increases its
longevity. According to Bonn (2000), a significant positive relationship exists between
the use of a formal strategic planning system and the manufacturer’s survival. Although
the planning process was dynamic and provided long-term organizational direction, its
effectiveness was dependent on being fully integrated with the management process, the
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organization`s culture and structure, and aligned with its information, control, and
incentive systems (Bonn, 2000). Unfortunately, the author did not analyze the sample on
the basis of manufacturers' age, or whether or not business families owned them. Such
sample distinctions could have offered additional contextual insights regarding the
strength and relevance of the planning system and longevity relationship.
Applying the Miles and Snow (1978) organizational strategy typology to firms in
the U.S. comic book industry, Mayfield and Mayfield (2007) found generic strategy types
affect firm longevity. A Defender strategy was associated with greater longevity, whereas
a Reactor strategy was linked to a shorter lifespan. The current family strategy literature
does not have a comparable strategic orientation typology, which limits our
understanding regarding the possible relationships between family strategy types and
business family longevity.
Studying the city of Rome, Carmeli and Markman (2011) posited that the citystate, as one of the longest-lasting organizational systems in world history, could provide
critical insights about organizational resilience and longevity. Organizational resilience is
defined as "the maintenance of positive adjustment under challenging conditions such
that the organization emerges from those conditions strengthened and more resourceful"
(Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 3418). The authors argued that Rome achieved such great
organizational longevity because of the ongoing and methodological pursuit of capture
and governance strategies combined with their supporting tactics. The pursuit of
territorial expansion relates to capture strategy. On the other hand, management and
administrative oversight before, during, and after expansionary activities involved
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governance strategy. Balancing these two strategies represents a form of organizational
ambidexterity (Carmeli & Markman, 2011).
It appears that organizational resilience and ambidexterity are connected as forms
of social adaptation to environmental change that is necessary for organizational
longevity (Penrose, 1952). Family and organizational resilience might be linked in a
family strategy theory. Although not yet theoretically connected, such a link may offer
valuable business family longevity insights by untangling the social complexities of
managing environmental change within the overlapping family, business family, and
business systems (Von Schlippe and Frank, 2013).
Organizational ambidexterity is defined as "the ability to simultaneously pursue
both incremental and discontinuous innovation results from hosting multiple
contradictory structures, processes, and cultures within the same firm" (Tushman &
O'Reilly, 1996, p. 24). It is required for long-term firm survival (March, 1991). O`Reilly
and Tushman (2013) reinforce that the capability to be ambidextrous is necessary to
ensure firm longevity. However, environmental dynamism, the amount of temporal
overlap between explorative and exploitative activities, and strategic fit are likely to
moderate the impact of organizational ambidexterity on longevity (Kim & Huh, 2015;
Piao, 2010).
Organizational learning is a multilevel mechanism that positively influences
organizational longevity (Montuori, 2000). The types of learning that are characterized
by the flows of knowledge and the leadership of the organization`s abilities to detect and
correct errors affect organizational learning (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). Montuori (2000)
argued that the fittest organizations treat longevity as a superordinate goal and claim a
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vast repertoire of cognitive skills, of which conceptual complexity is particularly
important. Conceptual complexity refers to individuals' ability to discriminate and
integrate multidimensional information (Montuori, 2000). Organizational leadership,
composed of individuals with much conceptual complexity, becomes adept at
distinguishing the relevance, significance, and meaningfulness of environmental cues in
order to extend longevity.
De Geus (1997) identified a sample of thirty 100-year-plus-old and large global
"living companies" who were particularly adept at managing change. Living companies
have traits of financial conservatism, environmental sensitivity, self-awareness in terms
of their identity and sense of community, and a great tolerance for new ideas. Living
companies favor organizational learning to facilitate adaptation and evolution in the face
of continuous change (de Geus, 1997). To improve their ability to exploit environmental
opportunities, de Geus (1997) found these companies are composed of mobile and
cohesive groups embedded with innovative individuals and social systems enabling the
propagation of innovation throughout the organization. Living companies' processes
aligned with the organizational development recommendations of Montuori (2000) to
implement a system capturing organizational and environmental interactions, to promote
an organizational culture of continuous and participatory improvement, and to develop
conceptually complex leaders. Learning organizations behave with strategic consistence,
while being environmentally responsive and organizationally respectful, to positively
affect organizational survival (Lamberg, Tikkanen, Nokelainen, and Suur‐Inkeroinen,
2009).
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2.2.3 Family business and longevity.
Family business longevity is different, possibly more complex, than (nonfamily)
business longevity (Gimeno, Baulenas, and Coma-Cros, 2010; Lambrecht & Lievens,
2008). From a systems perspective, family businesses, unlike non-family firms, contend
with unique strains from possibly competing goals, different functional and dominant
logics, lifecycle stages, and values between the family and business systems (Gersick,
1997; Von Schlippe & Frank, 2013). Family and business life beyond the first generation
of cousins is challenged as family altruism benefits may be overrun by growing agency
costs resulting from family complexity (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz, 2001;
Zellweger, Kammerlander, and forthcoming, 2015). Going from the third generation to
the fourth generation and beyond often means that for a family to become a dynasty it
may need to rely less on informality and more on structure to formalize familial bonds
(Jaffe & Lane, 2004). The extant family business literature is focused on family business
structures and attributes, and less so on family dynamics to explain dynastic business
family longevity.
Longevity may be viewed as an orientation held by the family (Lumpkin &
Brigham, 2011). To endure for a long time, the controlling family of a firm integrates a
long-term orientation as its dominant logic (Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011). Lumpkin and
Brigham (2011) defined a long-term orientation (LTO) as "the tendency to prioritize the
long range implications and impact of decisions and actions that come to fruition after an
extended time period (greater than 5 years)" (Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011, p. 1152). Longterm orientation is linked to superior financial performance and competitive advantages
for long-lived family firms (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005).

21

22
According to Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005), a long-term orientation is made
up of three dimensions: the first is futurity reflecting the family`s belief that planning,
forecasting, and evaluating the relationship between today`s actions and future outcomes;
the second is continuity, expressed as the shared history, beliefs, relationships, and
aspirations; and the third dimension is perseverance. Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005)
as well as Lumpkin and Brigham (2011) raised the importance of planning and
forecasting as a strategic function within the family firm, but not within the family.
Although not explicated through a family strategy, dynastic business families seem to
integrate a long-term orientation in many of their activities (Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011).
Are the beliefs underpinning a long-term orientation transmitted through a family
strategy creating and reinforcing a dynastic family identity or logic (Ashforth & Mael,
1996; Obloj, Obloj, & Pratt, 2010)?
The history, traditions and lifecycle of the family are represented in the business
family (Habbershon, Williams, and MacMillan, 2003). These family values, explicitly
stated or implicitly expressed by family member behaviors, are integral to business
family long-term survival (Sorenson, 2013). The business family is encouraged to
mobilize concerted communication efforts to preserve family values and family identity
(Sorenson, 2013). These communication efforts can converge through formal and
informal family governance vehicles (Suess, 2014). The family composition, structure,
and purpose of these family governance entities are explicated in the literature (Suess,
2014), but not the embedded strategic processes that establish and maintain them.
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Koiranen (2002) examined the relationship between values and the survival of
greater-than-century-old Finnish family firms (Koiranen, 2002). The author offers three
types of values definitions:
Business values are explicit or implicit conceptions of the desirable in business.
As shared beliefs, these desired end-states underlie the attitudinal and behavioral
processes of those involved in business…Family values are explicit or implicit
conceptions of the desirable in family life. As shared beliefs, these desired endstates underlie the attitudinal and behavioral processes of family
members…Family business values are explicit or implicit conceptions of the
desirable in both family and business life. Given that there are often conflicts of
interest between the two realms (business and family goals), family business
values should be defined and shared so that they create a common ground for a
durable value system that benefits both realms (Koiranen, 2002, p.177).

Values are stable over the long term and demonstrate what is important at the firm and
family levels (Koiranen, 2002). Values influence families' strategic choices; they
prioritize goals, which facilitates family and business decision-making; and increases
stakeholder commitment to company goals when shared (Koiranen, 2002). A family
strategy may exist to reconcile the potential conflicts between the family and business
realms creating a common ground for a durable and integrated value system.
The positive association between values and Finnish family business longevity
(Koiranen, 2002) also prevails in the context of Spanish, French, and Italian long-lived
family firms (Tàpies & Moya, 2012). Social and cultural frameworks influence family
business values (Tàpies & Moya, 2012). On the basis of their literature review and
empirical research, Tàpies and Moya (2012) argue that values are a most difficult
resource to imitate (Habbershon, Williams, and MacMillan, 2003) whereby conferring a
longevity advantage to the family firm. The longevity advantage becomes a strategic
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asset countering the argument that time brings organizational inertia undermining
strategic renewal and precipitating eventual decline.
Interestingly, Tàpies and Moya (2012) proposed a new classification of values
according to their contribution to longevity. Table 1 summarizes the longevity values
classification.
Table 1 Classification of Values According to Longevity Contribution
Value
Group

Value Contribution Type

Representative Values

Values contributing to family cohesion

Respect, loyalty, honesty,
reputation

Group 2

Values contributing to firm`s
sustainability

Group 3

Values allowing transmission of core
values

Entrepreneurship,
excellence, hard work,
prudence, quality,
profitability
Social responsibility,
accountability,
transparency, stewardship

Group 1

Source: adapted from Tàpies & Moya (2012).
Values are connected to strategy (Collis & Rukstad, 2008). However, the link between
values, and particularly different types of values, and family strategy remains unexplored.
How can different types of values be used to generate a classification of family
strategies?
2.2.3.1 Family business entrepreneurship and longevity
Entrepreneurship is ubiquitous in the family business literature (Aldrich & Cliff,
2003). This literature considers entrepreneurship via many conceptions including
transgenerational entrepreneurship (Habbershon, Nordqvist, and Zellweger, 2010) and
family entrepreneurial orientation (Zellweger et al., 2012), entrepreneurial exploration
and exploitation (Goel & Jones, 2016), entrepreneurial orientation (Zellweger & Sieger,
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2012), and entrepreneurial legacy (Jaskiewicz, Combs, and Rau, 2015). These various
dimensions of entrepreneurship are presented or implied as a necessary fuel for family
business longevity.
Entrepreneurship encompasses the identification of opportunities to explore and
then exploit, possibly leading to some value creating and sustainable business
propositions (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Transgenerational entrepreneurship is
defined as "the processes through which a family uses and develops entrepreneurial
mindsets and family influenced resources and capabilities to create new streams of
entrepreneurial, financial and social value across generations" (Habbershon et al., 2010,
p. 1). Mindsets are the attitudes, values, and beliefs that orient a person or a group toward
action (Zellweger et al., 2012). Family Entrepreneurial Orientation (FEO) refers to a
business family's mindset to engage in entrepreneurial activity as measured by the
attributes of the family and entrepreneurship (Zellweger et al., 2012). The non-validated
FEO scale attempts to capture the family attributes of interdependency, security, control,
stability, and tradition with those of the firm`s Entrepreneurial Orientation attributes, and
items related to resources and the formality of strategizing (Zellweger et al., 2012).
There is strong evidence of transgenerational entrepreneurial activity undertaken
by business families beyond their core (i.e., initial or largest) company (Michael-Tsabari,
Labaki, and Zachary, 2014; Zellweger et al., 2012). A business family with a family
entrepreneurial orientation operates a portfolio of business activities. Rearrangements of
elements within the portfolio of businesses are positioned as advancing the family`s
global wealth position over many generations. The family level processes or thresholds
guiding the business families' decision-making to divest, close, or enter new businesses
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are unexplored (Wennberg, Wiklund, DeTienne, and Cardon, 2010). The
transgenerational entrepreneurship view underpins a rationale to consider the family as a
superior level of analysis, compared with the firm level that allows one to follow and
measure the longevity of a business family (Zellweger et al., 2012).
Jaskiewicz, Combs, and Rau (2015) advance the theory that entrepreneurial
legacy nurtures transgenerational entrepreneurship, which supports business family
longevity. A family firm's entrepreneurial legacy is comprised of "narratives that
reconstruct the family's past entrepreneurial achievements or resilience" (Jaskiewicz et
al., 2015, p. 45) created by an imprinting process. The process of legacy building within
the business family requires many decades to take root and stay rooted.
The many facets of entrepreneurship discussed above are connected to strategy,
which influences organizational longevity (Carmeli & Markman, 2011; Mayfield &
Mayfield, 2007). Transgenerational entrepreneurship and Family Entrepreneurial
Orientation are concepts addressing the opportunity of linking business family dynamics
and longevity. Transgenerational entrepreneurship concerns family-level entrepreneurial
activities and processes to create new family wealth over multiple generations.
Transgenerational entrepreneurship assumes the presence of processes to use and develop
family resources and capabilities to generate new business family-level entrepreneurial,
financial, and social outcomes (Zellweger et al., 2012). However, missing is robust
knowledge about these processes, which could be some type of family-level strategizing.
Strategizing refers to "the detailed processes and practices which constitute the
day-to-day activities of organization life and which relate to strategic outcomes"
(Johnson, Melin, and Whittington, 2003, p. 14). Strategizing is essentially the work of
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making strategy and designing organizations (Whittington, 2003). These processes and
practices were studied in boards (Hendry, Kiel, and Nicholson, 2010), and family
businesses at the firm level (Nordqvist, 2005, 2012), but not within dynastic business
families.
2.3 Family Definition Overview
The business family is the focal unit of analysis for the present study. Before
proceeding to the business family discussion, the concept of family is reviewed,
particularly as the family business literature encourages researchers to draw more from
family theory to better understand family`s influence on business (Dyer & Dyer, 2009).
Given the interdependence between the family and business spheres (Zachary, 2011), we
cannot grasp all of the family and family business relationship dimensions without
delving deeper into the family (Sharma, Melin, & Nordqvist, 2014).
What is family? The notion of family is complex and its many meanings have
evolved from the pre-industrial to post-industrial periods (Rothausen, 1999). Social
change has reshaped family from being synonymous with household to now consider
household and kin as distinct constructs (Rothausen, 1999). As offered by Levin (1999),
family relates to a social group that is biologically, legally, and emotionally connected.
Furthermore, Levin (1992) argues there is no consensus on the definition of family, but
offers support to the idea that family can be framed in terms of dyadic units. Family can
be defined in terms of the spousal unit (co-habitation unit) and the parent-child unit
(Trost, 1988). Today, the notion of family requires the inclusion of the effects of
globalization and multiculturalism (Rothausen, 1999).
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The diverse types of families may or may not include relations from marriage,
biology, affection, obligation, dependence, or cooperation (Rothausen, 1999). Such a
perspective provides for the possibilities of complex familial arrangements such as
separated or divorced spousal units, reconstituted families, shared parental custody, and
the scope of extended family. The result of this diversity is the ensuing organizational
complexity at the individual and group levels (Kepner, 1983).
2.3.1 Family needs and goals.
The structure, function, and transaction perspectives sees family as a social
system tasked with caring for its members' needs (Kepner, 1983). Need is defined as a
"situation or condition of an individual the non-realization of which leads to undesirable
consequences" (Doherty & Colangelo, 1984, p.20). These social and emotional needs
include the sense of belonging, intimacy, identity and autonomy, and survival (Kepner,
1983; Levine & Moreland, 2006). The family`s pursuit of goals to nurture, develop, and
support its own drive individual and group behaviors (Dyer, 2003).
Goals are foundational to human motivation, and individual and organizational
performance (Locke & Latham, 2002). Goals are "internal representations of desired
states, where states are broadly construed as outcomes, events, or processes" (Austin &
Vancouver, 1996, p. 338) that are shaped at the individual, group, and organizational
levels (Unsworth, Yeo, and Beck, 2014). Family goal diversity emanates from projects
and tasks, and those higher-level abstract goals reflecting its values, culture, and identity
as embraced by its members (Chulef, Read, and Walsh, 2001). As much as goals are
"internal representations of desired states," they require prioritization and alignment
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between the individuals and family to allocate the finite stock of resources and time
available to goal attainment (Unsworth et al., 2014).
Pursuing the attainment of goals, which is part of goal-setting theory, requires
commitment to the goals (Locke, Latham, and Erez, 1988). Goal commitment depends on
the extent to which achieving the goal or goals are perceived by the individual(s) or
group(s) as attractive and achievable (Klein, Wesson, Hollenbeck, and Alge, 1999). In
the case of the business owning family, the goal-setting process is likely more complex,
due to the dualities between family and business systems (Tagiuri & Davis, 1996).
Dualities are, for example, the contradictions arising from the simultaneous roles
occupied by a family member in the family business system. For example, an individual,
who is president of the family firm and also mother to three children who are also her
employees, can be confronted with many conflicting decisions; the choice of mindset that
prevails in decision-making is a much-debated topic (e.g., parent-child or employeremployee).
The family and its members` financial and non-financial goals characterize the
family business`s goal set (Kotlar & De Massis, 2013). As the dominant coalition within
the family business through ownership, governance, and management, family has nonfinancial goals, which weigh on firm behavior and performance (Gomez-Mejia, Cruz,
Berrone, and De Castro, 2011). Family centered non-financial goals include autonomy
and control, family cohesiveness, harmony, sense of belonging, family name recognition
and social status, and the intent to perpetuate the family dynasty (Zellweger, Nason,
Nordqvist, and Brush, 2013).
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The family business goal-setting literature remains focused on the business`s
perspective in a single family-single business configuration through multiple theoretical
lenses. This is the case of a theoretical model, proposed by Zellweger et al. (2013) using
organizational identity. The authors suggest that the family`s desire for visibility in the
family firm, the family`s transgenerational sustainability intentions, and the firm`s ability
to self-enhance reputation of family together push the firm to pursue family centered nonfinancial goals. Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, and Barnett (2012) examined how the
interaction between transgenerational family control intentions and family commitment
influenced the adoption of family centered non-financial goals in the family firm. Their
empirical research on small family firms used the behavioral theory of the firm and the
stakeholder theory to explain goal diversity in the firm and the family`s power and
legitimacy to influence family centered non-financial goals (Chrisman et al., 2012).
Although still focused on family centered goals in the family firm, Kotlar and De Massis
(2013) offered a process view of goal setting in family firms. Importantly, their
qualitative study of small and medium Italian family firms identified, given firm goal
diversity, distinct professional and familial social interactions to achieve a collective
commitment to family centered firm goals (Kotlar & De Massis, 2013). The observation
of familial social interactions in the firm`s goal-setting process, displayed in non-firm
settings, offers evidence that a distinct owning family goal formulation process may exist
and may require further investigation in configurations beyond the single family-single
business type.
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2.3.2 Family as a form of organization.
Following McGrath`s (1997) conception of groups as complex adaptive systems,
family is an ongoing system embedded with processes to create meaning, manage group
conflict and consensus, and motivate, regulate and coordinate member behavior. All of
these group means are developed and exploited to simultaneously accomplish the
family`s projects, fulfill the members` needs, and preserve the family`s group intactness
(McGrath, 1997). Group effectiveness or functionality is sensitive to balancing individual
attributes, needs and roles and the group`s goals (McGrath, 1997). The inability to
achieve balance between needs, goals, and resources is a source of stress, conflict, and
resentment (McGrath, 1997) undermining the family`s effectiveness (Dyer & Dyer,
2009). This balancing act evolves as the family adapts along its life course trajectory
from formation to metamorphosis into related and extended families all the while dealing
with internal and external transitions and disruptions (Mayer, 2009).
Family disruptions may rise and intensify over generations as the value of
altruism diminishes in time and erodes familial bonds (Schulze et al., 2001). Expectations
about roles and responsibilities, individual and family goals among family members are
often unknown or misunderstood because of poor communication (Botero, Gomez
Betancourt, Betancourt Ramirez, & Lopez Vergara, 2015). If not cultivated, the sense of
loyalty and commitment of family members to the family`s welfare, characteristic of
altruism, is replaced with antipathy, hate, and jealousy, and eventual disintegration of the
family unit and the family firm (Dyer, 2003).
From the purview of this literature review, there seem to be many elements
present in this literature stream linked to the concept of strategy. These include purpose,
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multiple goals, resources, timelines, relationship networks, individual members with
roles, skills, needs, and responsibilities, individual and group choices and decisions, to
name a few (Collis & Rukstad, 2008). Including the unique family dimensions of
intimacy and altruism, family has also many organizational attributes. For example, over
time, a family may evolve into multiple family branches. Each family branch can
represent many households spanning multiple generations entailing work to operate as
one consolidated organization. How and if all of these organizational elements compose a
family strategy within dynastic business families remain part of the discovery process.
2.4 Business family definitions.
As a result of family businesses' success, families start to perceive themselves as
business families and less as family businesses (Steier et al., 2015). Business success
generates financial capital, as well as family social and human capital, which can be used
to create multiple family-multiple business configurations (Michael-Tsabari, Labaki, and
Zachary, 2014) to include indirect family financial securities and holdings (Zellweger et
al., 2012), and socially oriented activities like philanthropy (Rey-Garcia & Puig-Raposo,
2013). The multiplicity of family activities may satisfy family members` need for
inclusion because of multiple participation opportunities. This change in the family`s
conception of self has important implications for how the family governs itself (Steier et
al., 2015). For example, the issues of longevity, succession, financial distributions, and
performance are no longer solely attributed to a single-family business, but rather to the
business family (Habbershon & Pistrui, 2002; Zellweger et al., 2015; Zellweger et al.,
2012).

32

33
According to Uhlaner (2006), a business family refers to a family subgroup
composed of individuals from the family, who either own or work in the same business
enterprise, including family members in paid or unpaid positions and governance roles on
the family council or board of directors. By drawing from the team and group dynamics
literatures (Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, and Gilson, 2008), business
family is specified as a type of team (Uhlaner, 2006). It is argued that effective business
families are similar to teams because within the family unit they have shared values and
norms, clear roles and procedures exist, and there are conflict resolution mechanisms
(Uhlaner, 2006). The business family acts as the go-between for the family (inclusive of
non-business-related family members) and its various business and non-commercial
endeavors (Uhlaner, 2006, 2008).
The business family is the controlling family unit, by virtue of the business
family`s legal ownership of the family`s financial interests, of the larger family business
social system (Habbershon et al., 2003). Business families decide and oversee the
family`s entry into and exit from various business activities (Salvato et al., 2010). They
are tasked with encouraging and managing the entrepreneurial activities of family
members (Steier et al., 2015). The involvement of numerous family members, and in
some cases even several non-blood-related families (Pieper, Smith, Kudlats, and
Astrachan, 2015) in multiple related and unrelated activities increases organizational
complexity because of the array of goals, strategy, and structure combinations (Steier et
al., 2015).
Steier et al. (2015) classified business families in terms of a mindset continuum.
At one end of the continuum, there are business families with the family-in-business
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mindset and on the other end of the continuum there are those with the family-as-investor
mindset. The result is a business family-with-strategy mindset continuum. The family-asinvestor mindset defines the enterprising families' domain (Habbershon & Pistrui, 2002).
Enterprising families are represented by the family ownership group and they are
committed to transgenerational wealth creation, which is shown to be a function of a
family based competitive advantage (Habbershon et al., 2003). The family based
competitive advantage is characterized by the stock of resources and capabilities
generated by the distinct social interactions within the family business` subsystems:
family unit, business, and individual members (Habbershon et al., 2003a). Enterprising
activities may extend beyond a single firm focus (Zellweger et al., 2012). Long-term
wealth is created because the family favors an entrepreneurial strategy focused on
creative renewal to generate Schumpeterian rents (Habbershon & Pistrui, 2002).
In the case of the family-in-business mindset, Habbershon and Pistrui (2002)
argued the family has a more single firm view exploiting a managerial strategy focused
on extracting more rent from firm efficiencies, which may be less favorable to
transgenerational wealth creation. Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2015) suggested that a
single-family firm, single-industry focus does not necessarily undermine
transgenerational wealth creation potential since certain industry-specific characteristics
(e.g., as in arts-related industries) demand the business family maintain a family-inbusiness mindset.
For this study, business family includes family members inside and outside of the
business family group as defined by Uhlaner (2006). Inside family members share in the
ownership and management responsibilities of all family interests. Outside family
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members are connected to the inside family members but not via the family interests'
ownership and/or management structures. A broad definition of business family is
required given the exploratory nature of this research. To understand the components and
processes of family strategy demands information from multiple family member
perspectives. Also, the current literature offers a static view of business family
composition. Changes in business family group membership need further consideration
since family ownership and leadership succession is dealt principally within a singlefamily firm context in extant literature.
2.4.1 Dynastic business families.
Dynastic business families are the focus of the present study. A dynastic business
family is one where a multi-generational family keeps its family fortune intact within a
single business or through several jointly owned investments (Hutcheson, Lane, and
Jaffe, 2003). The term dynastic business family is mixed with other business-owning
family types like enterprising families and wealthy families (Zellweger, Nason, and
Nordqvist, 2012). The current views of the business family are principally focused on the
influence of the owning family and its resource attributes on the family business
(Habbershon, Williams, and MacMillan, 2003; Klein, Astrachan, and Smyrnios, 2005;
Moores, 2009).
Until now, as presented in Table 2, the dynastic business family literature
emphasizes the intergenerational transfer of the family firm from the founder to his or her
heirs. Multiple terms are used to describe the various phases and dynamics of family
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business dynasties. These dynastic phases are categorized as conception, development,
attainment, decline, and renewal stages2.
Table 2 Key Business Family Dynastic Terms by Dynastic Phase
Dynastic Phases

Terms
Dynastic
orientation

Conception

Dynastic
control
Dynastic
succession
and intention

Dynastic
motive

Dynastic
management
Development

Dynasting
Dynastic
ambition

Dynasty

Attainment
Dynasty
Emerging
Type

Dynasty
Fully Mature
Type

Definitions
"Entrepreneur`s drive and effort to move his family into a social status and more
secure economic situation whereby creating a tendency to cause the individual
to take a long run view and to acquire assets not necessary for his own short run
personal satisfaction" (Cramer & Leathers, 1981, p.754755) citing Schumpeter
J., Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.
"…over a firm is when its main controlling owner garners intentions to bequeath
control to her heirs when she retires" (Bach, 2016, p.1).
Renewal of family bonds to the firm through dynastic succession: the fifth
dimension of Social Emotional Wealth referring to the intention of handing the
business down to future generations (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012).
"…postulates the inheritance, in the form of the firm, is construed not as
something that future generations are intended to consume, but as something
that they are intended to preserve intact and transmit onward. Future generations
are conceived as stewards of their inheritance, and are under a duty to conserve
it, and if necessary enhance it, but without substantially changing its form"
(Casson, 1999, p.17).
"Private-sector and non-meritocratic practice of the inter-generational
transmission of managerial responsibilities in family firms" (Caselli &
Gennaioli, 2013, p.1).
"as the act of building, maintaining, and growing the power and resources of the
business within the family lineage" (Loy, 2010, p.76).
A dynamic leading to family business institutions and ongoing involvement
among family members while limiting the dispersal of the fortune among
children (Gilding, 2005).
•
A powerful group or family that maintains its position for a considerable
time (Merriam-Webster, 2015).
•
A family or a group of relatives has over the generations succeeded in first
obtaining and then maintaining a dominant position in some regard
(Sjogren, 2011).
•
"An organization understood as the evolution across generations of two
parallel structures that become meshed in complex ways…with extended
family relationships held together by a strongly sustained collective
memory and represented in the parallel structure of wealth by a calculus of
shares … to commit descendants to the wealth" (Marcus, 1985, p. 232).
•
Less than four continuous family ownership generations of a firm.
•
At least one of family controlled companies must be of sufficient size to be
considered a worldwide leader in its industry.
•
Family's views can influence the social and political agendas of their
country (Sjogren, 2011).
•
Less than four continuous family ownership generations of a firm.
•
At least one of family controlled companies must be of sufficient size to be
considered a worldwide leader in its industry.
•
Family's views can influence the social and political agendas of their
country (Sjogren, 2011).

2

The word phases is used to highlight the idea that these states are not necessarily a progression from one
state to the next, but rather they can go from one phase to the next and back, with some phases never being
experienced.
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Decline

Dynastic
Dissolution

Renewal

Dynastic
Renewal

"Dissolution of the organization of fortune and family… in the gradual
decoupling of particular ancestral businesses from instruments of concentrated
patrimonial capital, and eventually, the autonomy or expiration of such
instruments in relation to the family relations which they have organized"
(Marcus, 1985, p.233).

•

Undefined, but applied in the context of family firm succession process
(Woodman, 2016).

Source: Own
At the dynastic conception phase, the literature suggests there is some type of
rational choice made by the entrepreneur that goes beyond creating something new and
making a profit. Thereafter, it appears the entrepreneur`s dynastic choice or goal is
transformed into some business family strategy to actualize the necessary steps ensuring
the entwinement of family and fortune. The end result is continued family financial
security and perhaps a higher social class. There is a mix of disjointed ideas regarding
control of assets, related organizational entities with keeping the family together, and
stewardship. It is not clear that an entrepreneur ever begins his or her business journey
with the intent of becoming a dynasty.
In the dynastic development phase, the dynastic concepts present in the literature
attempt to circumscribe practices and dynamics connected to the ascent, the attainment,
and maintenance of being dynastic. Dynastic attainment refers to some type of
organizational finality achieved as a combination of business family control, social
influence, and economic position. The dynastic decline phase describes a state where the
family and fortune mesh dissolves because of family-level dysfunctionality (Marcus,
1985).
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The dynastic phases proposed in Table 2 do not posit a linear relationship
between phases. These phases are offered as means to locate the dynastic terminology
into simplified categories. The timing and degree of overlap between these various
phases requires further theoretical development and empirical validation.
In his analysis of Swedish business dynasties, Sjogren (2011) suggests that a
family becomes dynastic once a firm remains in familial control for at least four
generations. Furthermore, to retain the dynastic label, the family must have continuous
control of a business with global leadership status, the family through its various
enterprises becomes a large employer influencing labor markets, and the family has
sufficient influence to affect a government`s economic and social policies. Swedish
family dynasties are grouped as emerging or fully mature (Sjogren, 2011). Emerging
family dynasties have yet to reach the criterion of four successive generations, but fulfill
the other dynastic requirements.
The dynastic business family definition espoused by Sjogren (2011) is interesting
and useful for this research, as being dynastic comprises many dimensions. These
dimensions include an evolution of the family's dynastic business status, the family`s
significant social and economic positions and influences, and the family's continuous
control of these positions. These dimensions may be useful to develop a dynastic business
family typology, which currently does not exist in the family business literature.
Classifying dynastic business families may help uncover the presence, components, and
applications of a family strategy. Section 3.4 of this dissertation delineates the dynastic
business family definition used for this study.
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2.4.2 Dynastic business families and family governance.
Becoming and continuing a dynastic business family implies the presence of
multiple family members spanning many generations with multiple goals (Sjogren,
2011). Such increased organizational complexity requires institutions and mechanisms to
coordinate and control individual and family needs and interests over time (Jaffe & Lane,
2004). According to Steier et al. (2015) and Suess (2014), family governance
encompasses the set of institutions and practices from which dynastic business families
develop and employ to manage the heterogeneity of family stakeholders, of family goals,
of family interests, and institutional and industrial contexts.
Following are a few examples of dynastic business families who adopted some
type of family governance. The Koç Group of Turkey, which was founded in 1917,
established a family council in the early 1970s to discuss the group`s strategies and
environmental turbulence at the family level (Colpan & Jones, 2014). The Bonnier
family, an eighth-generation Swedish media dynasty founded in 1837, periodically
assembles family and relatives to discuss leadership issues at the holding company level
(Schwass, 2003; Sjogren, 2011). The Wallenberg dynasty, which started in 1837, uses
their family council as an informational forum, a family bonding opportunity, and a
recruitment platform for future family leaders (Lindgren, 2002; Sjogren, 2011). The
Mulliez family of France created a for-profit family association, which counts in excess
of 500 family shareholders. The association, founded in 1955, was created in part to
protect the founder`s multigenerational succession plan and also to oversee the diverse
portfolio of global economic interests, to finance business venturing, to establish and
communicate entry and exit rules into the family association, and to formalize the
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education path of the family`s youth (Bennedsen & Foss, 2015; Wikipedia, 2015). These
examples provide consistent evidence of the community of practice theory, which serves
to explain how family members learn about the many facets of business family continuity
(Konopaski, Jack, and Hamilton, 2015).
Governance, as generally applied to a business` board of directors, determines
"the broad uses to which organizational resources will be deployed and the resolution of
conflicts among the myriad participants in organizations (Daily, Dalton, and Cannella,
2003, p.371)." In their review of business groups' corporate governance, Colli and Colpan
(2015, p.6) define corporate governance as "the way in which corporations are owned,
controlled and coordinated and set their goals." In the case of family governance, Suess
(2014) defines governance as "the voluntary mechanisms established by the business
family with the primary aim of governing and strengthening relations between the family
and the business, as well as the relationships between the members of the business family
itself" (Suess, 2014, p.139). Corporate governance is obligatory, contractual and
institutional, whereas family governance is voluntary and relational (Mustakallio, Autio,
and Zahra, 2002). There are no external institutions mandating the family to organize and
manage family governance.
Family governance institutions include the more formal family council, the family
protocol, the family constitution and less formal family meetings (Suess, 2014; Uhlaner,
2006). Table 3 provides a brief description of the principal family governance
institutions.
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Table 3 Family Governance Institutions
Family
governance
institution
Family
council

Type
Of
Formality
•

Formal

Description
•

•
•

Family
constitution/
protocol

•

Formal

•
•

•
Family
meetings

•

Informal

•
•
•

Structured forum
inclusive of
multigenerational family
members
Periodic meetings
Opportunity for family
members to communicate
with ownership family
group
Normative agreement
amongst family members
Delineates and explicates
both behavioral and
contractual principles and
guidelines between
family, ownership, and
business
Expresses family`s values
and expectations sets
Common form of
assembly
Recurring assembly of
family members
Forum to discuss family
and/or business issues

Sample
literature

Theories
•

PrincipalAgent Theory
Stewardship
Theory

•

(Jaffe,
2005;
Nordqvist
& Melin,
2010)

•
•

Equity
Organization
al justice

•

Botero
(2015)

•

Stewardship
Theory

•

(Nordqvist
& Melin,
2010)

•

Sources: Suess (2014) Botero (2015)
The formality of family governance retained by the family is suggested to be a
function of family complexity and advent of succession issues (Suess, 2014). BerentBraun and Uhlaner (2012) showed a positive relationship between family governance
practices and the subjective evaluated performance of family and business assets. In their
study of Spanish small and medium enterprises, Gonzalez-Cruz and Cruz-Ros (2015)
found a positive relationship between the institutionalization of family governance (e.g.,
family council, family protocol) and higher firm performance. Family governance is
viewed as an effective mechanism, in large enough firms, to counter the negative effects
of ownership dispersion in the family system.
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In the case of family meetings, Tower et al. (2007) suggest from their findings
that greater family member inclusiveness in meeting participation results in better family
firm performance. Greater inclusiveness results in greater demographic and cognitive
diversity, which improves decision-making as found in the top management team and
governance diversity literatures (Haynes & Hillman, 2010; Olson, Parayitam, and Bao,
2007).
Corporate governance deals with the legal, financial, and strategic linkages
between the firm`s owners and its top management team (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).
Family governance connects family owners and non-owning family members to the
corporate governance institutions. The corporate governance literature views
organizational strategy making and monitoring as an important board of director’s
functions (Hung, 1998; Zhang, 2010). Within the sphere of family governance, family
strategy formulation and implementation remains undefined. The current family
governance literature is more focused on the structural and compositional aspects of the
institutions. Process and practice views of family governance in business families and
their influence on family longevity have yet to emerge in scholarly research.
2.5 The Importance of the Family for Family Business Strategy
This section reviews some of the principal theories regarding the relationship
between family influence and family business strategy. The influence of family is
important and it is reinforced by the co-evolutionary and family embeddedness
perspectives (Aldrich & Cliff, 2003; Kepner, 1983). These perspectives reinforce the
existence of interdependence between the family and business systems. Given the
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reciprocity between these systems, multiple views have developed in the family business
literature to define and measure family involvement in business.
Family involvement represents the level to which a family is embedded in the
ownership and management of an enterprise (Dyer, 2003). The level of family
involvement can range from family members permeating all aspects of a business
organization to family exhibiting distal remoteness through ownership pyramiding
(Faccio & Lang, 2002) and professionalization of the business. The essence, the
components-of-involvement, and the F-PEC and F-CPO scales are measures of family
involvement and influence in the firm (Chrisman et al., 2005; Rantanen & Jussila, 2011).
The components-of-involvement approach asks only whether the family is part or
not part of the firm`s ownership and/or management to gauge the family`s influence on
the business (Rutherford, Kuratko, and Holt, 2008). The essence approach goes further
than the components-of-involvement position to determine a family`s influence. The
essence approach establishes that influence is a function of the family`s weight over the
firm`s strategic direction, the family`s intent to maintain firm control, and the interactions
emanating from family and firm interdependence (Chrisman et al., 2005).
To further capture the complexities of family influence, Astrachan, Klein, and
Smyrnios (2002), and Klein, Astrachan, and Smyrnios (2005) developed and validated
the Family Power, Experience and Culture (F-PEC) scale. This scale enables consistent,
transparent, and rigorous measurement of family influence by collecting survey data and
statistically synthesizing three dimensions of family influence. The power dimension
subscale concerns the breadth and depth of the family`s influence on a firm`s ownership,
governance, and management (Klein et al., 2005). The experience dimension gives us a
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sense of a family`s intent to keep control and perpetuate its commitment to the firm
through family succession and generational participation in the power dimension (Klein
et al., 2005). Furthermore, the experience dimension becomes an indicator of
accumulated knowledge within the family, particularly multi-generational family firms
(Rantanen & Jussila, 2011). Finally, the culture dimension aims to measure the extent to
which the values of the business, as perceived by the top management team, overlap with
those of the family (Klein et al., 2005).
The concept of family involvement further evolves by linking the F-PEC to the FCPO scale. The collective psychological ownership of family over business (F-CPO), as
proposed by Rantanen and Jussila (2011), provides a measure for realized family
influence as opposed to potential family influence as measured by the F-PEC scale. The
collective psychological ownership of family over business view, derived from the
psychological ownership literature (Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2001; Pierce & Jussila,
2010), suggests that "families are likely to develop collective feelings of shared
ownership toward the business they legally own (Rantanen & Jussila, 2011, p. 141)." The
F-CPO is a family centric construct represented by the aggregation of three dimensions:
1) collective control of the business, 2) intersubjective familiarization, and 3)
interdependent effort (Rantanen & Jussila, 2011).
The four conceptions of family influence discussed previously are all connected
to the organizational elements of ownership, governance, and management of a family
business. These organizational elements are of the business strategy domain. From his
literature review, Dyer (2003) showed that family influences the family firm`s
governance in terms of possible lower agency costs, the firm`s strategy formulation
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because of family goals, and the firm`s competitive advantage because of its endowment
of inimitable family resources.
2.5.1 Sustainable Family Business Theory.
The Sustainable Family Business Theory perspective provides a theoretical link
between family and family business strategy (Goel, Mazzola, Phan, Pieper, & Zachary,
2012).
The Sustainable Family Business Theory (SFBT) resides at the interface of family and
business (Stafford, Duncan, Dane, & Winter, 1999). Theoretically grounded in systems
theory, SFBT assumes the family and business systems overlap. Family business
sustainability is examined as a function of the interactions between family and business
resources and constraints, processes, and transactions leading to business and family
achievements (Danes, Lee, Stafford, and Heck, 2008; Stafford et al., 1999). Danes et al.
(2008) extend the original SFBT model as a result of further research on family capital
and culture, and its impact on firm creation.
The SFBT relies, as well, on the resource-based view to specify the presence of
exchanges between the family and business systems to transact required resources
particularly in disruptive periods (Brewton, Danes, Stafford, and Haynes, 2010). For
example, Danes, Loy, and Stafford (2008) identified five types of strategies observed at
the family business interface. These adjustment strategies, which are decided by the
owning family, encompass the reallocation of personal time, obtaining additional family
help (in many cases in the absence of remuneration), adjusting family and business
resources, and mixing family and business tasks (Danes et al., 2008).
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These adjustment strategies are related to the day-to-day work-life balance issues
under disruptive conditions. Although useful and positively influencing business
sustainability, these strategies are not described as explicitly linked to some family
strategic management process in the context of some overarching multigenerational
family strategy (Danes et al., 2008; Olson et al., 2003). The adjustment strategies appear
more tactical than strategic in nature (Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010), and are seen
as operational rules or norms (Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001) laying out short-term expected
behaviors of owning family members.
SFBT builds on the concept of family capital. Family capital is the total resource
bundle of owning families and includes its social, human, and financial capital
components (Stafford et al., 2010). Family capital is viewed as a source of adaptive
capacity that is in turn viewed as a source of resilience capacity (Brewton et al., 2010;
Stafford et al., 2010). Resilience capacity increases business survival (Brewton et al.,
2010). Family capital represents an inventory of capacity that varies as a result of
transactions and processes at the family business interface during periods of stability and
change (Danes & Brewton, 2012).
The cumulative SFBT literature focuses on the long-term sustainability of a
single-family business as the dependent variable. SFBT is about business survival, not the
survival of dynastic business families. The SFBT model is comprehensive and complex.
Furthermore, in the context of considering SFBT`s applicability to exploring family
strategy, the current boundaries of SFBT are limited to family defined within a
household, and in most cases, SBFT empirical studies use family samples of less than
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two generations in small single-industry businesses (Brewton et al., 2010; Danes et al.,
2008).
2.6 Family Strategy
2.6.1 Anthropology, family history, and population demography perspectives.
The term family strategy is applied in multiple disciplines. A word search of
family strategy using Google Scholar retrieved 5,230 articles and books from diverse
domains including financial services, portfolio management, and marketing, which are
not relevant to this research topic. The majority of articles were related to the social
sciences domain. Articles and books dealing with family strategy in "business families"
and "family businesses" retrieved from the online search are the principal focus of the
next section.
Family historians use family strategy to describe family behavior in the preindustrial era (Dolan, 2008). Family strategy literature regroups all strategies dealing with
the family`s lifecycle issues of fertility, marriage, education and labor, transfer of
property, and migration (Viazzo & Lynch, 2002). The broad application of family
strategy results in various definitions and methodological shortcomings (Dolan, 2008;
Saraceno, 1989; Viazzo & Lynch, 2002).
There are many perspectives of family strategy. Generally, the concept of family
strategy involves the family as a strategic actor undertaking a series of rational decisions
over a long time period (Dolan, 2008). The concept of family strategy is composed of 1)
an intelligent actor capable of evaluating and choosing, 2) the presence of interdependent
relationships, 3) a set of constrained resources, and 4) a multi-dimensional time horizon
as represented by the past, present, and future (Saraceno, 1989). The concept of family
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strategy was also viewed as an approach to explore decision-making processes of family
over the lifetime of its members (Hareven, 1991). Another perspective defines family
strategy as a means to explain family choices to maximize their utility function, which is
constrained by institutional, economic, and social constraints (Moen & Wethington,
1992). Strategies are meant to describe family actions realized for coping or overcoming
the challenges of daily life (Moen & Wethington, 1992). This view of family strategy
encompasses planning and executing within two different timeframes: the short termplanning for tomorrow, and the long term-planning for the next generation (Moen &
Wethington, 1992).
Family strategy means combining the family`s circumstances, motivations, and
goals (Moch et al., 1987). Family strategy assumes that the family is a group acting as if
it were an individual (Moch et al., 1987). However, to invoke family strategy implies the
challenge of reconciling the family unit ruled by altruism and the forces of individual
self-interest (Moch et al., 1987).
In reviewing at a high level the titles and abstracts of the articles retrieved from
the Google Scholar search, three major themes emerged. Family strategy articles were
typically discussed in the context of marriage and fertility, labor, work and migration,
nobility, and succession and patrimony. The following sections contain a very broad
discussion of family strategy in each of these topic categories.
2.6.2 Family strategy in marriage, fertility, succession, nobility, and inheritance.
Marriage is related to the business of social reproduction (Bourdieu, 2002). The
family`s marriage strategy sets the plan in motion through biological and social processes
within the family`s context characterized by social circumstances and the cultural
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repertoire (Bourdieu, 2002). In pre-nineteenth-century France, marriage strategies served
to reproduce the family lineage to ensure a workforce to protect one`s economic position
in an environment dominated by scarce financial capital (Tilly, 1979).
Since strategy implies objectives, the goals of noble marriage strategies included
employment opportunities for offspring, risk mitigation from natural and social
extinctions, and preservation of power, wealth, and social status within family lineage
(van Steensel, 2012). These strategies were studied in various countries during various
periods (e.g., Japan, Ancient Egypt, Medieval Holland, Renaissance Italy, pre-industrial
France) (Bourdieu, 2002; Fruin, 1980; Huebner, 2007; Moran, 2015).
2.6.3 Family strategy in labor, work and migration.
Family strategy is used in the context of work-family and labor migration
research. This field studies the division of family labor, roles, and time allocations within
the family and their relationships with the labor force demand and supply dynamics
(Engelen, 2002; Paping, 2004). Quantitative and qualitative research methods are used,
but the research is somewhat atheoretical in nature.
Based on biographical oral stories of farmers, family strategy is used as a label to
describe the attributes of various types of Spanish farming families in terms of family
participation on the farm (Paniagua, 2013). Motivated by economic survival in difficult
economic times, international migration of Mexican family members to Minnesota is
treated as a family strategy (Solheim, Rojas-García, Olson, and Zuiker, 2012). Although
unspecified in terms of who does the planning and how it is done, family strategy is
considered a carefully planned process for Greek families regarding their professional
choices and status in the Greek tourism sector (Zagkotsi, 2014). The lack of transparency
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in the research process and numerous assumptions about the actual motivations of the
respondents make it impossible to truly assess the makeup of family strategies.
2.6.4 Family strategy shortcomings and criticism.
The family strategy concept is criticized on many fronts (Engelen, 2002). Some
authors consider family strategy a theoretically underspecified and poorly operationalized
concept in the family literature (Moen & Wethington, 1992). Moch et al. (1987)
dismissed the idea of family strategy entirely because of its origins in the military, which
would require a discussion of the family equivalencies of policy, theater strategy, and
tactics. Bourdieu (2002) wondered if families themselves conceive into existence a
family strategy, or instead the family and its members simply make decisions on the basis
of implicit learned principles and rules. Yet other scholars ponder whether family
strategy represents the actual experience lived by family, or if family strategy represents a
reality constructed from the researcher`s analysis and interpretation of family outcomes
(Viazzo & Lynch, 2002). For some scholars, family strategy is a form of collective
strategy, an aggregation of the individuals' strategy as part of the family, yet the specific
elements of each family member being aggregated and the weighting of each element are
unknown (Moch et al., 1987; Moen & Wethington, 1992).
The research findings in the family strategy literature are rarely derived from a
conceptual model and leave researchers looking for theoretical contributions. Most of the
family strategy research findings are presented as biographical accounts derived from
archives of unknown quality, such as relatively dated census forms, birth registries,
temple tablets, or quantitative analyses of large population demographic databases. From
historical outcomes, family strategy is derived without the opportunity to triangulate with
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primary data. The opportunity to collect data from the family`s informed respondents was
clearly not possible, making it impossible to determine the family`s actual strategic intent
and alternative choices (Engelen, 2002).
As a way to improve the rigor of family strategy research, Kok (2002) considers
the life course approach as "particularly suitable for the study of family strategy (p.
474)." The life course perspective is a means to study the interaction of interdependent
lives as they navigate through marital, parenthood, and employment life transitions (Kok,
2002; Moen & Wethington, 1992). However, the life course approach does not reveal,
from the collected transitions data, the individuals' motives, choices, and constraints that
shaped family strategy.
The purpose of the family strategy concept is to map out a family`s course of
actions and explain the realization of a family vision and achievement of family goals.
The family literature needs to better frame the family strategy domain within the
demands of organizational theory development (Bacharach, 1989). A family strategy
theory cannot be developed, elaborated, and eventually tested only on the basis of data,
typologies, and metaphors according to Bacharach (1989). A family strategy theory
should be composed of parsimoniously organized and clearly communicated theoretical
statements articulating the answers "to the questions of how, when, and why"
(Bacharach, 1989, p. 498), not just the what. The rich context of dynastic business
families combined with methodological rigor present an opportunity to reset the family
strategy paradigm given these families' extremely long life spans filled with multiple life
course events.
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2.6.5 Family strategy in the family business literature.
In the family business literature, the family strategy concept is applied
sporadically and with limited robust empirical evidence giving the theory a disjointed
quality. Used in a limited number of articles or books, the term family strategy lacked a
definition and references to trace its peer-reviewed scholarly lineage. For example, a
Babson Global STEP Project observation booklet (Nason, 2007, p. 7) states, "family
strategy is even more founder-centric than other forms of entrepreneurship." What does
that mean or imply, first about family strategy, and second about its relationship to the
many dimensions of entrepreneurship? Astrachan, Manners, McMillan, and Pieper (2012)
normatively introduced the family strategy concept in the curriculum of the Family
Business Executive MBA program at Kennesaw State University. They viewed family
strategy as positioned hierarchically superordinate to business strategy, and
operationalized within the business family unit (Astrachan et al., 2012). As yet
theoretically delineated, nor empirically validated, it is suggested the effectiveness of a
family strategy was influenced by fitting the dimensions of unifying goals, culture,
systems of organization, interface between family and other stakeholders (and
organizations), and resources (Astrachan et al., 2012).
The family strategy discussion is mixed with contradictory evidence. Uhlaner
(2006) connects family strategy as a family system consisting of familiness, an f-factor
(Habbershon et al., 2003), influencing firm performance. Yet in the development of their
Family Influence Familiness Scale (FIFS), Frank, Kessler, Rusch, Suess-Reyes, and
Weismeier-Sammer (2016) exclude any reference to family strategy in their scale
development's theoretical underpinnings. Furthermore, Tower et al. (2004) surprisingly
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found that family business boards do not influence family strategic planning issues such
as succession plans, estate plans, and family mission statements. On the other hand, Jaffe
and Lane (2004) suggested that to sustain a dynastic business family, family must remain
connected and aligned around vision, values, and strategy. In their case study of the
Alessi family, Dalpiaz, Tracey, and Phillips (2014) suggested that the family narratives of
family business successors in which they highlighted their affections for family members
are a tactic to "construct a sense of family strategy (p. 1384)."
According to Carlock and Ward (2001, 2010), family strategy lies in the family
system. Family strategy relates to the strategy component of their family business Parallel
Planning Process. Family strategy deals with family member selection and development
for participation in the family business and other enterprising family entities like the
family council, family office, and family foundation (Carlock & Ward, 2001, 2010). Baur
(2013) suggested in his discussion paper that a business family has a strategy distinct
from the family business, and there is some interaction between family and business
strategies that influences family business performance.
In a qualitative study of minority ethnic businesses in the United Kingdom,
Dhaliwal (2006) suggested that these family businesses emerged because of a family
strategy of cohesion. The strategy's aim was to keep the family together and family
members employed. Furthermore, the status of business people enhanced the family's
social position in their new UK community. While still undefined, family strategy is
connected to family and family business outcomes.
In their discussion on governing the family enterprise, Gersick and Feliu (2014)
considered family strategy as a family council function. Such a function is to "articulate a
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family strategy for business and wealth management" (Gersick & Feliu, 2014, p. 210).
The family strategy included "planning, rule setting, and collaborative asset allocation"
(Gersick & Feliu, 2014, p. 210). Planning for what and who, by whom, and when is not
clear and requires further clarification. No clear definition or process is available
explicating how family strategy bridges a dynastic family`s values, needs and
expectations, and the family`s various interests. In general, authors published a limited
normative view of family strategy based on papers authored by practitioners who omit
the family strategy concept from their own articles (Dickstein, 2003; Goldbart & DiFuria,
2009).
As argued earlier in the literature review, business strategy is useful and important
to explain and predict firm longevity. Strategic management and family business
literatures have yet to rigorously extend strategic thought at the family level. Fortuitously,
family strategy is at a nascent theoretical development stage. If family strategy truly
exists, at what point does it emerge? Who conceives it? How does the planned strategy
differ from the realized strategy? How could family strategy first influence the family`s
own longevity, before or in parallel with business longevity, by pursuing greater family
cohesiveness, or a more effective dynasting process?
2.6.6 Toward family strategy construct clarity.
Applied in many fields, the term family strategy is used generically without
common specification. The family strategy concept in the social sciences is employed as
a general and interchangeable term to describe how a family fulfills its numerous social
and economic functions like marriage, fertility, inheritance, work, and migration. The
family business field attributes family strategy normatively to various outcomes without
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theory connecting its constituting elements. Family strategy is not presented as a higherorder strategy conceived and evolving at the apex of all family business strategies. The
temporal dimension of family strategy is unclear in terms of timeframe, unlike five years
as in the case of a firm`s grand strategy (Pearce II, 1982), or one hundred years for a
nation. Family strategy appears to be a multidimensional and multi-level construct
applied to both groups and whole populations as in the case of transnational migration
studies (Waters, 2005). In sum, family strategy lacks construct clarity.
As a construct, family strategy is a "conceptual abstraction of a phenomenon
which cannot be directly observed and a foundation to theory" (Suddaby, 2010, p. 346).
Construct clarity comprises definition of the concept, the delineation of the applicability
or non-applicability of the construct`s contextual circumstances, the semantic relationship
to related constructs, and the demonstration of coherence of the construct in relation to
the overall theoretical argument (Suddaby, 2010). These construct elements
inconsistently applied leave us wondering whether family strategy is conceptualized as a
process or a variance theory.
If family strategy is a variance theory, is it developed as a category of concepts
operationalized and measured as fixed variables with multiple convergent dimensions
varying along some numerical scale? Or, maybe family strategy is defined as "a
developmental event sequence of historical incidents, activities, and stages that unfold
over the duration of a central subject`s existence" (Van de Ven, Andrew H, 1992, p. 170).
As identified by Van de Ven’s (1992) research note on strategy process theory,
development event sequencing can unfold linearly or by different multiple unit
progressions such as parallel, convergent, or divergent paths. But if the development
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event sequence is improperly specified, problems in logic may arise. For instance,
Carlock and Ward’s (2001, 2010) parallel planning process, which means parallel lines
never touch, is applied to their strategic planning model while assuming the family and
business systems overlap (Habbershon et al., 2003b). Alternatively, for dynastic business
families, maybe the family strategy concept is more suitably described as a convergent
planning sequence where the family business strategy components integrate into a higherorder family level strategy.
This study is in part motivated by the aim to improve family strategy construct
clarity, which is important for many reasons. Following Suddaby’s (2010) thinking on the
value of construct clarity, family strategy construct clarity might facilitate scholar and
practitioner communications. By sharing a common language on family strategy, we
could accumulate theoretical and practical knowledge. A clear and robust construct helps
in the empirical analysis of theory regardless of the researcher`s epistemological position.
A distinct family strategy construct could open itself to more perspectives and criticism
to advance the theory and facilitate its introduction in classroom settings and related
materials.
2.7 Grand Strategy as a Higher-Order Organizational Construct
2.7.1 Grand strategy purpose and components in strategic management.
Grand strategy is described as "a comprehensive and general plan of major
actions by which a firm intends to achieve its long-term objectives within its dynamic
environment" (Pearce II, 1981, p. 44). The grand strategy construct was defined as "the
primary, dominant, and single most important strategy of an industrial firm" (Hitt,
Ireland, & Palia, 1982, p. 266) as it circumscribed its domain of operation. Hitt et al.
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(1982) clearly distinguished grand strategy and its objectives as distinct from a firm`s
other strategies by defining grand strategy as "the major plan of action for achieving the
sales and earnings goals for an industrial firm as a whole (rather than a product, division,
or market segment)" (Hitt et al., 1982, p. 266). The firm`s long-term objectives and each
business unit`s operational strategies are mediated by the grand strategy (Pearce II, 1981).
The planning horizon of a grand strategy, although admittedly set arbitrarily, is set at five
years (Pearce II, 1982).
A grand strategy serves to coordinate, focus, and sustain firm efforts and
resources in the pursuit of long-term objectives and evaluate progress toward them
(Mintzberg, 1987b). Organizational leaders use the grand strategy to position the firm in
the competitive marketplace, and concurrently provide a focal point for all decisionmaking. Based on the contingency and the resource dependence theories, a grand strategy
is part of the strategic planning process that helps the firm survive and adapt successfully
to a changing environment (Boyd, 1991). Pearce (1982) identified 12 grand strategies in
terms of purpose and organizational focus. The options are presented in Table 4 as a
Grand Strategy Selection Matrix. The matrix is intended to assist decision-makers in
defining the basic intent of their strategy and to discipline their strategic choices with the
highest likelihood of success.
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Table 4 Grand Strategy Selection Matrix
Purpose
Of
Grand Strategy
Overcome Weaknesses

Maximize Strengths

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Internal – redirected
External – acquisition
resources
or merger for resource
within the firm
capability
Turnaround/retrenchment • Vertical
integration
Divestiture
• Conglomerate
Liquidation
diversification
Concentration
• Horizontal
diversification
Market development
• Concentric
Product development
diversification
Innovation
• Joint venture

Source: (Pearce II, 1982)
The list of grand strategies expanded to 23 types as a result of a longitudinal study
of a firm`s strategic actions in the pharmaceutical industry (Langley, Kakadadse, and
Swailes, 2005). By increasing the number of grand strategies, Langley et al. (2005)
showed that the concept of grand strategy should not be applied generically, but should
always be embedded within a context. A firm may also engage several grand strategies
simultaneously.
Having sampled 185 industrial firms from the Fortune 1000, Hitt and Ireland
(1985) found that grand strategy type and industry type moderate the relationship
between the firm`s distinctive competencies (e.g., marketing, production, R&D) and firm
performance. Significant relationship between the grand strategy type and the strategic
mixes of organizational functions was uncovered (Hitt et al., 1982). For example, in the
case of an industrial firm focused on internal growth as a grand strategy, the general
administration function played a predominant role. These findings reinforce the view that
a firm`s grand strategy requires integration with the business units' operating strategies
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for a given industry type and set of resources, particularly in the presence of perceived
environmental uncertainty (Hitt et al., 1982).
Since grand strategy is part of a firm`s strategic planning process, Pearce II et al.
(1987) studied the relationship between the formality of strategic planning, a firm`s grand
strategy, and financial performance. Pearce II et al. (1987) found a positive significant
relationship, irrespective of the grand strategy ultimately selected, between strategic
planning formality and firm performance as measured by return on assets and sales over a
five-year period. Grand strategies are an outcome of the strategic planning process, and
the level of planning formality improved the likelihood of making optimal strategic
choices for small American manufacturing firms (Pearce II et al., 1987).
One view of grand strategy assumes that a rational leader, like a firm`s CEO, or a
top management team, intently decides on the company`s direction and objectives (Hitt et
al., 1982; Smith & White, 1987). The grand strategy is subsequently diffused top down
throughout the organization. However, Mintzberg (1987, 2005) saw strategy not
necessarily as only deliberate and systemized by the firm`s top managers, but rather
argued that strategy was realized. Realized strategies were the product of deliberate
strategic planning and emerging strategies generated by middle- and operating-level
managers. Therefore, once set in motion, a grand strategy is part of a living and iterative
process that continually integrates environmental and organizational information
(Bahrami & Evans, 1989).
Regardless of firm size, capital intensity, or planning formality, strategic planning
arguably influences firm performance (C. C. Miller & Cardinal, 1994). Although there
are no family business studies examining grand strategy, the family business literature
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provides evidence that firm-level strategic planning positively affects firm performance
and corporate entrepreneurship (Eddleston, Kellermanns, and Sarathy, 2008;
Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006). These findings may explain why strategic planning is
still the most used management tool by firms worldwide (Rigby & Bilodeau, 2013).
2.7.2 Grand strategy purpose and components in international relations.
Some geopolitical and international relations scholars view a grand strategy as a
promise of national policy coherence in the face of complexity, while others view it as an
illusion (Betts, 2000; Hoffman, 2014). Policy is defined as "broad national goals"
(Owens, 2007). A grand strategy does not pertain only to military strategy. For a nation`s
political leadership, grand strategy sets the course and use made of any and all the assets
of a security community, including its military complex (Hoffman, 2014), and brings to
bear all the elements of national power (Owens, 2007).
According to Owens (2007), a grand strategy tends to three purposes. The first
purpose is to connect policy goals to a nation`s set of limited resources available for goal
attainment. Second, a grand strategy clarifies policy goals by prioritizing competing
goals. Third, strategy transforms resources into means by organizing, employing, and
deploying the former. But, a grand strategy is useful if it "functions as a force multiplier"
(Betts, 2000, p. 6) to beat an adversary.
A grand strategy is a plan connecting policy and operations (Betts, 2000). Grand
strategy, as it alludes to a nation`s geopolitical orientation, sits at the apex of the
hierarchy of strategies (Owens, 2007). The nation`s geopolitical orientation does not exist
in isolation from the next levels of strategy. Military strategy is the next level where
strategists necessarily decide on how to position the military apparatus in times of peace
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and war. In peacetime, military leadership deals with issues of deterrence, whereas in
wartime, resources are deployed in the pursuit of victory (Owens, 2007). The outputs of
military strategy feed into theater strategy. Planning and executing military campaigns to
achieve goals in the war theater are the concerns of theater strategy (Owens, 2007). At
the theater level, combatant commanders are challenged to mesh the goals of upper-level
strategies and the theater`s constraints, such as its geography. At each level of strategy,
there are distinct leaders strategizing within their scope of intervention. Between each
strategic level, there are linkages feeding bi-directional information flows, which,
depending on the quality of strategy execution, may dampen or enhance the grand
strategy`s "force multiplier" effects (Betts, 2000).
Like family strategy, some scholars are critical of the grand strategy concept. The
effectiveness of a grand strategy is considered illusory for many reasons, including: (1)
the gap between policy objectives and war outcomes is too significant and complex such
that manipulating strategy to a specific end is impossible, (2) inability to isolate and
understand the leaders' motives, such that policy actions are a reflection of personal and
not national concerns, (3) lack of agreed-upon criteria of what constitutes a good or bad
grand strategy in war, and (4) policy goals may be displaced to organizational processes
thus diverting attention and resources away from the desired outcome (Betts, 2000).
Historically, strategy concerned itself solely with military campaigns and how
battles were waged to win wars (Kitchen, 2010). Today, crafting a grand strategy is a
multilayered and dynamic undertaking. To balance a nation`s means and ends in both
peace time and wartime, grand strategy involves "the evolution and integration of policies
that operate for decades or even centuries" (Kitchen, 2010, p.120). A grand strategy is a
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statesmen's tool to set, maintain, or modify a nation's environmental boundaries in time
and space.
2.7.3 Grand strategy in the dynastic business family.
Like firms and polities, dynastic business families are a form of organization. An
organizational form combines structure and strategy (Ingram, 1996) to realize goalsetting activities and to regulate the flow of resources in and out of the organization
(Child and McGrath, 2001). Dynastic business families, firms, and polities share many
similarities like leadership groups, long-term horizons, multiple connected entities, and a
hierarchy of goals. However, as grand strategy theory may be set in the international
relations and strategic management fields, it has yet to be extended at the family level by
the family business field.
Such a theoretical extension would be important. Grand strategy may offer family
business literature a framework to explain how family, ownership, business, and
philanthropic strategies of dynastic business families are linked. Furthermore, grand
strategy theory may help uncover an array of family strategic orientations.
2.8 Strategic Fit and Alignment
To review the concepts of strategic fit and alignment is relevant to this
exploration and conceptualization of family strategy in dynastic business families. The
considerations pertaining to how the pieces of a family strategy fit together, be it
chaotically, laissez-faire, or with sensitivity and intent on the part of the family strategists
is of interest. The alignment of a dynastic business family strategy with the strategies of
the business family's other business and philanthropic interests should not be ignored
during data collection in the research field.
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Strategy is the bridge between organizational policy and operations, while
simultaneously linking policy and operations to the external environment. How family
strategy components fit and integrate together over time is important because fit will
influence organizational performance and longevity (Kathuria et al., 2007; Miller, 1993).
The concepts of fit or alignment and integration are central themes in strategic
management (Fuchs, Miffin, Miller, and Whitney, 2000; Venkatraman, 1989).
Fit or alignment in strategic management is synonymous with coherence. That is
the extent to which the relationships between the firm`s environment, organizational
structure, the firm`s business strategy and functional strategies are mutually supportive
(Kathuria et al., 2007). Rooted in contingency theory, fit considers that organizational
performance is a consequence of the alignment between two or more factors, such as
organizational structure and context, and the interactions and interdependencies of the
firm's internal systems (Van de Ven, Andrew H. & Drazin, 1985). Organizational vertical
alignment refers to the top to bottom (i.e., the corporate to business to function levels)
integration of strategies, objectives, action plans, and decisions (Kathuria et al., 2007).
The corporate level develops strategy to guide the entire organization. The business and
functional levels are charged with strategy formulation and implementation. When
consistency between strategy formulation and implementation are achieved, vertical
alignment is realized (Kathuria et al., 2007).
Unfortunately, the strategic fit literature has yet to research the science of
strategic alignment within dynastic business families. The strategic management
literature distinguishes two forms of organizational alignment: vertical and horizontal or
lateral (Kathuria et al., 2007). But what happens to fit when the dominant ownership
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family group`s family strategy becomes an additional level to consider in the alignment
process? Complexity of the alignment process further increases as we consider that the
family ownership group can be comprised of passive and active owners. It would be
fascinating to study the process of fitting the family business strategy to the family
strategy. Divesting a business interest that no longer fits with the family strategy should
be expected, not seen as a betrayal to one`s origins. For instance, the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund liquidating its petroleum interests was probably dictated by the evolving
family strategy (Milburn, 2015).
Lindow (2010) examined the applicability of the strategic fit concept to family
firms. Although unspecified, her analysis was a business strategy vertical alignment
study. She found a marginally positive relationship between the firm strategy and firm
organizational structure fit and firm performance. Furthermore, her empirical study of
German family firms surprisingly found that family influence does not affect firm
strategy as measured by the F-PEC scale and Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategy typology,
respectively. The author attributed the unconfirmed relationship by questioning the
appropriateness of using the Miles and Snow (1978) typology. This finding is also
surprising considering previous research has shown that family governance, a form of
family influence, positively affects family firm performance (Berent-Braun & Uhlaner,
2012; González-Cruz & Cruz-Ros, 2015).
By examining the horizontal fit between family oriented and business-oriented
decisions in Spanish family firms, Basco and Pérez Rodríguez (2011) aimed to determine
the ideal type of family business management. Their configurative approach analyzed
combinations of family owner and manager decisions in the family concerning the areas
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of board of directors, human resources, succession, and strategic process. Their
horizontal fit analysis produced three ideal types of family businesses: (1) family-first
where the family firm owners and managers emphasized and prioritized family values,
principles, and needs in their decision-making; (2) family enterprise-first, which pursued
a balanced decisional approach inclusive of family and business needs; and (3) businessfirst where decisions were governed by business needs and priorities (Basco &
Rodríguez, 2011). The authors found that business performance increases as family
business becomes more of a business-first or a family enterprise-first ideal type, but no
evidence supported improved family performance for either family-first or family
enterprise-first businesses as was hypothesized (Basco & Rodríguez, 2011).
The continued research focus on the firm as the central unit of analysis hampers
the conceptual emergence of family strategy, which might indeed be an antecedent to
firm strategy. The possibility of fitting together family vision, family mission, family
objectives, family strategy and the family`s ensuing strategic actions into an integrative
perspective is missing. Although family is understood as a social group, the family
business strategy literature still does not treat the business family as primary in the family
business system, which possibly explains inconsistent findings regarding family influence
and firm performance (Basco & Rodríguez, 2011; Moores, 2009).
2.9 Summary
The longevity, strategic management, and family business literatures emphasize
firm-level antecedents, outcomes, and processes, and consequently underexplore those
issues at the business family level. In light of their complex mix of organizational
configurations and dynastic timelines, researchers need a deeper understanding of
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dynastic business family dynamics. Of particular interest is the role and components of a
family strategy used by the dominant family ownership group to fulfill its dual mandates
of governing the family`s consolidated social and economic interests, and serving the
whole family for a very long time. Little is known about the construction of strategy or its
components and how these interact with the designing of dynastic business family
strategy.
The state of the family strategy is disjointed and incomplete. Providing a betterdefined view of family strategy in the context of dynastic business families may aid in the
development of a classification framework of family strategies. Such a family strategy
typology, like the seminal Miles and Snow (1978) business strategy typology of
Prospector-Analyzer-Defender-Reactor, might serve as a foundation to advance scientific
testing and validation of many family variables and interactions with the ownership and
business systems, as well as the environment. Therefore, a qualitative study using the
grounded theory approach in order to begin unearthing the meanings of a family strategy
from a sample of dynastic business family members is suitable at this stage (Bluhm,
Harman, Lee, and Mitchell, 2011).
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS-QUALITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN

"Although we cannot claim to replicate their [informants’] views or
reproduce their experiences in our own lives, we can try to enter their
settings and situations to the extent possible" (Charmaz, 2014, p. 24).
The purpose of this research is to explore, from the ground up, the components of a
family strategy in dynastic business families. This research searches for the meanings dynastic
business family informants give to family strategy, and investigates their realities. Given the
study`s exploratory nature, a qualitative research design was considered appropriate. A grounded
theory approach methodologically aligned with the research questions and topic fall in the
domain of nascent theory development (Edmondson & McManus, 2007; Glaser & Strauss,
1967). Nascent theory refers to topics that are under researched and under theorized (Edmondson
& McManus, 2007).
3.1 Research Design
This qualitative research emphasizes "the qualities of entities, the processes and the
meanings that are not experimentally examined or measured (if measured at all) in terms of
quantity, amount, intensity, or frequency" (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, p. 8). The present family
strategy inquiry represents inductive and interpretive research. This study is methodically
focused on capturing and comprehending situated meaning and systematic divergences between
dynastic business family types (Corley, 2015; Gephart, 2004). This is necessary since scientific
knowledge about family strategy within dynastic business families is sparse.

67

68
A qualitative approach is well suited to explore the "whys" and the "hows" (Pratt, 2009)
of dynastic business family strategy. This qualitative research helps build a pathway for
foundational knowledge about the components of a family strategy and its possible relationships
to family goals, family vision, and the actions related to a family strategy in the dynastic business
family context. This approach enables greater proximity to understanding the point at which
family strategy simply emerges from the autonomous acts of family members, or whether family
strategy is an intended family plan conceived to attain individual and group desired future states
(Beckert, 2013). As Gioia and Pitre (1990) stated, "the goal of theory building in the interpretive
paradigm is to generate descriptions, insights, and explanations of events so that the system of
interpretations and meaning, are revealed" (p. 588). Ultimately, this research approach
formulates family strategy theory to serve as a building block for further theoretical elaboration
and testing.
3.2 Sampling and Data Collection
Dynastic business families are the population of interest underlying the present research.
A purposeful sample of dynastic business families was chosen. The dynastic business families
were then theoretically sampled in search for data to refine the categories constituting a family
strategy theory (Charmaz, 2014). A business family is inclusive of active family members and
non-active family members. Family is defined as "a group of persons including those who are
either offspring of a couple (no matter what generation), their in-laws as well as their legally
adopted children" (Astrachan, Klein, and Smyrnios; 2002; p. 55). A broad definition of business
family is necessary to garner as many insights as possible about the interactions and the
communications between and within the various business family subgroups.
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For this study, the dynastic business families are typified using the dimensions of family
involvement, dynastic timeline, and family complexity. The family involvement dimension
represents the extent to which family members participate in the ownership, governance, and
management of their family interests. The terms Young Dynastic Business Family and Old
Dynastic Business Family are used to delineate a family's dynastic timeline. A Young Dynastic
Business Family has between two and four generations of continuous family controlled
ownership in one or many businesses, whereas an Old Dynastic Business Family has more than
four generations of continuous ownership (Sjogren, 2011). Family complexity refers to the
number, the heterogeneity, and the interrelatedness of the elements present within and connected
to the business family system (Klein, 2010; Sandig, Labadie, Saris, and Mayordomo, 2006).
Business family complexity increases as a function of the number of family members, the kind of
relationships established among them, the number of generations alive at a given point in time,
each family member's position relative to the nuclear family and their respective lifecycle stage
(Sandig et al., 2006, p. 147), and the number of family controlled and managed businesses and
family activities (Lambrecht & Lievens, 2008) . Table 5 provides a descriptive summary of the
dynastic business family dimensions.
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Table 5 Dynastic Business Family Dimensions
Dimension

Description
High family involvement:

Low family
involvement:
Family
involvement in
family interests

Dynastic timeline

Family complexity

Family members
participate only at the
ownership and the
governance levels of
their family interests.
Young dynasty: 24
continuous generations
of family ownership

Family members participate at the
ownership, governance, and
management levels of a single or
many family interests.
Old dynasty: greater than 4
continuous generations of family
ownership

Low to high complexity

References
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(2005)
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Gimeno Sandig,
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Lambrecht and Lievens
(2008); Klein (2010)

Source: Own
The study sample of dynastic business families was obtained from numerous sources.
The first source comprises personal and professional contacts resulting from working 20-plus
years in the area of private wealth management with Canadian business families. Second, the
professional contacts of the researcher in the areas of private equity, private banking, law, and
consulting identified business families who may have an interest in participating in the research.
Third, the president of the Business Families Foundation in Montreal offered great assistance in
identifying potential candidate business families in Canada and Europe.
Data about the dynastic business families were collected from two sources. Semistructured interviews with business family members generated the principal data set. The
interview process in grounded theory research is depicted in Figure 1. Second, data were
collected from business family archival documents such as, but not exclusively, the family
constitution, charter, protocol, or code of conduct, business family websites, and business family
biographies. Field research methods, such as interviews and archival document analysis, are
accepted means in strategic management field research (Snow & Thomas, 1994).
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Figure 1 Interviewing Process in Grounded Theory Studies

Source: Charmaz (2014, p. 88)
As the main data source, the interviewing process became the site of "exploration,
emergent understandings, legitimation of identity, and validation of identity" (Charmaz, 2014, p.
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91). The interviewing process consisted of asking a few questions to allow the research
participants to tell their stories, which minimizes introducing bias into the content or the
direction of the interviews (Charmaz, 2014). The interview questions consisted mainly of
"what," "how," and "when" types as the analysis of the responses leads to explicating the
components and processes of a family strategy. The "when" type questions take the data
collection toward the timing and change conditions of the study phenomenon (Charmaz, 2014).
A theoretical direction emerged from interviewee coding and memos. This theoretical
direction offered direction in deepening inquiry into certain central theoretical themes, and then
concluded with theoretical adequacy, which is considered at the core of theoretical sampling
(Charmaz, 2014).
Gathering data from multiple sources improves proximity to the research participants'
worlds and generated many properties of a family strategy and its relations with other categories.
Importantly, using multiple data sources provides greater revelatory, richness, and
trustworthiness, thus improving the value of the findings.
This research design minimizes the apparent bias of studying strategy retrospectively
with prior knowledge of the success or failure outcomes by combining historical analysis with
real-time study (Van de Ven, 1992). To assist the researcher in better disentangling the origins
and components of a dynastic business family strategy, the dynastic business family sample
characterized by multiple dimensions was overlaid with archival and interview data. The archival
and interview data helped build a retrospective historical timeline of the dynastic business
families' context and outcomes.
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Unlike quantitative research, grounded theory combines data collection and analysis in an
iterative process involving theoretical sampling, constant comparison, and saturation. Figure 2
illustrates the grounded theory process.
Figure 2 THE GROUNDED THEORY PROCESS

Source: Adapted from (Locke, 1996) and (Pieper, Fall Semester 2015)
Dynastic business families as the phenomenon of interest and the research questions were
the starting points, and a circular process of constantly comparing the cumulative data from
interviews and emerging categories was pursued. Theoretical sampling aimed at elaborating and
refining the categories constituting the theory by searching pertinent data to develop the
emerging theory (Charmaz, 2014). Theoretical sampling is a continuous process that involves
starting with data, conceiving tentative ideas from the data, and then challenging these ideas
through more data collection and analysis (Charmaz, 2014). These ideas were constantly
compared to new data and ideas to become categories that may transform into themes, and
eventually the researcher abstracts themes into aggregated dimensions to form a data structure
(Gioia et al., 2013).
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The logic of theoretical saturation argues that the researcher keeps sampling until no new
categories emerge from the data (Charmaz, 2014). Following Charmaz (2014), this study
achieved theoretical saturation after 15 interviews as the gathering of new data no longer ignited
new theoretical insights, or revealed new properties regarding the core theoretical categories.
This study`s sample size falls within the typical sample size range of 10 to 60 persons needed to
achieve theoretical adequacy (Starks & Trinidad, 2007). In family business research, Reay
(2014) reinforces the point that there is no magic number in terms of sample size as this will vary
according to the research topic. Chapter 4 explicates the depth and breadth of the study data
collected from key business family informants.
3.3 Study Data Sources and Sample Characteristics
The study data were collected from eleven business families located in the Northern
Hemisphere. The dynastic business families are located in Canada, the United States, and
Europe. The fact that the data were collected from families in different countries offers greater
contextual richness. Context influences strategy, which explains the choice of different
geographical settings (Papadakis, Lioukas, and Chambers, 1998). These multiple research
settings differed because of their differences in environmental factors such as economic
institutions, culture, geography, and history. At least one dynastic business family in each
geographical setting was recruited.
Data were sourced from 15 business family interviewees, researcher field notes, and
archival data. Table 6 presents the study`s data sources by business family. To ensure
confidentiality, each business family is identified by a three-letter identifier. If there is more than
one interviewee per business family, each business family interviewee is identified by a four- or
five-letter identifier.
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Table 6 Study Data Sources by Business Family

Business
Family
BFA
BFB
BFC
BFD
BFE
BFF

BFG

BFH
BFI
BFJ
BFK
Total

Number of
Interview
Business Family
Number of
Length
Researcher
Informants
Interviews
(hours:minutes)
Field Notes
1
1
0:30
Yes
1
1
2:18
Yes
1
1
1:08
No
1
1
1:44
Yes
1
1
1:10
Yes
1
1
1:23
Yes
4
BFGES,
BFGEJ,
2
1:58
Yes
BFGNS,
BFGRR
2
2
3:10
Yes
BFHG, BFHS
1
1
1:42
No
1
1
1:02
Yes
1
3
2:31
Yes
15
15
18:36
Interviews were conducted from June to September 2016

Archival Data
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Source: Own
As described in Table 7, the study sample is composed of young and old business
families. The business family interviewees occupied or occupy many important leadership roles
in their organization's family, ownership, or business systems. As per the theory of social
systems (Von Schlippe & Frank, 2013), each role has its own functional logic of communication
creating a distinct set of role expectations and meanings. Accessibility to more than one dynastic
business family member per family proved difficult mainly due to logistical constraints.
There are 11 male interviewees and 4 female interviewees. Three of the 11 business
families had their principal base of operation located in Europe. The three European business
families are from three different countries. There are eight business families located in North
America. The business families operated in a variety of economic sectors.

75

76
Table 7 Description of Business Families & Interviewees

Business
Family
BFA
BFB
BFC
BFD
BFE
BFF
BFG
BFH
BFI
BFJ
BFK

Business
Family
Principal Base
of Operation

Male, Non-family CEO, Family Office
G4, Male, Majority shareholder,
Executive Chairman, Board of Directors,
family-owned operating company
G1, Male, Founder; G2, Male, co-CEO;
G2, female, co-CEO, non-family CFO
G3, Male, Chairman, Family Office; G4,
Male, President, G4 family-owned
investment company

North America

Economic Sector
Of
Core Operating Company
International Food Processing &
Distribution
International
Food Additives Trading
International Industrial
Manufacturing
Diversified: International Food
Processing, Environmental Services,
and Real Estate
International Food Processing

North America

International Food Processing

North America

Regional
Real Estate Development

North America

Finance

G4, Female, Family Council Chair

North America

Business Family Interviewees
G10, Female, Chairperson of operating
company board
G14, Male, former family CEO and
current shareholder of family business
G8, Female, Board member of family
holding company

Europe
Europe
Europe

G3, Male, Executive Chairman, Family
Investment Holding Company

North America

G3, Male, Principal shareholder and
Director of Single Operating Company
G12, Male, Founder, new Operating
Company and multiple private family
foundations

North America
North America

International Industrial
Manufacturing
Regional
Construction Materials Distribution
Communications

Source: Own
3.4 Dynastic Status Validation of Study Sample
As previously mentioned, a dynastic business family is a group characterized by
longevity, power, and status. Position or status refers to an individual or a group's ranking in a
social hierarchy (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Status comes from the respect or admiration
conferred by others to a target individual or group on the basis of some valued dimensions
(Magee & Galinsky, 2008). To be a dynasty implies a subjective assessment of a dynastic
business family's higher social leadership position (Cramer & Leathers, 1981).
When it comes to using the term powerful as a defining characteristic of a dynasty, the
implications of power are less clear. The ambiguity about power relates to its application to a
76

77
dynasty. Are we referring to power in the context of social dominance, as in coercive power,
through the control of resources to effect negative or positive outcomes (Turner, 2005)? Or,
maybe, power refers to social power, where as a group with a shared social identity dynastic
business families display a capacity to organize themselves into groups and institutions
composed of individuals developing emergent capacities, acting in concert, cooperating,
coordinating, and unifying their actions to impact both the physical and social worlds (Turner,
2005). Perhaps by continuously entwining family and fortune, dynastically oriented business
families achieve more through social cohesion than social fragmentation.
During the interview process, the business family informants were not asked if they
viewed or defined themselves as a dynasty. The interviewees never referred to themselves as
being part of a dynasty. But given that the literature sees a dynasty as a social outcome, it would
be important to try to assess whether or not the business families in the study were being
conferred the business family dynastic status by society or their community. There is no dynastic
status scale in the literature to make this assessment.
To overcome the lack of a dynastic scale, a two-step approach was used to validate the
dynastic status of the business family study participants. The first step was an Internet search
using Google to identify documents, texts, or articles that referenced the business families in the
study as a dynasty. Second, the dynastic status of the business families in the study consisted of
applying the dynasty definition offered by Sjogren (2011).
The Sjogren (2011) definition uses additive qualitative and quantitative criteria. The
Sjogren (2011) dynasty definition is viewed as the most restrictive and is used as it offers clearer
criteria than those offered by Landes (2006) and Hutcheson et al. (2003). In the case of Landes
(2006), a dynasty is defined strictly on the basis of familial control. As for Hutcheson et al.
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(2003), their dynasty definition considers the multigenerational cohesion of family and fortune,
but excludes any criteria regarding the socio-economic position of the business family. The
Sjogren (2011) dynasty definition explicitly combines the criteria of multigenerational familial
control, the entwinement of family and fortune, and the socio-economic position of the business
family. Furthermore, Sjogren (2011), by classifying dynasties as old or young, suggests that the
dynasty evolves over time. The Sjogren (2011) dynasty definition also has shortcomings, which
are commented in brackets below by the present study’s researcher. The Sjogren (2011) dynasty
criteria are:
1. "A firm must have been owned by a particular family for at least four generations in
order to be considered a dynasty [Defined as Dynastic Familial Control Timeline]; an
old dynasty is four generation or more, while a young dynasty is two to three
generations;
2. At least one of the companies controlled by the family must be of sufficient size to be
considered a worldwide leader in its industry [Who defines worldwide leader and the
criteria to be used are unspecified.];
3. Family control can spread over various economic activities as long as the total market
value of the holdings amount to a substantial sum [What constitutes a substantial sum
market value of a private firm is calculated without access to data remain
unspecified];
4. Family has sufficient influence in their country and society that government and
parliament are influenced by the family`s views on important national economic
questions, and thus influence the family can influence the rules of the game in the
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business world” (Sjogren, 2011, p. 34). [What constitutes sufficient influence
remains undefined].
The results from the two dynastic status classification approaches are presented in Table
8. On the basis of Step One (Internet search), business families BFG, BFH, BFI, and BFJ were
not conferred a dynastic status. According to Sjogren`s (2011) business family dynasty
definition, seven business families in the study sample qualify as dynastic business families.
Business families BFA, BFB, BFC, BFE, BFF, and BFK are considered old dynasties. Business
family BFD was the only young dynasty. The additional category of nascent dynasty is created to
classify and retain business family BFG in the study sample. Business family BFG already
manifests very significant social and economic positions and influences in its country of origin
without meeting the dynastic familial control timeline requirement of a young dynasty. Families
BFH, BFI, and BFJ were not considered dynastic business families according to either dynastic
definitional validation approaches.
Although not considered dynastic according to Sjogren (2011), business families BFG,
BFH, and BFI were retained in the study sample for a number of reasons. First, the purpose of
this study is to explore the concept of family strategy within business families. Therefore, having
dynastic and non-dynastic business families in the study sample provide an opportunity to
investigate the existence, the components, and possible differences of a family strategy within
different business family types. Second, from the interview data, families BFH and BFI
displayed strong evidence of a family strategy given their degree of family governance
formalization, business family continuity goal, and family cohesiveness. Finally, including
families BFG, BFH, and BFI in the study sample helped uncover factors that lead to, or
prevented, the emergence and attainment of a business family dynasty. Business family BFJ was
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excluded from the study as the family failed to meet a number of dynastic definitional criteria
plus the interview lacked any evidence of a business family strategy.
Table 8 Dynastic Status Validation of Business Family Study Sample

Business
Family
BFA
BFB
BFC
BFD
BFE
BFF
BFG
BFH
BFI
BFJ
BFK

Step One: Dynastic
Status Assignment
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes

Step Two: Dynastic Status according to Sjogren (2011) Criteria
Dynastic Familial
Significant
Significant Economic
Control Timeline
Dynasty
Social Positions
Positions &
Type
& Influences
Influences
G10/G11
Old
Yes
Yes
G14/G15
Old
Yes
Yes
G8/G9
Old
Yes
Yes
G3/G4
Young
Yes
Yes
G4/G5
Old
Yes
Yes
G4/G5
Old
Yes
Yes
G1/G2
Nascent
Yes
Yes
G3/G4
Young
No
Yes
G3/G4
Young
No
Yes
G3/G4
Young
No
Yes
G12/G13
Old
Yes
Yes

Source: Own
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CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
This chapter presents this study`s data analysis and results. The output of this chapter is
the result of an iterative process of comparing and analyzing the study`s data and the relevant
extant literature. The study`s data collection process relied principally on semi-structured
interviews and archival data as explained in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 starts by discussing the
qualitative analysis steps used to assemble this study`s data structure. The data structure depicts
the five main categories used to describe the overarching theme of dynastic business family
strategy. Each main category and their key codes with supporting data are presented next. The
dynastic business family strategy conceptual framework that emerged from the analysis is
presented and discussed in Chapter 5.
4.1 Qualitative Analysis
The purpose of this study is to explore family strategy in dynastic business families. To
best capture the multi-level and multi-dimension socially constructed nature of business family
strategy, a qualitative research study was undertaken (Langley & Abdallah, 2011). From a
purposeful sample of business family informants, data were collected about the situated
meanings, processes, individuals, groups, and actions related to the elements and creation of a
family strategy in the dynastic business family context. The primary source of data were semistructured interviews (see Appendix A for the interview guide) with informants from 11 North
American and European business families. As explained in Chapter 3, the grounded theory
approach guided the interview process (Charmaz, 2014).
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The computer-assisted qualitative analysis software (CAQDAS) Atlas Ti V.7 supported
the storage, coding, and analysis of the interview transcripts, field notes, and archival data. The
use of CAQDAS is an accepted grounded theory influenced research tool for social sciences and
business studies (Woods, Paulus, Atkins, and Macklin, 2016). The qualitative database contained
15 interview transcripts (232 pages), 10 field note documents (30 pages), and 17 pieces of
archival data.
4.1.1 Emergence of theoretical codes.
Data coding evolved throughout the study as the database of interview transcripts, field
notes, and archival data grew. Data coding started with initial codes, or open coding, derived
from the interviewee transcripts (LaRossa, 2005). The initial codes were labeled to best describe
the interpretation of a quote`s content, meaning, and identity of the business family interviewee
(Charmaz, 2014). The choice of words used to label the initial codes, emergent theoretical codes,
categories, and themes was influenced by the researcher's professional past and the literature
review supporting this study (Charmaz, 2014). The construction of codes represents the
researcher's view in thinking about what is significant and what is happening in the data
(Charmaz, 2014). Several initial codes may be used to make sense of a quote. Table 9 provides a
sample of initial codes generated from the interview transcript with Interviewee BFK.
Table 9 Sample of Initial Codes from BFK Interview Transcript

Source: Own Atlas ti study database
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The sample initial codes in Table 10 identify Interviewee BFK discussing various
attributes of the Council of Owners, which is a business family governance mechanism. PDGB
refers to Interviewee`s identity. Throughout the study, the coding sought to capture interviewee's
identity, business family, topics, contexts, and actions. This initial coding exercise was repeated
for each piece of study data, be it transcripts, field notes, or archives. A total of 2861 initial
codes were generated from the 15 interviews.
Throughout the data coding exercise, the coding stock was constantly re-evaluated. In the
interview data, a number of themes, topics, conflicts, and situations emerged as common themes
or patterns. Therefore, initial codes were aggregated into code families (Charmaz, 2014). Code
families represent a higher level of abstract thinking and analysis about the meaning of initial
codes. Code families are like focused codes meant to help classify units of data into categories of
similar and dissimilar meanings. These aggregated abstract interpretations were free of people
and context providing greater theoretical direction, reach, and centrality in the researcher's
thinking (Charmaz, 2014). These code families assist the researcher in appreciating what is
emerging from the nascent analysis. Furthermore, the code families provide a guide as to topics
and concepts that require further investigation during the subsequent interviews. Chart 1 depicts
the quantitative evolution of the initial and family codes by the cumulative number of interviews
completed.
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Chart 1 Evolution of Study Coding as a Function of Total Interviews Conducted
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By the ninth interview, code families totaled 100 and eventually peaked at 154 after the
final interview. Between the tenth and fifteenth interviews, the number of code families varied
between 142 and 154 as initial and family coding was reviewed and relabeled. At this point,
evidence of some form of theoretical saturation emerged. It became apparent that the number of
code families remained constant even as the number of interviews, quotes, and initial codes
increased. Therefore, the next step consisted of higher-order data aggregation by creating initial
theoretical codes from code families (Charmaz, 2014).
Initial theoretical codes were developed by comparing code families and revisiting the
extant literature connected to the code families and initial theoretical codes. At this point, the
form of the research transitioned from inductive to abductive as both theory and data were
evaluated in tandem (Gioia et al., 2013). By continuously iterating between data structure and the
literature, some of the findings had precedents, but also offered glimmers of conceptual
revelations. The initial theoretical codes included business family member socialization, family
capital, business family organization and structure, business family group dynamics, business
family strategy, and family values and goals. Appendix B depicts the set of code families created
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and categorized from the initial theoretical codes. A visual representation of the importance of
each initial theoretical code according to the number of quotes, initial codes, and codes families
is offered in Chart 2.
Chart 2 Importance of Initial Theoretical Codes
Intial Theoretical Code Importance by Quotations, Initial Codes and Code
Famlies
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Source: Own Atlas ti study database
Six initial theoretical codes emerged by aggregating data from all business family
informants. It was difficult to know how each individual business family contributed to the
overall analysis. There was concern that the initial coding and aggregation approach would fail
to reveal idiosyncrasies unique to each informant. There was a risk forgoing potential rich
findings. Therefore, to deepen the data analysis, each individual business family in the study was
compared against each initial theoretical code and the extant literature. Although arduous, it was
a worthwhile step. From this exercise, the overarching dimension of dynastic business family
strategy and its categories surfaced. These are explicated in the remaining sections of this
chapter.
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4.2 Overarching Theme and Categories
In the following sections, the study findings are presented in a top-down approach, which
is counter to the actual research process. This line of presentation aims to make it easier for the
reader to appreciate the theory development as the overarching theme cascades into categories,
codes, and then into rich quotes. The overarching theme "dynastic business family strategy"
emerged from iterative interpretation and comparison of individual dynastic business family data
and relevant literature. The dynastic business family strategy overarching theme is defined and
described through a number of connected categories, codes, and quotes. Table 10 depicts the
study`s data structure as a summary view of the study`s connected theme, categories, and codes.
Table 10 Summary of Connected Overarching Theme, Categories, and Codes
Key Codes
FAMILY
Cohesion values
FORTUNE
Family consumption values
Family investment values
Family giving values
Family goals
Fortune goals
Business family champion
FAMILY CAPITAL
Interactivity of family capital
components
ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES
BUSINESS FAMILY GOVERNANCE

Categories

Overarching Theme

VALUES

GOALS
STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

DYNASTIC BUSINESS
FAMILY
STRATEGY

RESOURCES
SYSTEMS OF
ORGANIZATION

Source: Own
This research’s qualitative data analysis and the literature review as well as the
researcher’s experiences as a business family strategic advisor stimulated the conceptual leap to
identify and describe the key components of a dynastic business family strategy. The conceptual
leap involved "bridging the gap between empirical data and theory" (Klag and Langley, 2013) to
uncover a new sense making way and representation of an aspect of these dynastic business
families' social world. Five organizational components came together to generate a dynastic
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business family strategy emergent theory: values, goals, strategic leadership, resources, and
systems of organization. The interplay among these five components to produce a dynastic
business family strategy is not straightforward. Within each component are many nested subcomponents that are realized in dynamic internal and external contexts. Each dynastic business
family strategy component is discussed in Chapter 4.
4.2.1 Dynastic business family strategy.
A dynastic business family strategy can be understood as the strategic choice(s) and
actions that are designed to multigenerationally entwine family and fortune. A dynastic business
family strategy, defined as a family level phenomenon, is distinct from other business family
strategies like the corporate strategy. This distinct nature of a business family strategy is further
elucidated by Interviewee BFC:
[Is there a difference between a family strategy and a corporate strategy?] Yes, because
there is a part of the family that manages the business, they are intrinsically part of the
business, and then there is a very significant part of the family which is stationary, not
really involved [French to English translation by researcher] (Interviewee BFC, QU:
28:36).
A number of the business family interviewees disclosed the existence and uniqueness of
a family strategy. For example, dynastic business family BFD engaged and managed a dynastic
business family strategy:
…we’ve got this 10-year thing that everybody subscribed to. [Ten-year thing being a 10year plan?] Yes. [And what would I find in that plan?] Basically, how would anybody
exit if they want to exit, but how we will run the company [G3-G5 family owned
investment company] in the meantime…annual meetings, you know…how the board will
be comprised…what it’s responsible for and so on. [But the family council, does it only
affect the [family owned investment company] or…? Oh, no, affects the whole thing. It’s
the whole thing. Now, this is not what your textbook would tell you about. [And when was
this put in place?] This was put in place four-and-a-half years ago when we exited the
[G2 family owned investment company] [And did you hire external consultants to come
up with this idea?] No. We just did it ourselves. [And who was the champion leading this
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effort?] Probably [non-family CEO of G3-G5 family owned investment company] and I.
(Interviewee BFD, QU: 41:22)
From the quote above, interviewee BFD acknowledges the existence of a family plan. Recalling
from the literature review, a plan can be considered a strategy. The BFD business family strategy
has a ten-year horizon. There is some thought to family membership adhesion and exit from the
plan and the family owned investment company. Interviewee BFD and his CEO are business
family strategists tasked with the conceptualization and implementation of the family plan. A
family re-organization where business family wealth was transitioning from the second to the
third generation precipitated the development of their strategy. The family strategy or plan is
connected to the family`s organizational entities: the family owned investment company and
family council, including the board as a governance mechanism. The family strategy is currently
addressing the business family needs of the third to the fifth generations.
Interviewee BFK calls the business family strategy a conceptual plan that addresses the
needs and concerns of the business family owners:
…we ask the council of owners to prepare a conceptual plan of the views of the owners.
Now, what’s that? It’s not a strategic plan. The strategic plan is your baby, and you
determine what we are going to do to make this accomplished. But, the conceptual plan is
broad-brush, it’s a longer-term vision. It’s not into the details, it’s into the concepts,
conceptual plan, and we don’t need to do it every year, you know, once every 2-3 year is
just fine – with revisions if we want to — but basically, it’s giving the broad guidelines to
the Board about what the owners would be happy to see. The one subject that the owners
insist upon is that element of return to them, or the dividend policy, and the owners say:
“it’s never enough,” because they would like to have more, and therefore, the owners
have got a responsibility to tell the Board of directors what they would wish to have in
the way of dividends; with one provision: that it not weaken the financial position of the
business. In other words: “Harry, if you can afford it, we wouldn’t mind to see a 10 to
15% dividend, this year, because we’ve got a lot of personal demands from some of our
members, there, in South Florida, and things like that. If you can do it, it’s an ease. We
are not telling you what it is, because it depends on the money that’s available, and we
don’t see all the things that you guys see, as the head of corporate governance. If you can
afford it, we would be happy. You know, this is the fourth year we’ve had no dividends.
Don’t you think we can forgo some of the acquisition route that you are doing, and give
us a bit of a return?” In other words, the owners are not dictating, but they are saying:
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“hey Board, you got to think about us a little bit, here. If you can afford it, not weaken
the company. Okay, you can’t this year, but look, it would be the fifth year, and we would
like to see a dividend declared.” (Interviewee BFK, QU: 10: 17).

Business family BFK`s view of their family strategy or conceptual plan is distinct from, yet
linked to the family firm's strategic plan by way of the Council of Owners and the board of
directors. The Council of Owners is a business family governance mechanism representative of
the family's active and non-active owners. The conceptual plan encompasses the owners' longterm vision. It communicates the owners' expectations to the board of directors of the family
controlled business. As part of their set of expectations, the conceptual plan deals with the
allocation and distribution of business family financial resources to advance business goals and
meet the consumption needs and wants of individual family owners. All the while, the BFK
family strategy conveys to their business managers the family owners' value of financial
conservatism.
Chairperson of the family council and fourth-generation BFI business family member
offers a third example of a business family strategy and some of its key components:
So what I did was basically put together a strategy based on our vision which is
essentially what I described to you, having essential family directors, and leaders, great
relationships, good partners in the business and you know, and a strong fifth-generation
program, that is really what our vision is of where we wanted to go and essentially what
we did was establish what our key values were as a group (Interviewee BFI, QU: 20:12).
This BFI business family member played a strategic leadership role in the conceptualization of
the family strategy. She further identifies the existence of values and goals in a group values
formulation process. From the quote above, business family member BFI demonstrates the
comprehensiveness of a family strategy as their strategy deals with matters related to
development and succession of family human capital to fulfill governance roles in their family
business.
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Because business family informant BFK views their family as an organization not unlike
the entities connected to the management of their fortune, a business family strategy distinctly
emerges:
The family is an organization. The family comes together every year…They’ve got to
have a budget—now they all put money in… And the sooner we realised that, the better it
could be, because it has its own set of rules, of policies, of procedures, of systems of
organization, of conflict resolution—things different from the business and different from
the owners. (Interviewee BFK, QU: 2: 8992).
Interviewee BFK provides insights about how their family deals with the matters of cohesion,
pooling of resources, governance of family, and family members.
By identifying the family as an organization connected yet separate from the other
business family organizational entities, the idea and relevance of a business family strategy gains
credence. Furthermore, from the representative quotes above, the five key elements composing a
business family strategy begin to emerge. Although not all of the business families in the study
had an explicit business family strategy, all of them evidenced aspects of values, goals, strategic
leadership, resources, and systems of organization. In the following sections, rich data will be
presented to better situate each dynastic business family strategy component. Then, a dynastic
business family strategy conceptual framework that integrates all components is presented in
Chapter 5.
4.2.2 Component 1 of dynastic business family strategy: family values.
As revealed in the findings, business family values represented a higher order of beliefs.
The principal dynastic business family values observed in the study's business family sample
were divided between family and fortune to offer more clarity and differentiation about their
beliefs and expected behaviors. Family values gravitated toward family cohesion. Fortune values
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converged toward beliefs and norms about how the family and its membership should own,
consume, invest, and donate the family fortune.
Table 11 presents the principal family values that emerged from the data. The family
values are also categorized by dynastic business family and dynasty type. Although divided into
two main groups of family and fortune, these two value groups are very much interconnected.
For example, the financial conservatism fortune value, as explained by interviewee BFB, where
family shareholders favor resilience and slack resources ("rainy day funds") to ensure the
business family CEO`s decision-making independence and ability to operate for the long term:
So, the continuation of the company is important. I have had annual meetings with
shareholders where I declared the dividend, which they refused, because they said it was
too high. They said: put it in your reserves. It’s fabulous, of course, if you don’t have
those shareholders breathing in your neck, like you would have in stock companies,
where you have to perform every quarter, you are busy reporting all the time; it makes
you think short-term. (Interviewee BFB, QU: 3: 67).

Table 11 Principal Family Values by Business Family and Type
Business
Family
Type

Family
Business
Families

BFA

Old
Dynasty

BFB

Cohesion Values
Acceptance of family
member life choices
Intergenerational
collaboration
Early integration of next
generation into family
business life
Inclusiveness
Inclusiveness
Ancestors are revered
for contributions
Protestant roots
Early integration of next
generation into family
business life
Family unity
Mutual respect
Acceptance of family
member life choices
Transparency
Power and strength in
numbers

Consumption Values

Frugality
Living within your
means
Modesty
Balanced conspicuous
consumption
Entitlement bad
Work and sense of
accomplishment
Lifestyle conditional
on dividends not asset
base
Self-sufficiency
Entrepreneurship
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Fortune
Investing
Values
Family ownership
control
Family strategic
control
Core Operating
Company continuity

Family Ownership
control
Family strategic
control
Financial
conservatism
Independence
between consumption
and business dividend
policy
Free traders
Strategic renewal
Continuous
reinvestment for
long-term growth

Charitable Giving
Values
Preserving history
of business and
community

Social contribution:
connecting business
activity with
employee welfare
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BFC

Family unity ranks
higher than money and
business dealings
Stewardship
Ancestors are revered
for contributions
Celebrate family history
Acceptance of family
member life choices
Family identity
grounded in business
life
Family unity
Stewardship
Early integration of next
generation into family
business life
Mutual trust
Power and strength in
numbers
Family unity ranks
higher than money and
business dealings
Stewardship
Acceptance of family
member life choices

Business family
leadership team
humble, accessible,
grounded, and risk
takers
Family ownership
control
Strategic ownership
control
Prevent family
shareholder activism
Core Operating
Company continuity
Continuous
reinvestment for
long-term growth
Consolidated
financial holdings

Preserving history
of business,
community and
public service

Family ownership
control
Strategic ownership
control
Reputational risk
management
Regulatory and tax
compliance
Core Operating
Company continuity
Long-term tax
optimization

Social contribution:
giving back

Early integration of next
generation into family
business life
Belief core operating
company anchored to
founding community
Ancestors are revered
for contributions
Stewardship

Family ownership
control
Strategic ownership
control
Core Operating
Company continuity
Continuous
reinvestment for
long-term growth
Independence
between consumption
and business dividend
policy

Preserving history
of business,
community and
public service
Social contribution:
giving back

View of family as
continuously in business
Continued passion for
family continuity
Non-active owners’
belief in ongoing
connection to current
business family
Early integration of next
generation into family
business life
Inclusiveness

Family ownership
control
Strategic ownership
control
Continuous
reinvestment for
long-term growth
Consolidated
financial holdings

Social contribution

BFE

BFF

BFK

Long-term
optimization

Lifestyle conditional
on dividends not asset
base
Self-sufficiency
Entitlement bad
Modesty/Discretion
regarding wealth
position
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Family unity
Mutual trust
Transparency
Power and strength in
numbers
Stewardship

Inclusiveness
Family unity
Transparency
Power and strength in
numbers

Young
Dynasty

Nascent
Dynasty

NonDynastic

Frugality
Living within your
means
Modesty
Balanced conspicuous
consumption

BFD

BFG

BFH

Family ownership
control
Strategic ownership
control
Continuous
reinvestment for
long-term growth
Independence
between consumption
and business dividend
policy
Consolidated
financial holdings
Long-term tax
optimization

Early integration of next
generation into family
business life
Inclusiveness
Family unity
Mutual trust
Mutual respect
Acceptance of family
member life choices
Power and strength in
numbers
Family unity ranks
higher than money and
business dealings
Equity

Business family
leadership team
humble, accessible,
grounded, and risk
takers
Family ownership
control
Strategic ownership
control
Core Operating
Company continuity
Continuous
reinvestment for
long-term growth
Independence
between consumption
and business dividend
policy
Consolidated
financial holdings
Long-term tax
optimization

Social contribution

Stewardship
Inclusiveness
Mutual trust
Mutual respect
Acceptance of family
member life choices
Transparency
Family unity ranks
higher than money and
business dealings
Power and strength in
numbers
Equity

Continuous
reinvestment for
long-term growth
Long-term tax
optimization

Social contribution
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BFI

Family identity
grounded in family
business
Inclusiveness
Family unity
Mutual trust
Acceptance of family
member life choices
Early integration of next
generation into family
business life
Transparency
Power and strength in
numbers

Family ownership
control
Strategic ownership
control
Core Operating
Company continuity
Continuous
reinvestment for
long-term growth
Independence
between consumption
and business dividend
policy
Consolidated
financial holdings

Source: Own, Atlas Ti study database
Defining business family values is an exercise froth with difficulty and judgment on
family members' own view of the world. Values are considered subjective by the study`s
dynastic business families. Interviewee BFI describes reaching agreement on the business family
values as a laborious process:
…essentially what we did was establish what our key values were as a group. And that
was one of the most painful things we have ever done because we found out that we had
six shared [family] values as they pertain to the business. And that inclusiveness,
stewardship, transparency, empowerment which is like education, engagement and
relationships (Interviewee BFI, QU: 20:12).
A family member can feel judged by another family member who views a value or set of
beliefs differently. So, who is the rightful arbiter of the meaning or worthiness of a value? Which
family member has the higher moral ground? For example, some family members believed they
have the right to freely spend the family’s financial capital as they see fit. Interviewees BFB,
BFD, and BFHG broached the sensitive topic of personal preferences being constrained or
looked at in a negative light because of business family values. As Interviewee BFHG explains
in the quotation below, agreeing about and living the business family values is not easy. Through
the generations, values undergo changes in some cases because of life course events such as
marital breakups.
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Now you risk falling into a very sanctimonious area, so we need to come back together
and say to one another: "Well, what are our values?" We have never written our values
down. I face the risk of being told: "Yes, that is all well and nice [interviewee BFHG],
but look, with my wealth I can live as I please. If I feel like doing three $20 000 trips a
year, who are you to tell me." Somewhere he is right to feel that way. It is nice to speak of
virtue, everyone is up for virtue; but when it comes to living a virtuous life, excuses easily
come up. "There is my spouse, there are my children, there is the neighborhood…Listen,
I am not about to motor around in an old clunker, and therefore I absolutely need a
BMW…a Maserati for example." Now you enter in areas…that are more delicate. There
are certain great principles on which we generally agree, the family as whole, however
as each generation develops…it is certain a marital separation brings in new
considerations…where now you need to compromise much in the hope of preserving your
relationships with your children [French to English translation by researcher]
(Interviewee BFHG, QU: 9:47).
The dynastic business families in this study demonstrated that family values shape their
decision-making processes, their objectives, the way they organize themselves, the allocation of
resources, and the priority of activities. Values help them appreciate the holistic business family
situation over the long term and thus helps them minimize individual issues. Family values
helped them define their relationship with aspects of their fortune like the family business:
So every decision we made had to basically have met all of the values that we agreed on.
And that was really basically very helpful in our decision-making process, because we
have made a lot of changes in our process, our organization and in our interaction with
the company but because we can start with, like, we say we want to be good stewards, we
say we want to be inclusive, so this is the kind of direction we need to go because we
don’t have to think about the stuff, the foundation elements, we agree on that so actually
we only have to talk about that little thing which is different. And then basically what we
did was to determine that the foundation, as I read out to you was all of those things, that
basically had to look at what are all of the risks and aspirations that we foresee over the
next ten years. And you can basically say we are not going to have enough qualified
directors or you know, or I am afraid that we are not going to have good relationships,
so a risk that you identify you can basically turn into an objective (Interviewee BFI, QU:
20:14).
The next sub-sections of Chapter 4 draw from Table 12 to discuss the evidence regarding
family and fortune values.
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4.2.2.1 Family cohesions values.
The dynastic business families in this study have been together for a long time; some for
centuries as in the cases of dynastic business families BFA, BFB, and BFC. They expressed a
continued desire to remain together. To be cohesive as a family unit is more than a call for unity.
Their cohesiveness emerged and was sustained because an ensemble of family values are shared
and lived by the majority of family members.
The desire to remain together as a family was managed by business family strategic
leaders. Geographical dispersion was overcome to build and maintain family bonds. In the case
of BFI, family council members were all encouraged to bring their children (G5) to meetings.
The BFI family council wanted to make sure that G5 children socialized together to maintain a
familial bond:
And the other thing that we do during our family council meetings, is we actually, most of
the people on the family council have G5s who are 13 and under and so we provide –
four two-day meetings a year, and we bring the G5s in with us and they actually get
(inaudible) they play during those two-day meetings and we have a family get-together
on one of the nights. And that is actually been probably the most brilliant thing that we
have ever done even though it was born out of convenience, I mean we decided, we will
get more G4s if they can bring their kids. The closeness of the relationships that these
G5s have, I mean they have known each other since infancy and I think I calculated that
they have seen each other about 20 days a year and they live all over the country
(Interviewee BFI, QU: 20:23).
Interviewee BFHS, a G4 business family member, explained how one of the family foundations
played a role in bringing the next generation together through group learning around the common
purpose of philanthropy. Interviewee BFHS`s grandfather saw giving activities as an opportunity
for the future generations to come and stay together:
The objective of sensitizing family members, the young to affairs of business, that is
essential. We must be sensitized to affairs of business, and for that, the way it was done,
my grandfather already had a private foundation which he had set up; he set up a second
foundation which he gave to G4 family members. He said to us: « This is your
foundation, organize yourselves with this. » It has been a great tool for us, on one hand
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to bring us together, but mostly to touch on all the basics of management, economics,
financial reporting … begin to meet professionals who would help us in our plans and
activities,… and develop our values. (Interviewee BFHS, QU: 29: 9).
Cohesiveness implied unity as it refers to these families' decisions to act in unison in the
pursuit of their organizational goals and in their decision-making. By acting in unison, these
business families favor group diversity and pooling of resources to gain more perspectives:
…nice to get a much large swatch of the family, because I feel that is healthier, cause you
are getting more perspectives you know and things like that…(Interviewee BFI, QU:
20:43).
A condition is set upon us: under no circumstances, in all the decisions you will be asked
to make, you will not jeopardize family unity. Therefore, beyond money, above all else,
Dad and Mom are still alive at this time – family unity dominates even till this day as the
issue was debated amongst the family. It is an important anchoring point [French to
English translation by researcher] (Interviewee BFHG, QU: 9:18).
Family unity improved risk management through diversity of perspectives and
experiences. A unified business family enables better exploitation of risks and opportunities as
they are better understood by all family members; each family voice is heard and considered in
the evaluation process. Family unity facilitated the onboarding process of ideas and people:
The seven of us [G3 siblings] we were equal? There is not one sibling that could, even if
some siblings spoke more loudly than the others, but that did not matter, as that did not
mean they were more right than others. We mutually protected one another. I have often
explained: "I probably would be livid, pitiful, and poor, as I am no longer an
entrepreneur, and I would have been duped by someone. But because I am with my
brothers and sisters, our projects are tabled for all us to criticize. Hence, we learned to
work together and we saw the benefits of working and learning together (Interviewee
BFHG, QU: 9:28).
Family unity is viewed as a way of doing things. It is dependent on trust particularly
toward the business family leadership, and that in time of conflict there is the capacity for all to
communicate. For dynastic business family BFC, the belief in family cohesion is composed and
instituted in the early part of the 19th century by the family`s forefathers in the family charter.
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The BFC family charter strongly advised all present and future generations to remain a united
family as this was in the best interest of all:
The family charter is constant reminder to remain together…it is more beneficial than
carrying on as a fractured group…It is a way of doing things: we must trust those
[business family leaders] that manage the business [portfolio of business holdings] and
yes we must trust and stay united, or hence, if there are tensions, we must communicate
[French to English translation by researcher] (Interviewee BFC, QU: 28:3031).
Interviewee BFC disclosed the original family charter during the course of this research project,
but for confidentiality reasons asked that it not be reproduced or referenced. The family charter is
preserved in the business family museum.
The desire for family unity was motivated by a proactive approach to conflict avoidance
and resolution. Gravitating toward a common vision, honesty, and awareness of individual
differences enabled problem resolution as a cohesive family. They were anticipatory and
proactive in addressing issues. They realized a proactive approach kept issues from growing into
full-blown emotional conflicts:
Because conflicts are managed as they emerge. When something happens, I think we are
very proactive. We see a situation, and I think we share a common vision and being very
conscious of individual differences, we are a united family. We do not tell lies. I will not
tell one family member I will give you this, and make sure you tell no one. If we are going
to lie amongst each other it is because we consciously decided to do so. [French to
English translation by researcher] (Interviewee BFGES, QU: 5:30).
… We must trust one and another and stay united, or if they are tensions we must
communicate [French to English translation by researcher] (Interviewee BFC, QU, 28:
31).
Family unity is also about strength and power derived from the aggregation of family
members. Dynastic business families see family size as positive overall. Increasing family size
means more coordination, however aggregating people and capital confers greater group and
individual family member benefits:
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Family business models are complicated, but if you can keep it simple, and you can have
mechanisms to resolve conflicts and facilitate communication, and encourage
cooperation, team playing, you’ve got a formula for success. Because you’re much
stronger together, than individually (Interviewee BFK, QU: 10:29).
…the force we have in our family-owned investment company came from the idea of
student movements which I understood and reincarnated in our business family and say:
« Look, the force, if family members scatter in all directions and do anything, well you
have no more force. What is the force of Capital [BFH]? It is the fact that we are all
together and we assess a real estate investment opportunity, for example, we can say:
together we have the means to do this investment, individually we can`t» [Translated
from French to English by researcher] (Interviewee BFHG, QU: 9:38).
Business families were sensitive to breakdowns in family cohesiveness that reduce nextgeneration business family involvement and diminished the business family talent pool:
…so going back a generation and in the third generation there was, actually second
generation there was a very bad conflict, and so much so that there are a couple of
legacies from that, one is that we do not have any fourth-generation family members
working in management. And that is because when all the fourth-generations started
thinking about possible employment, I’ve graduated from college I should go into family
business but I never considered employment because it was, you had to be a masochist to
want to work there. That is just how it was, it was totally, totally nuts, there were
meetings, nasty e-mails, there were conference calls left and right, random about
individuals, it was a total mess (Interviewee BFI, 20: 7).
Dynastic business family BFB felt that family branch thinking was to be avoided, as this
is another source of family cohesion breakdown. Differences in capabilities and resources, status
and power between family branches form fault lines that can split the business family. Family
branch heterogeneity comes from differences in values, like a sense of duty to participate and
learn, risk preferences, lifestyles, proclivity to procreate, personality traits, and control and
ownership rights. Therefore, family branch thinking also represents a source of constant work for
the business families' strategic leaders as they monitor the family mood to avoid or quell the
motivation to form family branch identities.
Things you want to avoid, I think, in family businesses is thinking too much in branches;
you know? Brothers amongst each other, sisters, whatever. You know, that’s sister
number three, branch number two, whatever... Yeah, I think they have a bit too much
influence, you know… (Interviewee BFB, QU: 3: 45).
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We really worked hard to get out of branch mentality… if you think about branches, you
basically, especially when it comes to the leadership positions or board seats or
whatever, or representation on the family council, you basically are supporting an
entitled requirement (Interviewee BFI, QU: 20:47)
4.2.2.2 Family consumption values.
Family consumption values are about what the families and their members could extract
from the family fortune for personal consumption. Consumption values were linked to
entitlement. Entitlement essentially refers to the individual's belief in what he or she "deserves"
(Naumann, Minsky, Sturman, 2002). From this entitlement perspective, dynastic business
families in this study viewed entitlement not as one deserving a free lunch or a set of preestablished rights because of one`s position or affiliation within the family. Rather, they
understand and expect entitlement as an exchange of one`s effort and contribution to the business
family for a share of the fortune`s distributions. And if not understood that way it becomes a
problem to recruit engaged family members into the ownership responsibilities of the family
fortune.
The whole work thing is a problem and the fact is that it is inhibiting our capability to
bring in highly talented directors, to develop highly qualified directors because that is
actually one of our requirements is that not that you have to work for every paycheck, but
we have to be really inclusive of the people who don’t have to work, but they actually
have to be contributors to society and they have to like have meaningful, make a
meaningful contribution in the organization. Be a cheerleader for your own children, or
if you have you own business or whatever, you have to work, you have to have some
experience working in an organization and you implemented projects and things like
that… (Interviewee BFI, 20:30).
Family member behaviors contrary to this norm are frowned upon by the business family
leaders:
…because the G4s, they’d like to get the payout higher, and they can’t get it through their
parents. [So, everybody has their own job, their day-to-day job.] Well, some of them do,
some of them don’t. Well, they feel entitled because somehow or other they were born
into a well-to-do family, and they know their worth (Interviewee BFD, QU: 41: 4445).
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Frugality refers to individual attitudes and behaviors related to prudent savings and lack
of wasteful consumption (Killorin, 2017). Saving for a rainy day is not only a value that builds
resiliency and preparation for harder days ahead, but it is also a reminder to live within the
family`s current and future financial means:
Huguenot roots: philosophy-free traders: needed to maintain innovation. Huguenot Protestantism: "don`t go beyond your means," "live within your means," modesty.
Make sure a sense of entitlement is not created in all family members, and future
generations. Sure there may be deviations from time to time, the importance of
frugality always returns (Interviewee BFB, QU: 4:9).
Business family BFG, which has the first- to third-generation family members working in
the family enterprise, warns of all of their eventual downfall should they behave as landlords.
The BFG family head reinforces the idea that entitlement and lack of self-sufficiency is a proven
recipe for their financial decline.
Hence, the notion of "income heir"…I do not believe you are providing a great
service to someone. If you want to destroy a family, give them a 100 million dollars.
In 50 years, there will be barely anything left [French to English translation by
researcher] (Interviewee BFGES, QU: 5:52).
The BFE multibillionaire business family, like the billionaire BFG business family, sets
the norm of education and self-sufficiency for all family members. The expectation that a family
member can draw on the family fortune without contributing to its growth is considered
unacceptable.
As a family member you are expected to be educated and seek out your own path.
Entitlement is not acceptable (Interviewee BFE, QU: 33:39).
Excessive entitlement and excessive conspicuous consumption are seen as values that
negatively influence the family fortune`s longevity because the rate of drawdowns is likely
greater than the rate of capital replenishment. The BFB business family reminds us of the visible
signs of uncontrolled and unsustainable family consumption patterns.
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It sounds crazy to say so — I think you just have a certain modesty. Typically, one of
the things . . . is what you saw with the Vanderbilt family, which suddenly, they all
started to fly in jets, and the whole thing started to collapse. They were spending 1
million a day, whatever. That’s what you see happening more often with family
companies, particularly the 3rd4th generation; they start spending all the assets
(Interviewee BFB, QU: 3:75).
The case of BFE business family is quite fascinating when compared to business family
BFB. The BFE Family Office CEO views his family members living a modest lifestyle, or as he
calls it "Quiet Wealth." Strangely, it seems that modesty, like beauty, lies in the eyes of the
beholder. The archival data on the BFE family shows that their high spending lifestyle and
significant funding activities of their private foundations are anything but "Quiet Wealth." It
would seem as suggested by Veblen`s Theory of leisure class that conspicuous consumption is a
means of elevating one`s social class position (Veblen, 1899).
Family Office Managing Director believes the members of the family branches he
deals with espouse the idea of a Quiet Wealth (Interviewee BFE, QU: 33:39).
BFB is a protestant European business family whose roots date back to the 17th century.
This business family informant stresses the importance of a strong work ethic. They believe that
the next generation cannot expect to receive just because business family resources are available.
The next generation must demonstrate its ability to provide for itself.
You have to earn it to yourself. It’s not something… You know, because you have
dividends or whatever that you can afford whatever. You have to earn it. You have to
work for it (Interviewee BFB, QU: 3:77).
The sense of work ethic does not always prevail. As in the case of business family BFD
where 12 family members of the third and fourth generations each receive $400,000 annually in
dividends from their investment portfolio. Some family members hold menial jobs, many do not
work, and most are vocal in their desire to receive greater dividends.
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The BFG family connects pride of ownership to the value of one`s work and sense of
accomplishment; not only in business, but also in all undertakings. The pride of ownership is one
of the most prized values as it teaches the family member how to resolve problems and overcome
adversity; it is a motivational force (Pierce, Rubenfeld, and Morgan, 1991). As explained by the
Chairman of the BFG business family group, pride associated with what is earned develops
within the person a sense of stewardship as opposed to entitlement:
If you teach him or her to work, whatever the obstacle, because he or she can… they will
know how to pick themselves up and move forward, because I believe it is the most
beautiful value, anyhow, one of the most beautiful values, if not the most beautiful one, to
teach someone how to work, in any field, but work. Plus, you have the additional merit of
having done your work. Something we have worked on, we care for. On the other hand,
in the case we are given something, we may be less attentive and caring [French to
English translation by researcher] (Interviewee BFGES, QU: 5:53).
4.2.2.3 Family investing values.
The financial conservatism value permeates many aspects of the dynastic business family
life. Its influence is far-reaching and in seen in the business family's shareholder base as well as
their operating company-supplier relationships.
There is the case of business family BFB`s shareholders refusing dividends declared by
the board of their operating company. They felt the excess capital should be held as reserves for
market opportunities and resilience. Compared to non-family publicly listed companies, such
shareholder behavior is unusual.
I have had annual meetings with shareholders where I declared the dividend, which
they refused, because they said it was too high. They said: put it in your reserves.
(Interviewee BFB, QU: 3:67).
Business family BFG is attuned to the consumption habits of the owners and managers of
their various suppliers. Individuals who display signs of conspicuous consumption are closely
monitored for unusual price increases. To business family BFG, conspicuous spending habits
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suggest that profits are distributed for lifestyle instead of supporting corporate growth and the
needs of clients.
Our suppliers whom we notice start showing up in the big Corvettes and bid
Cadillacs, and they start pushing prices higher. At a given point, they lose us; it's
over. They fall. Those that do well and seek to sow, to grow steadily, and to
accumulate, rarely will these suppliers stray off course [French to English translation
by researcher]. (Interviewee BFGES, QU: 5:2).
Like family unity, unity of fortune indicates to stakeholders and partners the business
family represents significant scale of capital. Such scale projects power that positively influences
the business family's conditions and terms of trade. An aggregated, as opposed to fragmented,
view of the family fortune provides improved deal flow and access to better resources.
Everything was kept together because he believed in keeping things in one spot and,
you know, watching the pot. And, you know, you got better exposure, I guess, and
better service and what have you for having a large company than having a half a
dozen little ones. So, he believed in consolidation. He believed in consolidation of
capital. Of capital. And showing a consolidated position to whoever he had to deal
with. And that represented force or stability. (Interviewee BFD, QU: 40:37).
Family investing values may be compromised if distributed earnings and family
shareholder consumption demands are not in balance. A generous dividend policy may fuel
family member entitlement. Although financially unrelated, changes in company market value
can create divergent views amongst family members regarding appropriate long-term dividend
payout. Too generous a policy may compromise the sustainability of the business that feeds
family members' lifestyles.
Well, they feel entitled because somehow or other they were born into a well-to-do
family, and they know their worth. Well, for example, each of them is worth 4 million
dollars more this week than they were 10 days ago, net worth, because of the uptick in
the value of [Company H]. But you can’t spend it. Now, I don’t know how many houses
you can own or how many vehicles you can have or…you know. And there’s quite a
difference of opinion between the G3s as to how much should come out. I mean, you have
some that would cut the dividend out entirely. And you’ve got some that would like to
increase it some more. So, you’ve got this job of managing expectations and reality.
(Interviewee BFD, QU: 41:45).
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In the case of business family BFI, Interviewee BFI explains that some of the family
members are entirely dependent on dividend income to fund their lifestyles. Furthermore, these
family members will dynamically adjust their lifestyle according to the dividend payout in order
to avoid work needed to compensate for an income shortfall from dividends:
…this is the one thing that I find really confounding because I have many, many family
members, and this is actually, and I am being honest, one of the biggest problems that I
have in our family is that I have family members for whom it doesn’t matter how much
dividends they get, they will adjust their life style to it – so they were halved, they would
figure out how to live with half and actually not go and get a job (Interviewee BFI, QU:
20:30).
For some of the business families, the core operating family enterprise is viewed as an
‘evergreen’ asset, a long-term family fortune component from which one may receive and use its
dividends to consume, to give, or to invest, but which may never be sold. In the case of the BFE
business family, the core operating company, which bears the family name, has grown from a
regional to a global food processor.
Recently, he explained to the 18 year old son of a mother who owns a percentage of [BFE
company] that family members have only the right to lifetime dividend. There will be no
liquidity event, [BFE family company] will not be sold. Therefore, the task at hand is to
protect, grow, and transfer the family business to subsequent generations. (Interviewee
BFE, QU: 33:39).
As discussed by interviewee BFK, business family longevity implies a passionate
identification with a business family lineage extending beyond four hundred years. This
continuous sense of business family involvement is not necessarily limited to a single business:
You are speaking to a person whom as always been passionate about business family
longevity because our family is one of the oldest North American families which has
always been in the family business domain for [multiple centuries]. I am the 12th
generation which has continuously been in a family business. But not always the same
business [French to English translation by researcher]. (Interviewee BFK, QU: 2:4).
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Investment decisions framed in a horizon greater than fifty (50) years seems to further reinforce
the dynastic business family's very long term orientation. The very long time horizon also seems
to enhance the integration of family and fortune goals in decision-making:
Family members have an investment horizon of 50+ years. The objective is to grow
capital consistently and continuously. (Interviewee BFE, QU: 33:20).
For the BFC business family, enduring beyond two hundred years was made possible by
sustaining a religious-like will to continuously pursue the improvement of the community's
social welfare. Religion may be used as metaphor to mean passion and unyielding belief:
[According to you, why has [BFC] survived for more than 200 years till this day?] I think
because there is a great will to continue giving work to people, it`s … yes it is a will, and
a bit like a religion [French to English translation by researcher]. (Interviewee BFC,
QU: 28:40).
Continuity not only comes from a strong will, it also comes about from a sense of duty
because family and fortune are embedded into the community for generations. For example, a
merger or acquisition decision must consider the impact on a dynastic business family's
ownership and managerial control and future strategic paths:
I made [my children] independently wealthy, because we shared the product of selling
our company. They wanted desperately to do a big acquisition, and came all the way
close, and the [seller] said: “I will do it, but I need to control.” And they said: “no.” So,
I said: “that’s a tiebreaker”, and they said: “Either you buy us, or we buy you”, and he
had more money, and they offered to buy us, so they sold the [core operating] at that
point. The family ended up with a huge pile of money… (Interviewee BFK, QU: 10: 26).
Or, the family business, as a component of the business family fortune, cannot be simply
disposed of without undermining the integrity of the dynastic business family system:
With the goal that is a business which his great grandfather founded, and has endured,
that his grandfather developed, and then his father, and it is something which he does not
own, will transfer to his children and grandchildren, and it is an enterprise with a strong
moral connection with the country`s citizens, year after year all the friends which passed
through the business, the business cannot be simply sold like nothing of it, or let it
disappear … (Interviewee BFC, QU: 28:22).
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The strategy, well, it is:« the company shares you own, these are lent to you, these shares
are not really your property; you must grow, the value of the shares must grow and these
must be transferred to your children, and grandchildren [French to English translation by
researcher] (Interviewee BFC, QU: 28:36).
4.2.2.4 Family giving values.
Business family giving entails a wide range of philanthropic work and social roles
undertaken by the business families in this study. Philanthropic work involved, for example,
creating a private foundation aligned with a family cause. A private foundation is an
institutionalized way of allocating private resources to provide a public good (Rey-Garcia &
Puig-Raposo, 2013). Social roles relate to positions family members occupy that allow them to
influence public policy, such as by holding public office or serving in government.
For the dynastic business families in this study, giving to others is not only measured and
validated in economic terms, but also in terms of social contributions. At the most basic level,
the business families in this study expected family members to leave the "world" a better place,
be it in environmental terms or for mankind in general. These acts of social betterment start with
one`s daily work and are lived every day.
As suggested by interviewee BFHG, a family member's social contribution starts with the
outcome of one`s work. However, the connection between work and social contribution may
dissipate through the generations.
Because a value which is very important…work. Not only the notion of work, but
your contribution to society, and that value was strongly instilled in our parents.
It was also very strong in my brothers and sisters. In my mind it is less apparent, I
am not sure, but these values I see them less in the G4 family members, this notion
of work and contributing to society [French to English translation by researcher]
(Interviewee BFHG, QU: 9:44).
Business families in this study were sensitive to their social role and influence in business and
community. Over the long term, they view the business family as entwined with business and
community. For example, in the case of the BFF family, there is a strong multigenerational
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commitment to social good. For five generations, providing good employment opportunities,
continued economic renewal, dedication to municipal and provincial public service, and
preservation of public parks represent some of the multifaceted outcomes of family giving
values. The BFF business family demonstrate the symbiotic nature of investing and giving
values.
He wasn’t looking to take a lot of money out because going back to one of your
fundamental issues, it’s always been important to the family members that had significant
influence that this business stay here and continue to employ people here and that it not
be sold, that it continue to make its incredible commitment to the [region] of [BFF
country]. And that commitment goes way beyond just employing people. I mean, [BFFW]
was mayor; we’ve got two [parliamentarians] out of the [BFF] family…X.X., who went
on to become [governors]. [BFF business family member] was the founder of the [BFF
Country [Regional] Economic Council, served on the board of [large communication
company] for a long period of time. Even today, I mean, we’ve got the [BFF]Park that’s
downtown; we’ve got the [BFF]Nature Park, which is an absolutely gorgeous
[significant acreage] piece of land that [BFF business family member] wanted left as a
full-time nature park at the time of his demise. So, there’s been an enormous integration
between family members and the community over the years, over the generations." And
I’m not much different. Still got some real serious activities in terms of trying to change
up our town and so forth and so on (Interviewee BFF, QU: 42:33).
4.2.3 Component 2 of dynastic business family strategy: family and fortune goals.
Goals are "specific achievements the attainment of which will serve to fulfill the strategy"
(Raynor, 1998, p. 370). The boundary differentiating a business family value from a goal was not
always clear, probably because none of the business family informants disclosed the benchmarks
or parameters used to measure, monitor, and compare goal attainment. However, the
permeability between dynastic business family values and their goals reflected the extent to
which they were integral to a family strategy.
Business family goals were organized for ease of explanation according to family and
fortune goals. In reality, family and fortune goals are quite interdependent. There were multiple
business family and fortune goals identified in this study. These are presented in Table 12.
Dynastic business family goals as a whole were focused on unity, harmony, and continuity of
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family and control of fortune. On the fortune side of goals, the older dynastic business families
paid more attention to preserving and promoting an entrepreneurial mindset within the business
family. Family and fortune goals are discussed separately in the next sections.
Table 12 Dynastic Business Family Principal Family and Fortune Goals
Business
Family
Type

Sample
Business
Families
BFA

•
•
•

BFB

•
•
•
•

BFC
Old
Dynasty

•
•
•
•

Family Goals
Integrate past, present, and future
Socialize next gen family members
into business family life
Recognizing business family
ancestors
Family continuity
Family unity
Constructive and harmonious
relationship with family business
management
Good and transparent
communications
Family unity
Family harmony
Civic duty
Act like a steward of family
fortune

Fortune Goals
N/A

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

BFE

•
•
BFF

BFK

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Young
Dynasty

BFD

•
•
•

Family social goals supersede
family economic goals
Maintain social contract with
company`s founding city
Civic duty
Family organization continuity
Protect economic base
Family unity

•
•

Family leadership goal of strategic
thinking
Focus on business family issues to
be considered and managed by
future generations
Draft family strategic map
Individual lifestyle goals
Cohesiveness of family assets and
members

•
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•
•
•

•
•

Family business continuity
Recruiting competent family talent
Set very long-term vision of family
business
Family ownership control of family
business
Entrepreneurial mindset
Maintain financial flexibility
Family ownership control
Recruit trustworthy and competent
family leadership
Building good corporate citizenship
image
Financial capital goal of consistent
and continuous growth
Family ownership control of family
business
Family business continuity
Family ownership control of family
business
Family managerial control of family
business
Protect and sustain ownership
control of family interests
Social contribution: promote and
train business family intrapreneurs
Maximize long-term after-tax
wealth
Family ownership control of
operating companies
Minimize agency risks from
professionalization
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•
•
•
•
Nascent
Dynasty

Family continuity
Family unity
Family harmony
Individual fulfillment

BFG

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

BFH

•
•
•
•

NonDynastic
•

BFI

•
•
•
•

Family unity
Creating environments/structures
for experiential individual and
group learning
Fluid family communications
(information flow)
Ensure sense of inclusiveness for
all family members
Individual fulfillment
Maintain constructive and
harmonious relationship with
family business management
Generate pool of qualified family
directors for board of directors of
operating company
Creating and ensuring positive
climate for future generations
Business family life is a positive
and fulfilling for family members
Socialize fifth-generation family
members into business family life
Harmony

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Re-investment of profits
Consolidated financial capital
Family business continuity
Family ownership control of family
business
Family managerial control of family
business
Steady and continuous growth of
financial capital
Recruiting competent family talent
Integrate social responsibility in
financial decision-making
Create KSAO3 stock/inventory at
individual, group, and
organizational levels
Transfer KSAO stocks across
generations
Continuous and steady growth of
financial capital
Family business continuity
Family ownership control
Attract and retain top professional
management

Source: Own, Atlas ti study database
The data reveal findings related to goals as desired outcomes or objectives, and not so
much in terms of the family goal setting and monitoring processes. However, the data show that
the actual goal-setting process used by dynastic business families ranged from formalized to
informal. For example, the BFI business family goal setting was part of the business family
strategy formulation process:
…you basically turn your risks, your aspirations and your vision into objectives and then
you implement, you determine what strategy you have to put together in order to

3

KSAO means Knowledge, Skills, Abilities, and Other characteristics.
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implement that and all the programs and planning that you need to execute (Interviewee
BFI, QU: 20:14).
Interviewee BFK suggested family owners and members collaborate and communicate to
prioritize family goals:
Owners inform family members about realism of family goals in light of business
constraints. There is a goal prioritization exercise which takes place (Interviewee BFK,
QU: 1: 2122).
A more informal goal-setting process is found in the BFB business family: for an old dynasty
like the BFB family, the appearance of informality prevails because over the centuries the family
has codified some dominant logic enabling decision-making that is more reliant on a sense of
duty and less on procedural formality.
[From the family perspective; are there goals that are discussed within the family?] Not
formally…I think that’s the thing that every shareholder understands. You can ask why?
Well, it’s simply because there is a sense of obligation towards your ancestors who have
done a lot of work to take the company where it is now, and so there is a certain
obligation to continue the company. I felt that, you know, I am just part of a chain and I
am to pass it on to the next generation. It’s not that I was thinking about that all the time,
of course, but it is in the back of your mind (Interviewee BFB, QU: 3: 65-67).
4.2.3.1 Family goals.
Dynastic business family-level goals gravitated toward family unity and harmony, nextgeneration family member socialization and integration, and family member talent fulfilment and
development. These goals are congruent with the set of dynastic business family level values of
cohesion discussed earlier. Business families in the study aspire for family harmony as a
cohesive whole. This means they want to be harmonious while being productive together. Many
of the business families wanted to make sure that family members experienced fulfilled and
rewarding personal and business family lives. For example, Interviewee BFI, the family council
chair states:
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…we had to make sure that our 5th generation who, at that time, was about fourteen and

younger, really make sure that they were, that every interaction that they had with the
family, at the company was exciting, fun and educational. So we needed to basically put
the fourth generation’s experience on its head for the fifth generation and say we are not
going to introduce you to the family chaos and the horrors of being in a family business,
we are going to show you that it is amazing, fun… (Interviewee BFI, QU: 20:11).
Business family BFB interviewee encouraged his sons to “do their own thing” and seek out their
own business ventures. The next generation of children would not have their life prescribed by
primogeniture rules.
By maintaining a cohesive family whole, the business families felt they improved the
odds of retaining and training leadership talent to drive the many facets of a dynastic business
family. Interviewee BFI supports the importance of a deep family talent pool to achieve its
family ownership control objective:
…better have a ten year plan to match our capabilities so that … can hire highly

sophisticated family directors, because we did not have anybody in management, the
board now became more and more important so we could have highly sophisticated
family directors, highly sophisticated family leaders to guide and update the family
through the spirit of the changes in the business and that we would continue to focus on
really managing our family and maintaining very positive working relationships which,
with 50 people is very difficult (Interviewee BFI, QU: 20:11).
Business family BFC pursued multiple goals directed at integrating the next generation of
business family members:
[How is the next generation initiated, informed, or involved in the business family?] We
have an annual event called Next Gen where our children are invited to spend a weekend
at our office located in one of our castles in the founding city of our family enterprises.
One our family leaders explains to the children how our business family is constituted
and operates, etc. [What are the goals of the Next Gen event?]The goal is to retain the
family enterprises, to show that these enterprises are not some abstract concept…there is
a family bond to the business…it is not just share certificates that all children of current
shareholders would just simply sell like a stock market transaction. Ownership is lived in
a family enterprise sprit with a history, a philosophy, an opportunity to creating lasting
bonds, and recognizing the value of family [French to English translation by researcher]
(Interviewee BFC, QU: 28: 67).
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The multiple goals included the continuous control of the family enterprise. Control of the family
enterprise is not an abstraction, but it is lived through the family bonds and business. These goals
were embedded in the business family's history and culture.
Interviewee BFD stated that ultimately the goal is to keep together family and fortune.
Strength in numbers enables the pooling of resources and capabilities to run the family fortune.
Splintering of family and fortune weaken the group's power and effectiveness in sustaining
business family longevity as eventually capital and sources of family successors would be
depleted.
[So, the ultimate objective of keeping things together, making sure…] Yeah, that I think is
the primary, number-one…Cohesiveness of the people and the capital. Yeah, because I
don’t think that individually they can run it right. It’ll be far less effective if it’s
splintered. And we have the example of that in the [other significant business family from
the same region]. There were two…there was one daughter, and then she had two sons.
They basically are pissing it away, and they’re getting lots of kudos from the art
community and all that kind of stuff. But they have no successors (Interviewee BFD, QU:
41:32).
4.2.3.2 Family fortune goals.
The family fortune goals of dynastic business families in this study focus around family
ownership and managerial control, long-term investment horizons and continuity of control, and
wealth maximization. These family fortune goals were not directed only to a family business, but
they were also related to the family office, the family owned investment company, the
foundation(s), and intrapreneurship and venturing. Each of these organizational entities are
related to the management of the family fortune. The family fortune goals in some respect
require active balancing at a family level. In some cases, the balancing attempts became more of
a battle between what was desirable or appropriate to consume today relative to how much
should be saved and invested for tomorrow. Some families like BFE focused on long-term
growth and capital appreciation.
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Family members have an investment horizon of 50+ years. The objective is to grow
capital consistently and continuously. The 2008/2009 financial crisis did not detract
family members from their investment strategy even if they experienced negative returns.
The family member reaction was to invest more capital as crisis was equated to
opportunity. Family members are patient investors. Short term underperformance will
not detract from their game plan (Interviewee BFE, QU: 33:20).
Others like business family BFD actively managed the tension between some current family
members' desired income for lifestyle and the fortune's capacity to deliver consumable income
while regenerating. These conflicting goals were integrated within the business family's
investment strategy:
They basically feel that…you know, their biggest issue at this point is…they all want to
live a lifestyle that doesn’t require them to do any work, by and large. We’re paying out
400,000 dollars a year to each family. In dividends. But you see, our problem is, we’re
asset-rich and cash-poor. And, you know, so, the question was, you pay out
dividends…and we’ve paid out two special dividends of 5 million and 12 million. So, 17
plus 8…they paid out 25 million. In other words, each family’s got roughly 5 million over
the last four years. And, you know, in my way of thinking, that’s enough to live on, but
they don’t think that, some of them…[So, this goes back to a question that I asked a few
minutes ago about thoughts that you want to put on paper.] I’ve laid it out. It’ll be an
economic environmental overview of where I think we are and where we’re headed. And
then it’ll be a cash flow with the assets we have; and it’ll be discussion of the assets we
have and then what changes should we make, if any, in those assets; and are people
prepared to live with that knowing that this is what will result from it? It’s an investment
strategy, but then it’s tied into what people’s expectations and desires, wishes are
(Interviewee BFD, QU: 41: 4344, 48).
The old dynasties in this study prefer a high level of family involvement to ensure
ownership and managerial control. Family fortune ownership goals are characterized by the
diversity, the participation, the control intention, and succession of its shareholders. In the case
of their multi-century trading group BFB, interviewee BFB explained that the family business
issued new shares from the treasury to family members to address their family fortune ownership
and financial growth goals:
[So, the 45 shareholders: where are they? Are they all over the world?] Yes, they are
pretty spread out, so if we have an annual meeting, certainly, not all of them will show
up, but it’s a growing… Because we did an emission of shares, a couple of years ago;
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basically offering shares also to new family members, new shareholders. [And you raise
capital because there was a business opportunity, a change in direction…?] Yes, we
wanted to support, well, your own assets, to do more, be able to invest in more and more
businesses… So that… And apart from that, the other effect is that you get a wider field of
shareholders, which actually happened. There is a new generation, which came in the
shareholders, so… Actually, the shareholdership is growing (Interviewee BFB, QU: 3:
5355).
Intrapreneurship and venturing, avoiding strategic entrenchment, and continuous tax
planning were means to protect and grow the family`s financial and physical resources.
Interviewee BFK spells out the merits of intrapreneurship:
[You were a family business, you are now a business family, but now, the business family
is creating a legacy to spawn…] … More family businesses. Yes, yes. That’s why the
concept of entrepreneurship is so strong. So powerful. Because I could never get my
grandson to join our company, but I could certainly join him in his company and in the
beginning, he controls it; “you can do whatever you wish," but he is bringing me in an
area I never… I didn’t know, no interest, but he’s bringing me there, and he is showing
me it can succeed, it’s successful, so I am a win-win. I see that growing, and I have our
family entity growing, and the family will provide him with some help and support. So, we
are going to have… I don’t have the dynasty of the French, who build this huge
conglomerate in Paris, but I see the possibilities of a… Keeping the family together, on a
business scale, as well, with the entrepreneurship concept (Interviewee BFK, QU:
10:2728).
The business family leadership goal was characterized by the incessant preoccupation
and need for leadership succession routes and leadership competencies. If the business family
wished to maintain a high level of family involvement in the pursuit of its dynastic goals, many
business family roles necessarily required family successors. Interviewee BFC, family
shareholder of a two-hundred-year-old business, states that leadership competency was a
necessary ingredient for the next two hundred years:
[And so, if you had to project for another 200 years what will ensure your continuity?]
...and that the individuals and the person leading the enterprise be competent [French to
English translation by researcher] (Interviewee BFC, QU: 28:41).
As Interviewee BFI explains, business family leadership succession was inevitable and
somewhat predictable but difficult to prepare for:
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…how many times have I got caught off guard like oh my gosh, we have a ten-year-old
we should probably be throwing something to them about the company and you know just
getting caught off guard as each transitions are happening, that is the lowest, that is the
guaranteed thing, what you should be able … you know what is coming, you may not
know the exact date, but you know that this 60-year-old is probably going to retire in the
next ten years (Interviewee BFI, QU: 20:36).
Continuous control of family fortune was linked to the continuity of family cohesiveness
as explained below by Interviewee BFD. The current leader of the BFD business family affirmed
his sense of duty to facilitate business family longevity through leadership, organization, and
structure. He felt obligated to leave a recipe book, or operations manual for the next generation
to make sure unethical professional agents did not undermine the business family fortune.
I can’t rule it from the grave. I don’t want to rule it from the grave. I’d just like to set it
up in such a way that they can’t screw it up. [Now, what would that mean? How would
you describe screwing it up?] Basically, all going their own separate ways and taking
their own assets and trying to have somebody else who is smarter than they are manage
them for them…who may or may not be as smart as they think they are or as ethical as
they should be (Interviewee BFD, QU: 41:26).
Dedicating family capital to next-generation entrepreneurial initiatives supports
continuous business family control. An example of such a next-generation family entrepreneurial
initiative is an entrepreneurial legacy fund structured and financed by the 12th-generation BFK
family head. This legacy fund aimed to grow the family fortune and ensure its continuous
multigenerational family control of entrepreneurial opportunities:
And now, I am going one step further, so I take that back: yes I hope it will happen, but it
will happen with the entrepreneurship initiative, because I am putting all my wealth into
a Legacy fund, to help encourage those next-generation members to start their own
company in partnership with the family. In other words: young [family member], You
want to control your own company, and that is 51%; we will share the 49% with you,
provide a little bit of the money, and some of the advice, counsel, and we will become
your partner. And this is what has happened to the family in France that become… I just
came back from France, to find out how they do it, to make 30 new companies that have
started in the past 10 years. 30, with members of their family, next generations, that they
are founding in partnership with them. I want to see the same thing happen in my family,
so that’s when it will happen... (Interviewee BFK, QU: 10:26).
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The goal of family business continuity is important. Its importance stemmed from a sense
of obligation toward those who built the business to its present state. The current generation was
tasked to steward the business for the next generation. This sentiment was echoed by interviewee
BFB:
[There are 45 shareholders right now, and their respective in-laws or spouses; what

goals are communicated or exchanged amongst you? What is important?] Importance?
Certainly it’s continuity; I think that’s the thing that every shareholder understands. You
can ask why? Well, it’s simply because there is a sense of obligation towards your
ancestors who have done a lot of work to take the company where it is now, and so there
is a certain obligation to continue the company. I felt that, you know, I am just part of a
chain and I am to pass it on to the next generation. It’s not that I was thinking about that
all the time, of course, but it is in the back of your mind. So, the continuation of the
company is important (Interviewee BFB, QU: 3: 6667).
The goal of wealth maximization or continuity was also connected to minimizing taxes.
Organizational entities were created and maintained, and estate freeze techniques were used to
avoid or defer taxes multi-generationally. For business family BFD founder, tax minimization
was a business life goal. A business family with a significant estate tax bill indicated poor
planning.
No, I think his master plan… [Founder of BFD business family] believed the guy that had
the most money at the end of the game was the winner. And when [founder of other
significant business family in same region as BFD] died…and he left a taxable estate of
about 20 million dollars…he was reported to have said, “My God,” he says, “I thought
he was smarter than that.” Because his objective in life was to minimize taxes. …[So,
how did your mum and dad…at some point, when your grandfather deceased…your mum
had a significant estate and her siblings’ to take care of.] Yes. [How did that unfold?]
Well, most of the value stayed within the ambit of my grandfather, in the sense…he did an
estate freeze for the three children in 1946, back at the point in time at which, you know,
nobody was even thinking about estate planning. I remember in 1963, at Christmas time,
I carried to [a major financial center] all the share certificates for [a leading insurance
company], in a great big shoebox, to have them transferred from one company to
another, to set a new cost base on them, so if they brought in a capital gains tax at some
point, he wouldn’t have to start from ground zero. He was always looking ahead. And he
was great friends with the finance minister during the Second World War. And he was the
Member of Parliament for his constituency (Interviewee BFD, QU: 40: 32).
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4.2.4 Component 3 of dynastic business family strategy: strategic leadership.
Business family strategic leadership refers to business family members who thought and
behaved to plan, execute, monitor, and adjust business family strategy. Within this study's
business family sample, one or multiple business family champions located in the family
assembly, the family council, the family owned investment company, the family business, or a
family private foundation embodies the strategizing role.
4.2.4.1 Business family champion: an organizational steward.
A business family champion can be a current or next-generation leader "who emerges in
the ownership group and serves to develop, catalyze, and lead the nonoperating owners of a
family enterprise in their responsibilities (Nacht, 2015, p.8)." A business family champion can
also be a current or next-generation family champion of continuity exiting a family legacy
business (Salvato et al., 2010). In this study, the business family champion included family
members who occupied family leadership roles, which included the chairperson or director of the
family council, chairperson or CEO of the family office, of the family controlled operating
company or companies, and family owned private foundation, and the head of the family
assembly.
Business family champions were identified in the BFB, BFD, BFF, BFG, BFH, BFI, and
BFK business families. In the cases of business families BFA and BFC, business family
champions were not identified likely due to a lack of interview data. Table 13 describes the
attributes of this study's business family champions.
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Table 13 Business Family Champion Attributes

Business
Family
BFB

Business
Family
Champion
Interviewee
BFB

Business
Family
Generation

Business Family Champion
Position

14th

Business family owner; exCEO of business family
operating company

3rd

Business family owner,
Chairman of business family
investment company

•

•
BFD

BFF

BFG

BFH

Interviewee
BFD

Interviewee
BFF

Interviewee
BFGES

Interviewee
BFHG, BFHS

4th

1st

3rd, 4th

Business family owner,
Business family operating
company
Executive chairman, former
Business family operating
company CEO
Business family owner,
founder and chairman of
business family operating
company and family owned
investment company
BFHG: G3 business family
owner, Family office
Chairperson
BFHS: G4 business family
owner, President of G4
family owned operating
company

•
•

•

•
•
•
•

BFI

Interviewee
BFI

BFK

Interviewee
BFK

4th

Family Council Chair,
Family business board
member

12th

Former business family
operating company CEO,
Chair of multiple business
family controlled foundations

•

•

Areas
Of
Strategic Thinking
& Stewardship
Lead CEO succession of
family business with family
shareholders and board of
directors
Coaching 4th-generation
family leaders
Framing business family
strategy with CEO of family
owned investment company
Facilitating 5th-generation
family CEO succession and
transition processes with
board of directors

Setting and reinforcing the
business family values set for
2nd- and 3rd-generation active
and non-active business
family members
Planning leadership team
succession process
Leading business family
strategic change
Integrating G4 and G5 family
members into business family
responsibilities
Develops and manages a
business family strategy
process to re-integrate
business family members and
integrate G5 family members
Develops and manages the
business family leadership
talent pool aligned with
corporate governance needs
of family operating company
Ensuring continuity of
multigenerational family
entrepreneurial mindset

Source: Own, Atlas ti study database
Table 14 shows business family champions were not only present in the family system,
they also are present in the various organizational entities of a dynastic business family. The
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business family strategic leaders existed at different generational timelines. The business family
strategic leaders were engaged in numerous business family strategic activities. These activities
of strategic thinking and stewardship spanned from leadership succession, to developing and
promoting a family entrepreneurial mindset, to integrating family members into business family,
to reinforcing business family values. As strategic leaders, business family champions worked
with other strategic family leaders like board members, family assembly leader, or the CEO of
the family office or operating company.
In this study, the family council chairperson exemplifies one of the business family
champion positions at the family level. The family council chairperson was typically elected by
the business family membership. The main responsibilities of the family council chair, as
identified in this study, are highlighted in Table 14.
Table 14 Main Responsibilities of Family Council Chairperson
Family Council Chairperson Responsibilities
•

Provide corporate updates to family

•

Act as a corporate board observer or
family business board member

•

Manage family conflict and family
business management relations

•

Develop family strategy derived from
family vision

•

Influence board of director composition
process

Representative Interviewee Quotes
"…allow the chair of the family council to sit in on all board
meetings and make a report to the family afterwards"
(Interviewee BFD, QU: 41:17).
"So, what we do at the moment is we allow the chair of the
family council to sit in on all board meetings" (Interviewee
BFD, QU: 41:17).
"And there was a lack of transparency about the business, so we
really tried to be you know, that something would come over the
fence and blow up and instead of creating that environment we
would not engage the discussion at that point in time,
incendiary questions and really dive deep into like what their
concerns were, what were their questions like you know, made
sure we were not just answering yes or no questions, but really
diving deep into what their issues were and then we put together
a taskforce to do research on it and so basically for the one that
we did on dividend policy" (Interviewee BFI, QU: 20:40).
"So what I did was basically put together a strategy based on
our vision which is essentially what I described to you, having
essential family directors, and leaders, great relationships, good
partners in the business and you know, and a strong fifthgeneration program, that is really what our vision is of where
we wanted to go" (Interviewee BFI, QU: 20:12).
"… in 2010 both of my aunts had like ceased to bring value to
the board, I mean it was kind of an embarrassment at the time,
but we were sort of pressured into allowing them to stay and try
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to figure out how are we going to get them off, because you
know it is awkward, and what we did, we actually have a, one of
the things that we did, it is part of the family strategy, a
competency list of about 50 competencies that we thought
people in different roles would need different numbers of
competencies in order for them to achieve a leadership role or
to be on the board or have an executive term or trustee or those
other roles" (Interviewee BFI, QU: 20:27).

Source: Own, Atlas ti study database
The BFI family council chair worked diligently to revitalize the composition of the
business family`s operating company over-tenured board:
…for my father’s transition out of his position as chairman, was that he had, two third
generation family members who were on the board, who had been on the board for about
40 years, one was, and 40 years ago like our company was totally different and you
know, one of those individuals was selected because they were the major shareholder and
you know hey that’s you will put me on this, and the other person was chosen because she
was a lawyer and family council chair at the time. But you know going up to 2010 both of
my [G3] aunts had like ceased to bring value to the board, I mean it was kind of an
embarrassment at the time, but we were sort of pressured into allowing them to stay and
try to figure out how are we going to get them off, because you know it is awkward
(Interviewee BFI, QU: 20: 27).
A common attribute of the business family champion was their ability to think
strategically. Their behaviors were aligned with the long-term orientation as discussed earlier.
Strategic thinking is seen as a valuable and necessary leadership attribute of business family
strategic leaders. However, a lack of strategic thinking by business family leaders undermined
the business family's longevity as suggested by interviewees BFI and BFB. Interviewee BFI
describes the situation as follows:
That is too bad because you know, had they been thinking strategically as a family, ahead
of the game, he could have said, look I need to prepare you for the fact that we do not
have any family members who can do this, or I need to say look, these are the skills and
capabilities that we need to see in individuals who will maybe be considered as a
replacement. And be very upfront about it, because when you start complaining a couple
of years before you want to retire, but you do not have any successors, whose power is
that? Whose fault is that right? (Interviewee BFI, QU: 20:16).
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Interviewee BFHG further reinforces this lack of strategic thinking where he pleads
guilty to his own shortcomings in his role as Chairperson of the BFH family office. He believed
he lacked proactivity in pushing the family office CEO succession plan as part of their board`s
agenda:
Therefore, my job, as I convened the shareholders together, as I did three weeks ago, the
meeting purpose was a discussion at the Family Office level: who decides what, right
decision-making power is currently in the hands of one person, the Family Office CEO. I
have a problem: Why do I have a problem? Because nature is horrified by a void. So, as
Chairperson of the Family Office Board, I failed to consistently convene my board of
directors to discuss a number of issues…Yes this is one of the big…it is our principal and
current concern. It is succession…at two levels. Let`s call it family succession and
succession of family office operations. [French to English translation by researcher]
(Interviewee BFHG, QU: 9: 78, 83).
Furthermore, he pointed out that his lack of strategic thinking resulted in a situation where no
current G4 family members were prepared to become qualified members of the business family
leadership team.
Strategic thinkers were required to lead strategic renewal in order to manage the
misalignment within some range that is tolerable for the business family. Measuring such a
strategic misalignment and the business family`s tolerance levels were not part of this study.
Shortcoming in strategic thinking by a leader may result in her or his dismissal:
So, when it came time to consider him as chief executive officer, he could implement a
strategy, but he couldn’t create one…simplistic form… [Mr. X] was a good chief
operating officer. But any strategy wears out. Doesn’t take very long for a strategy to run
out or at least have to be refreshed, and [Mr. X] didn’t know how to refresh it, and it was
thank you very much, [Mr. X] (Interviewee BFF, QU: 42: 41).
The other quality attributed to the dynastic business family champion was stewardship.
Interviewee BFHS, a fourth-generation family member, saw himself as a steward of the family
fortune. He used the metaphor of a well-cultivated garden to illustrate that, as a steward there is a
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sense of obligation not to turn the family garden into a pasture. Interviewee BFHS believed he
could achieve the collective desired result with effort without compromising his personal values:
I feel a certain responsibility. I mean, as I see it as if there is a garden, a legacy given to
me. From there, I can let the garden turn to bush, or I can continue cultivating the
garden while respecting my personal values and putting much energy behind my effort
[French to English translation by researcher] (Interviewee BFHS, QU: 29:10)4.
Interviewee BFK displayed strategic thinking and stewardship traits by addressing the
concept of family legacies by making sure the actions of the current family owners created more
than just significant financial wealth for the benefit of future generations:
What does the current family want to leave behind when they’re gone? And that is
something where the owners, those people who want to leave more behind than just their
ownership and their money—those things that they want to leave for the long-term benefit
of the family…to continue building, though I’m not going to do it myself, I’m going to do
it through my grandchildren (Interviewee BFK, QU: 10: 35).
Interviewee BFC`s brother, who was a business family CEO in one of their operating
companies and also holds an informal role of family steward commented:
[By trusting those who lead the family interests, would you, for example, consider that
your brother also occupies the role of family steward?]:«Yes] (Interviewee BFC, QU:
28:32).
In this study`s dynastic business families, there were cases where there was more than
one business family champion in the organization; thus, leadership was shared. While upholding
a common organizational value and goal, dynastic business families shared the burden of
stewardship:
[Our grandfather] believed in consolidation of capital…showing a consolidated position
to whoever he had to deal with. And that represented force or stability or… [So, who
became the head stewards, the people in charge of continuing this way of thinking?]
…two of my cousins and myself as kind of the successors, to the two of them running the
active business parts of the company, me kind of looking after the portfolio [of public
securities] (Interviewee BFD, QU: 40:3738).
4

The abbreviation QU: 20:13 refers to a quote (QU) sourced from study document number 20 and tag number 13 in
the quotations index utilized by AtlasTi. QU always refers to a quotation, whereas the other letters reference a
business family interviewee.
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The quote above illustrates where BFD G3 cousins shared the leadership role by splitting the
family fortune into their respective areas of specialization. Another example of shared leadership
is the case of interviewee BFHS. A G4 family member and president of one of the business
family's investment companies, interviewee BFHS took it upon himself to reflect on ways of onboarding the G5 members into business family life. This issue was being shared with the head of
the family assembly and the chairperson of the family office:
…I said to myself: "it would be time to offer an opportunity for them (G5 family
members) to be sensitized to business affairs… "And from there, I said to myself: "Good,
OK, the relationship they have between each other, the circle is much larger [than the
G4]." Therefore, I said to myself: "the first step is to find a way where everyone can build
bonds." After that, they will decide what they wish to undertake together, what are their
common values, what interests them…after all we have a potential…[French to English
translation by researcher]" (Interviewee BFHS, QU: 29:16).
As revealed in the quote below, a dynastic business family champion, like interviewee
BFI, strategically pieced together multiple components of a family strategy and aligned it with
the family business strategy. As a strategic leader, she recognized her family`s strength and
weaknesses. She acted to resolve the family directorship competency shortcomings in order to
secure the long-term family goal of ownership continuity of the family business:
So we loosened the glue of having family members in office every day and at the same
time the company is going from being majority operated, the majority of the businesses
operated in the USA to two-thirds operations in the [Europe] and China. And you know
most of my family still think that we only make two or three things you know. They do not
even understand the business at that moment in time, let alone something with so much
more complexity. So basically this took me up to a year, I was so, so concerned that
although my family was very passionate about the business and doing the right things,
and we were going to lose [our family owned company] just because it was going to be
too sophisticated for us. And with our outside CEO what I did was basically I decided
that he had a ten-year plan to triple the size of our business, we better have a ten-year
plan to match our capabilities so that … can hire highly sophisticated family directors,
because we did not have anybody in management, the board now became more and more
important so we could have highly sophisticated family directors, highly sophisticated
family leaders to guide and update the family through the spirit of the changes in the
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business and that we would continue to focus on really managing our family and
maintaining very positive working relationships… (Interviewee BFI, QU: 20: 1011).
4.2.5 Component 4 of dynastic business family strategy: resources.
4.2.5.1 Family capital.
The presence of business family capital was evident in this study. The various business
family capital types and their respective properties that emerged from the data are presented
below. Family capital refers to the total fortune of business family resources composed of
human, social, cultural, physical, and financial capital. Significant financial and physical
resources are part of this study's dynastic business family fortunes. Each of these dynastic
business families had a net worth in excess of $100 million. For confidentiality reasons, the net
worth of each family is not disclosed. Definitions for each type of capital are available in
Appendix D.
Interviewee BFHS (G4 family member) highlights that constant attention and tending to
the family capital is required to preserve and grow it lest it depreciate. However, because of
human capital limitations, one family member alone cannot accomplish the mission:
It is as if a garden has been bequeathed to me, and from that point I said to myself: "I can
leave it in brush, or I can continue cultivating the garden while respecting my personal
values, I can apply energy, but I know my own strengths and weaknesses [French to
English translation by researcher] … (Interviewee BFHS, QU: 29:10).
For the dynastic business families in this study, there was a motivation to maintain a
cohesive and growing stock of business family capital, which stemmed from a sense of duty to
protect and ensure its transmission to the next generation. Although there is a sense of duty to
protect and transmit capital, family members were cognizant and grateful for the benefits derived
from the family capital`s transformability into other forms of capital:
I believe in the transmission, to bequeath something to the next generation, because I am
blessed to have inherited all that I have received has given me incredible freedom to
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grow as a human being, as an artist. It gave me time, that`s it, to flourish, hence this
fortune is a fortune of heart and capital, I mean the capital is a force for action; I want to
be able to transmit this to the next generation, as well; I wish to tell the next generation:
«you also have the right to access the fortune as I have not depleted it». [French to
English translation by researcher] (Interviewee BFHS, QU: 29:43).
Family capital in dynastic business families was tradable as it was exchanged within
family and between family and fortune. There was the case of the spouse tending to the
personnel needs of Interviewee BFD`s grandfather who slept for a few hours before re-engaging
in a series of non-stop business transactions. Or, the situation where the significance of the BFH
business family's family capital enabled family members to consider personal development
choices beyond those connected to financial gain. Another example of family capital is the case
of using the human, social, and financial capital of the core operating company`s information and
technology department with that of the family office to customize a portfolio investment and
accounting system for the benefit of the business family membership:
Invested time and family capital to formalize and integrate the accounting and investing
functions. [BFE] IT department and external computer consultants developed software to
retrieve, store, and aggregate investment position and transactional data from investment
manager to custodian to the FO`s General Ledger system (Interviewee BFE: 33: 30).
The state of the business family's human capital was considered critical for business
family longevity. It was viewed as foundational to family capital. Business families BFI and
BFH provided concrete examples of assessing the current and expected future stocks of human
capital. The evaluation of human capital was viewed as necessary to identify temporal
knowledge, skills, and aptitude gaps in light of business family strategy formulation and
implementation:
…what we did, we actually have a, one of the things that we did, it is part of the family

strategy, a competency list of about 50 competencies that we thought people in different
roles would need different numbers of competencies in order for them to achieve a
leadership role or to be on the board or have an executive term or trustee or those other
roles (Interviewee BFI, QU: 20:27).
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The BFH, BFD, and BFK business families provided telling examples of business family
capital transformability. Of particular interest was how these three business families acted to
transform and transfer business family financial, social, and human capital to the next generation.
The third-generation leaders of BFH and BFD business families set up separate family
investment holding companies as subsidiaries of the main family investment holding company.
The subsidiary family investment companies received many millions of dollars equating to
approximately 10% of the business families' total financial capital. Fourth-generation family
members, with the mentoring of third-generation business family leaders were selected and
tasked with the governance and management of the allocated capital. The creation of these
entities was intended to provide learning experiences in order to transfer human and social
capital so the next generation could continue the work of preserving and protecting the business
family's financial and physical capital:
What we have done, as part of our planning program, is to take half a dozen small
companies and group them together, and we call that [subsidiary of 3rd-generation
investment holding company]. And we’ve given that to [G4 family member leader] to
manage, with [G3 family investment holding company CEO]’s supervision. I stayed right
out of it; [vice chairperson of G3 investment holding company] stayed right out of it. And
they’re theirs to decide how business runs and what they want to do with them and how
to learn. That’s the G4s, as a group. And some of them are involved, and some of them
aren’t. Some of them intend, and some of them don’t. And there’s no consistency amongst
that group of who does what. But they’ve had the year and a half at it now, and I think
they’re making progress. I don’t know how else to involve them other than that. They get
about 10 percent of the assets to play with (Interviewee BFD, QU: 41: 69).
Business family BFH deployed a similar strategy as BFD by creating a subsidiary family owned
investment company to be owned and operated by a group of fourteen fourth-generation family
members:
There is mentorship, it is more in the mentorship that it is achieved. Therefore, we will be
mentored, for example in our next generation family owned investment company, we are
mentored but at the same time we are given a lot of decision-making autonomy. Our
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Family Chair has always been present for us, after all he initiated and structured the
idea, convinced his brothers and sisters to all jointly invest. The Family Chair told us: «
I am here, if you need me, I am here, otherwise it is yours to operate…The objective was
continuity, to ensure that we manage, at least a little, of the capital that will be
transferred and that is transferred to us…We, the G4 owners of the next-generation
family owned investment company, created some rules, we created investment rules,
group decision-making rules; from there we operate on a project-by-project, opportunityby-opportunity basis, which are sourced by our Family Office, by G4 family members,
and by our networks, with the objectives of managing the capital well, to make the capital
grow and make sure it endures [French to English translation by researcher].
(Interviewee BFH, QU: 29: 3132).
Total family membership of each dynastic business family represented the family's
current and potential pool of human capital. Family leadership talent was drawn and developed
from the family membership. Interviewee BFI explained the thinking behind this important
business family requirement of developing human capital:
…you actually need to find a successor that has the capabilities not what you need today
but what you need ten years from now. Because by the time you get them up and running
they need to have some bandwidth to actually expand the company or the organization
beyond where they are today (Interviewee BFI, QU: 20:19).
4.2.5.2 Interactivity of the family capital components.
Family capital interactivity refers to the possible interactions between all types of family
capital. Family capital interactions were part of a dynastic business family strategy, and were a
priority for dynastic business families in this study. Family capital interactions are also part of
the business family fortune:
What about the continuity...what about what happens afterwards? In other words, what
about ensuring that something happens with the next generation, with those who follow?
How could we benefit those who are coming with the lessons that we’ve learned along
the way, rather than just chuck it all out the door and let everybody else start all over
again? (Interviewee BFK, QU: 2:94).
As suggested by the questions asked by Interviewee BFK, the dynastic business families
were not only dealing with the continuity of the financial and physical capital, they also had the
challenge of continuously transferring the cumulative knowledge and networks, which were part
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of the business family`s human, cultural, and social capital. To replenish and renew their human,
cultural, and social capital, dynastic business families favored a consolidated and integrated
approach for their physical and financial capital. Such an approach was a force for action:
Ok, we have potential. We have capital in this moment, therefore it represents a force,
and it is a force for action, a distinct force … [French to English translation by
researcher] (Interviewee BFHS, QU: 29:17).
Financial capital was used to underwrite the family membership's human and cultural
capital, which interact together to fuel the business family`s social capital within the family and
their fortune. Examples of this multi-capital dynamic are many in this sample of dynastic
business families. As a first example, interviewee BFC, member of the business family
investment holding company, was trained and worked as an architect. Interviewee BFC was
tasked by the business family to oversee the restoration and maintenance of a portfolio of
multigenerational castles, which date to the early 19th century. The castles represent part of the
cultural heritage and founding community roots of the BFC dynastic business family. These
castles are used to promote the socializing of business family members and their stakeholders,
and also contain a museum depicting the business family history:
The castles of the [city where business family founded], Patriotism, public service, and
entrepreneurship of the [BFC] family membership (Interviewee BFC, QU: 31:1).
The patterns of combining physical, financial, human, cultural, and social capital set up
dynastic narratives that are repeated in the BFA, BFE, and BFF business families. These
narratives served to remind the business family members and their stakeholders of the business
family's position in the community and society in general:
The grandchildren are already initiated to the family business by summers spent in [the
region where the family business was founded in the 18th century], working in the
company museum giving tours. They are learning through these various activities
(Interviewee BFA, QU: 7:11).
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The study findings show how powerful and encompassing social capital was for these
business families. Their social capital set them as a class apart in terms of accessing resources
and opportunities, spanning market, industrial, and geographical boundaries, enhancing business
family status, and resolving conflicts and crises. In the case of increasing its boundary spanning
capabilities, business families BFB, BFC, BFE, BFF, and BFK instituted early on and remained
true to the principle of building a diversified board of directors and making sure the board`s
social capital was transferred to the next generation:
They’ve all got a connection of some kind, which I think will build with [G5 family
member, VP of sales] and [G5 family member, CEO of business family operating
company] here over the next few years. But many of them were people that I knew from
my external experiences as much as anything…or had [regional connections to family
business] roots. And, I mean, still now there are a couple of people with [regional]
roots…one of the financial services business in [major North American financial
center]…So, I won’t say there’s a bit of magic putting it together, but it does involve
those external tentacles out there, and partly because this is an old business, right, 1873,
that is important to the community…that externally there are people that say, well, yeah,
I’m prepared to help (Interviewee BFF, QU: 42:59).
The quote below is an example of the BFF business family enhancing its business family
status through the reaches of their strong social capital to attract recently retired CEOs of
multinational banking and manufacturing companies to their boards:
But his roots, of course, were [from region of business family] as well, [province of
business family]. And so, [Mr. ex-CEO of the country`s largest bank] and I went and had
lunch with [ex-CEO of country`s largest diversified conglomerate] and asked whether he
had an interest in coming, and he chose to join the board and so did for a number of
years… And so, we had a succession of absolutely outstanding board chairs and such.
I’ve had the CEO…president, I should say…of what was one of the biggest [food
processing] firms going, and that connection was made because I was involved in the
[Food Processing] manufacturers Association, chaired it for a period of time
(Interviewee BFF, QU: 42: 21).
Another finding of particular note was the prevalence and importance of business family
advisors as stewards and purveyors of social capital. Trusted business family advisors did not
only dispense advice, they also warehoused and purveyed social capital in the highest business
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spheres for the dynastic business families. Business family advisors were, in many cases, the
dynastic business family`s gateway to access greater human, social, and financial capital in the
spheres of industry, education, politics, and government institutions. Social capital gains were
achieved in terms of expanding social networks and closing structural holes in their networks.
Structural holes represent the disconnected individuals within a social structure (Burt, 1997).
Financial capital was enriched by greater monetary capacity and diversity in terms, conditions,
and sources:
[he trusted [Interviewee BFD`s grandfather lawyer]? That much that…Yeah. His partner,
[name of partner], was kind of the financial guy of the [region]. He was a director of the
[the country`s largest bank]; he was a director of almost all the local companies. And so,
in the late ‘40s, when my grandfather wanted to buy his initial position in [a very large
insurance company], [a large competitor of the country`s largest bank], who was his
bank at that point, wouldn’t provide the money because they said he had more than he
should. And so, he went to [Interviewee BFD`s grandfather law firm], and he got him an
interview with [CEO of the country`s largest banker], and they provided the money, so
they became our second banker (Interviewee BFD, QU: 40:35).
The incumbent dynastic business families were proactive in the introductions of the business
family`s next-generation members to the professional networks of the incumbent business family
generation. These networks formed the basic building blocks of the business family's social
capital:
During my years in a major metropolitan city…I went up there in ’63 and came back in
’66…quite frequently had breakfast with my grandfather. He was in a major metropolitan
city; he usually stayed at the XXX Club [a most prestigious and exclusive private
business club], so it was convenient just to come downtown, have breakfast, and go next
door to an investment dealer office afterwards. And so, I met a lot of the players that
were in his life during that period. And that’s when we got involved in a plantation
takeover battle and so on. Because at that point he had accumulated a very substantial
securities portfolio. And in many cases the directorships plus the actual securities
holdings in significant corporations here. So, it was all a good education for me. You
know, you learned quickly who the shysters were because they cost me money. Who the
good guys were and so on" (Interviewee BFD, QU: 40:15).
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An example of closing a structural hole was the incumbent generation family executive chairman
of the BFF family business working with the new BFF business family CEO to establish
coaching and mentorship relationships with the company's other board members:
So, then we reached the stage where we felt that [Interviewee BFF`s G5 daughter] was
the right one to move into the job, and started that movement six months before she took
the job, to do coaching and training. And we pooled off a lot of input and help from the
board on that one. So, there was a very high level of interaction between board and
[Interviewee BFF`s G5 daughter] in her position as upcoming CEO. And a lot more
dialogue than just takes place at board meetings. So, outside of the board setting, there
was a great deal of interaction…because she’s down here still dealing with the legacy
issues, learning very quickly she needed somebody really hands-on. So, [Interviewee
BFF`s G5 daughter] and I had a long talk about that, and we decided that [ex-CEO of
multinational food processing division] who was serving on our board at that time, that
we’d ask…I mean, I knew him for 20 years. So, he seemed to be the right guy. He knew
the business, right? He’d run one. He knew about commodities (Interviewee BFF, QU:
42: 4648).
Closing structural holes between generations involves the social integration of family
members within and between family branches. Close social connections reinforce and protect
learned norms, expectations, and obligations. Social capital was used by the dynastic business
families to build their social structures and generate human capital enrichment opportunities. A
practical example of intergenerational network closure was the Stewardship Participation Matrix
developed by the BFH business family office chairperson (See Appendix C). This spreadsheet
was developed by the family office chairperson to track the involvement of each family member
in the business family`s numerous family and fortune governance mechanisms (Interviewee
BFHG, QU: 15:1). In time, the business family leadership group assessed family membership
participation and personal development.
4.2.6 Component 5 of dynastic business family strategy: systems of organization.
In this study, dynastic business family organizations resembled an ensemble of
organizations with articulated purposes paired with various systems of organization. Governance
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and organizational entity were two such systems of organization that emerged from this
investigation. First, findings on organizational entities are discussed, followed by the three types
of governance identified in the study's sample of dynastic business families.
4.2.6.1 Organizational entities.
A number of organizational entities were identified from the data. Entities at the family
level included the Family Assembly and the Family Council. The Family Office and the
Investment management/holding company were entities operating at the nexus of family,
business family ownership, fortune consumption, fortune investing, and fortune giving activities.
Philanthropic activities were situated in the dynastic business families' private foundations where
some of their giving activities were organized. The family businesses were located in
commercial operating companies.
Table 15 organizes each type of organizational entity identified in this study by dynastic
business family. The most observed organizational entity in this study sample was the family
owned investment company. Then, the operating companies were divided into family owned
operating companies and family controlled operating companies. The former are 100% owned by
the same business family, and in the latter, the ownership and governance are controlled by the
business family and shared with non-family shareholders.
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Table 15 Organizational Entities Present in Study Business Families

Business
Family
Type

Old
Dynasty

Business
Families
Sample
BFA
BFB
BFC
BFE
BFF
BFK

Young
BFD
Dynasty
Nascent
BFG
Dynasty
BFH
Non
Dynastic
BFI
Organizational Entity
Frequency by Type

Family
Assembly

Family
Council
X

Family
Office

X

X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

9

5

X
3

Private
Foundation
/ Not-ForProfit
Entity
X

X

X
2

Family
Controlled
Operating
Company
(ies)

X

X

X

Family
owned
Operating
Company
(ies)
X

X
X
X
X
X

X

X

Family
Owned
Investment
Company

4

X
X

X
5

6

Source: Own, Atlas ti study database
A family assembly is a formalized family meeting. It is considered a family governance
entity. Business families BFH and BFC were the only two business families in the study to have
instituted a formal Family Assembly:
The family assembly is a workshop for personal growth, for business, and to cement
family bonds [French to English translation by researcher] (Interviewee BFHS, QU:
27:2).
4.2.6.1.1 Family council.
Business families BFA, BFD, and BFI have a family council. According to Interviewee
BFI, the family council is a formal family governance entity instituted to realize the business
family strategy:
The purpose of family governance is to empower a group of people, called the Family
Council, to execute the family strategy (Interviewee BFI, QU: 26:1).
Business family BFD and BFI`s family councils were located in different North
American countries. The BFI family council idea was initiated and led by Interviewee BFI, a G4
family member. The BFD family council was initiated by a group of G4 siblings, children of
Interviewee BFD`s youngest siblings:
134

135
[Who came up with this idea of putting together a family council?] Oh, that came out of
the other generation…my younger siblings…Their two kids…three kids, rather…two of
them…well, probably all three of them…have bought the Kool-Aid and believe all this
stuff that you get from the corporate governance crowd is the be-all and end-all, and you
should have outside directors and all those things (Interviewee BFD, QU: 41:18).
In the case of business family BFI, the G4 family member who initiated the creation of
the family council had no previous work experience in the family owned operating company. For
business family BFD, Interviewee BFD had significant governance and management knowledge
and experience in the ownership and management of the business family investment holding
company:
[And who was the champion leading this effort?] Probably [family owned investment
holding company CEO] and I. You were leading the effort of a family council? [But you
said you weren’t drinking the Kool-Aid.] I know, but I had people want it, so what do you
do? You can’t be perceived as being wrong, can you? [Laughs.] See, I’ve learned a little
bit over the years (Interviewee BFD, QU: 41:23).
This last quote from Interviewee BFD reveals how a new idea from the next generation was
reluctantly received at first by the BFD business family leader, who eventually claimed pride of
ownership and role of initiative champion.
Interviewee BFI, a G4 family member, was not a source of initial resistance like
Interviewee BFD. Interviewee BFI was on the receiving end of the business family resistance to
forming a family council:
I mean basically, there were definitely some very, very, very rough times and there was
actually one period of time, where I had determined that it all was not worth it and I was
being the punching bag for the third generation because they were like so freaked out.
And I was like, this close to quitting, and this was like, I am the family council Chair so
this is my being a consultant this is my major job, but you know, it is also a huge source
of income for me and you know, I had little kids, I could not just like you know quit and
go on to the next thing (Interviewee BFI, QU: 20:21).
Fortunately, Interviewee BFI had the support of her father, who was at the time Chairman of the
board of the family owned operating company:
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…my dad, like I called him up and told him, if I wasn’t depending on this job for my

income I would definitely have left by now, this is ridiculous how you are hard you are
making this. And he and I, what is great about working with my dad is that he never
really, he never really said, I forbid this, you can never… he never made it so hard for me
that I could not implement the thing that I thought was right…But he is also not, he has
done a really good job of stepping back and not being overly, you know, like being heavy
handed in the implementation of this new work, which has been nice you know
(Interviewee BFI, QU: 20:22).
According to Interviewee BFI, some family councils never come to be or are shut down
because there is no business family strategy justifying the continuation of a family council. The
lack of transparency amongst business family members is another reason given for not creating
or for dissolving a family council.
Counter-measures to mitigate the influence of family branch thoughts and actions are
implemented or considered by the business families. One such measure is the implementation of
a family council:
Family council is an opportunity to influence the children, preserve the family talent
pool, limit branch thinking about family, making family lines less visible therefore
encourage thinking about overall and less about one`s branch, which can drive
divisiveness (Interviewee BFB, QU: 4: 14).
The BFI family council was not considered a family branch representative body. Seats on
the family council and the board of directors of the core operating company were available to
family members on the basis of competency, not family branch position. The cohesiveness of
family and fortune had primacy over a family branch's interest. The BFI business family took
this approach in order to favor the development of business family human and social capital:
We are not really a representative organization, we are basically, this group of
individuals who are responsible for representing the entire family all the time. You know,
we do not have any branch representation, we believe that everybody has exactly the
same interests and that is the same with our board, we don’t have branch seats, we have
qualified seats (Interviewee BFI, QU: 20:23).
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4.2.6.1.2 Family office and family owned investment holding company.
In general, significant excess financial and physical capital flowing from the operations
or divestment of the business family's core or legacy operating company (ies) impelled the
formation of a family office or a family owned investment company. Table 16 summarizes the
main purposes behind the creation of a family office or family owned investment company.
Table 16 Purposes of Family Office and Family Owned Investment Companies
Business Family

Type of Entity

Purpose

•

BFC

Family owned
Investment
Company
•

•

BFD

Family owned
Investment
Company
•

BFE

Family office,
internalized as a
division within core
operating company

BFG

Family Owned
Investment
Company,
internalized as a

Hold and manage multiple
and significant control
positions in a limited number
of listed and unlisted
operating companies and
significant real estate holdings
To thwart family activism

Hold and manage multiple
and significant control
positions in a limited number
of listed and unlisted
operating companies and
significant real estate holdings
Control, transparency,
avoidance of agency costs

•

Customized and externally
managed investments, tax
management, and estate
planning for two family
branches through generations
G3-G5

•

Manage excess capital
generated by the operating
company in a diversified
portfolio of public and private
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Interviewee Quote
[What motivated the family to become a
family owned investment company?]
Because about twenty-five years ago, my
uncles, and a cousin at that time had
directorships, and were managing the
businesses on a three-year rotation. Then,
one of the uncles, with another cousin,
and a brother-in-law attempted to sell the
company for cash. Then, my father, with
the help of a great uncle, and one of his
uncle rallied all family members to buy
out the activist family members to gain
majority control within a family sub-group
to ensure enduring family ownership
[French to English translation by
researcher] (Interviewee BFC, QU:
28:21).
…the portfolio because I don’t believe
that you…you know, I don’t think it’s a
good thing to have other people managing
your money, that you don’t know what
they’re doing. Now, that’s contrary to my
life being in the investment business, but if
you can buy companies as opposed to
invest in companies, I think you’re going
to be better off, eventually, long term. We
have a control position...and knowing
what’s happening. And it’s basic. People
got to eat. But, I mean, I told you the five
largest holding… (Interviewee BFD, QU:
41: 1314)
FO goal, make lives simpler for our
clients. Try not to be too
intrusive…focused on regulatory
compliance, corporate minute books,
monthly reporting: accounting and
investment performance, estate freezes,
life insurance coverage for estate taxes
(Interviewee BFE, QU: 33:10, 14).
Source of information is myself as I acted
as a strategic advisor and portfolio
manager to the BFG family for 10 years.
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subsidiary of global
corporate structure

BFH

Family office

BFI

Non-financial family
office

securities; public securities are
mostly externally managed
•

Customized investment
management, tax
management, and estate
planning for seven family
branches through generations
G3-G5

•

Manage growing workload
from instituting business
family governance model

There are two types of family clients: one
type is the family member, the second type
is the personal holding company. The
initial clients were the seven holding
companies representing all G3 sisters and
brothers. Then there are the shareholders
of each of the seven holding companies
[French to English translation by
researcher], (Interviewee BFHG, QU:
9:7).
We do not have enough liquid wealth to
actually create a financial family office. I
think that may come in the next ten years
just because of the trajectory the company
is on. But actually we are in the process of
putting together a non-financial family
office because we have so much work to
do in order for us to keep pace with
building a governance model that is really
going to match the growth of the board
management. So we are actually going to
hire a full-time outside person to actually
help us execute (Interviewee BFI,
QU:20:46)

Source: Own, Atlas ti study database
The family office and family owned investment company were organizational structures
supportive of business family goals discussed earlier: control of ownership and consolidation of
financial and physical capital. The family office or family owned investment company offered a
milieu for the business family to align its family cohesiveness, consumption and investing values
with the thinking and execution of its business family and investing strategies.
A family office and family owned investment company are generally capable of
preparing future transgenerational ownership transitions, optimizing and anticipating overall
business family corporate structures, including estate freezes, planning life insurance coverage
for estate taxes, setting general investment policy guidelines for the benefit of each family
branch, and establishing a network hub of accountants, lawyers, insurance specialists, and
investment managers. A family office and family owned investment company are generally led
by a CEO and governed by a board of directors.
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The family office and family owned investment companies are organizations tasked with
the long-term management of the business family`s financial and physical capital. The business
family members were clients of these organizations. In this study, the family office and family
owned investment company were constituted and instituted as a result of growing organizational
complexity and financial capital. The complexity arose from the growing social interactions and
transactions between family members, the family office leadership and staff, and their many
external stakeholders.
Added to this increase in business family complexity were life course events, like death
or age of key business family members or a trusted family advisor. These events created a human
capital shortfall for adequately dealing with the consequences of these events. This situation
prompted the business family membership to adapt its organizational structure to close the
human capital gap by creating a family office. Such a case was the death of BFE business family
co-founder, which caused the formation of a family office. The estate and tax planning
considerations were beyond the capabilities of existing resources:
Family decision to create a FO [family office] was triggered by the death of [a BFE
business family founder]. The in-house corporate accountant was managing corporate
accounting needs and owners' accounting and tax planning needs on the side. In-house
accountant was about to retire. In-house accountant suggested to business family owners
death of [a business family founder] triggered complex estate planning and tax issues
beyond in-house capabilities. Long time in-house accountant advised BFE family to
consider recruiting outside expertise or possibly set up a family office (Interviewee BFE,
QU: 33: 22).
The formation of a family office may have been the result of a liquidity event, like the
sale of a business. This was the case for business family BFH. The sale of the business family's
operating company and the resulting increase in liquid capital partially explained the creation of
a family office. Interviewee BFHG pointed out that the underlying motivation to create a family
office was the desire of the seven G3 siblings to remain together. They believed in the strength
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and advantages each family member derives from business family cohesion, be it problem
solving or their purchasing power in buying professional goods and services:
…when we decided 30 years ago, when we sold the [family controlled operating
company], we were three family branches, descendants of our grandfather [BFH]. And
we, as one of the family [BFH] branches, we said: « we are accustomed being together,
seven sisters and brothers; let`s continue together. » Because of the seven, there were a
number artists, a gym teacher, one was a former portfolio manager at the [family
controlled operating company], another one in a venture capital firm, one sibling was a
priest, and another one a Member of Parliament. There was with all our diversity, family
members who were skilled in wealth management, some that were not. Since were
already accustomed to working together in a corporation called «Investments BFH », at
least 20 years… We were accustomed to taking decisions together, we said: «It`s ok.
Let`s keep «Investments BFH» and continue doing business together » (Interviewee
BFHG, QU: 9: 16).
The strategic advantages from the family office and the family owned companies
revealed here included the aggregation of family capital, deal flow consolidation and purchasing
power, customization of financial advisory services to family membership, alignment of family
values with investment strategies, capital management mentoring advisory services for nextgeneration entrepreneurship initiatives, and legal management of family ownership and control.
The supporting representative interviewee quotes evidenced each advantage in Table 17.
Table 17 Family Office and Family Owned Investment Company Advantages
Family office and Family owned
Investment Advantages
•

Aggregate family capital

Deal flow and purchasing power

•

Representative Interviewee Quotes
One thing that distinguishes us greatly from others, it is because
to diminish their workloads, often individuals will get non-family
partners. Then come year end you have accumulated 25-30-50
million dollars and then you start distributing the capital to 5 6
partners and then there is only 10 million dollars left. Say some
30 million has exited the business. For us it all stays here in the
business. We hit a year where interest rates spike to 67%, for us
it changes nothing in terms of our revenue. We still make ends
meet, we renew our mortgages, and we continue buying. We stay
the same, however, if we were organized as unrelated partners
and we ask the partners to return their capital distributions
would the partners do so to support the tougher times?
[Translated from French to English by researcher] (Interviewee
BFG, QU: 5:61).
When you have significantly large portfolio it enables you to
access other types of investments, which otherwise would not be
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•
Higher degree of customization for
individuals and family
•
•
Better alignment of services to family
members with family vision and values

•
Capital management mentoring advisory
services for next-generation
entrepreneurship initiatives

•
Legal management of family ownership
and control

available in a small portfolio. We would not have been able to
partner with a large commercial real estate developer or many
other real estate managers. I, alone, would not have been able to
partner with large business partners as 50/50 partners. To be a
united family group attracts large high-quality partners
[Translated from French to English by researcher] (Interviewee
BFHS, QU: 29:59).
…these are funds which we constituted, for example, equities,
global equities, bonds, mortgages, hedge funds which are offered
to family members. These funds were constituted internally.
[Translated from French to English by researcher] (Interviewee
BFHG, QU: 9:7).
FO managing director views each family member as a client with
specific needs (Interviewee BFE, QU: 33: 6).
The family office offers a general perspective on our finances, a
global investment policy, advice and accompaniment at all levels.
Be it buying a residence or investing in a sports centre. I am not
sure a large bank could do all that for us? Our affairs are so
particular, the family office always provides a global vision.
[Translated from French to English by researcher] (Interviewee
BFHS, QU: 29:58).
What we have done, as part of our planning program, is to take
half a dozen small companies and group them together, and we
call that [a subsidiary G4 family owned investment company].
And we’ve given that to [G4 business family member] to manage,
with [CEO of G3 family owned investment company]’s
supervision…And they’re theirs to decide how business runs and
what they want to do with them and how to learn (Interviewee
BFD, QU: 41: 78).
If something were to happen, my next oldest brother is targeted
as vice chairman to take over. I don’t know; we’ve done all the
things we can do, I think, to get started on it. We did a 10-year
basic freeze of anybody exiting, except at a significant penalty
(Interviewee BFD, QU: 41:9).

Source: Own, Atlas ti study database
The "raison d`être" of a family office or family owned company evolved and was
questioned over time. For example, the business family BFH leadership questioned the family
office`s purpose and cost structure as the needs of the business family change due to various
environmental pressures. A change in asset mix required different ways and types of expertise
for managing the business family's assets. The growing cost structure resulting from serving
more family members forced the business family to reconsider modifying the role of the family
office from a single family to a multiple family office. Such a multifamily office structure could
commercially offer its services to other unrelated business families.
141

142
4.2.6.1.3 Giving entities.
Voluntarily giving away parts of the business family fortune to others, excluding family,
is considered acting and behaving philanthropically (Feliu & Botero, 2016). Multiple
manifestations of philanthropic behavior including the presence of giving entities like private
foundations, park conservancies, museums, and charitable giving were revealed in the data.
These entities are another element of the dynastic business family's systems of organization. The
giving entities of the business families in this study are presented in Table 18.
Table 18 Principal Attributes of Dynastic Business Family Giving Entities
Business
Family

Giving
Entity/Practices

•
BFA

•
BFC

Giving Entity Motivation

Giving Entity
Outcome

"Family
name"
Family
business
museum

Dual motives: family and
fortune: co-located to
family owned operating
company: family identity,
strategic: entwinement of
family, operating company
and community

Dual level: Family
next-generation
learning opportunities;
Fortune-reputation and
reinforcement of
strategic entwinement
family operating
company-community

"Family
name"
Business
family
museum

Dual motives: family and
fortune: co-located in
business family head
office: family identity,
strategic: entwinement of
family, family owned
investment and founding
community

Dual level: Family
socialization of nextgen business family
members; Fortunestrategic entwinement
of family, family
owned investment,
community
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Interviewee Quote
"The grandchildren are
already initiated to the
family business by
participating in
…summers spent in
[BFA province of
origin], working in the
company museum
giving tours. They are
learning through these
various activities"
(Interviewee BFA, QU:
7: 11).
There is a family event
named Next Gen for
our children where
they are invited to
spend the weekend in
our founding city
where our head office
is housed in one of our
castles and there the
business, its
constitution, its spirit,
its history, the
connections between
family and business are
explained [French to
English translation by
researcher]
(Interviewee BFC, QU:
28: 67).
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•

"Family
name" Park
conservancy
"Family
Name"
Municipal
Park
"Family
Name"
Corporate
museum
"Annual
product
festival and
parade"

Dual motives: family and
fortune: proximity (same
town and nearby county)
to family owned operating
company: family identity,
strategic: entwinement of
family, operating company
and community, giving
back culture

Dual level: Family
socialization of nextgen business family
members; Fortunestrategic entwinement
of family, family
owned investment,
community

•

Corporate
Charitable
Giving

Dual motives: family and
fortune: co-located in
multiple operating
company communities:
family identity, strategic:
entwinement of family,
fortune and communities
where operating
companies are present,
giving back culture

Dual level: Family
socialization of nextgen business family
members; Fortunestrategic entwinement
of family, operating
companies, and
community, business
family reputation

•

Multiple
"Family
name"
private
foundations

Dual motives: family and
fortune: giving back
culture

Dual level: reputation
of business family

Dual motives: family and
fortune: legacy, wealth
benefits, reputation,
education

Dual level: family and
fortune: family legacy
creation and transfer;
business family
membership's
professional skills and
capabilities
development

•

BFF

•

•

BFG

BFH

•

BFK

•

"Family
name"
private
foundation
"Legacy
driven"
private
foundation
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"[G6 business family
children] were on the
float the [BFF business
family] had in the
recent international
festival parade. We had
the employee family
barbecue two weeks
ago, down at the [BFF]
Nature Park. [G6
business family
children] are all down
there for that; they’re
all mixing with other
kids and employees. So,
they know…you know,
not necessarily any
formal planning…but
they know what’s
happening"
(Interviewee BFF, QU:
42:52).
Source of information
is myself as I acted as a
strategic advisor and
portfolio manager to
the BFG family for 10
years, and the family
business corporate
website identifies
numerous not-for-profit
causes which they fund.
Sources of information
originate from
corporate and private
foundation web sites.
Kept confidential to
protect anonymity of
family and
confidentiality of
Interviewee BFH.
"And now, I am going
one step further, so I
take that back: yes I
hope it will happen, but
it will happen with the
entrepreneurship
initiative, because I am
putting all my wealth
into a Legacy fund, to
help encourage those
next-generation
members to start their
own company in
partnership with the
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family" (Interviewee
BFK, QU: 10: 26).

Source: Own, Atlas ti study database, attributes of giving entities adapted from Feliu and Botero
(2016)
Each business family giving entity was described using a framework adapted from Feliu
and Botero (2016)`s recent literature review on family business philanthropy. The framework
looks at the giving entity practices, motivations, and outcomes for each of the business families
in the study. In general, the business families in this study are motivated to give and expect some
family and social-level outcomes from their philanthropic activities. The creation and
management of giving entities required business family resources. In essence, giving is one way
of consuming the business family fortune.
Giving entities served multiple purposes. They are meant to support both family and
fortune goals. The dynastic business families in Table 19 showed how they used giving to
entwine family, fortune, and community. Giving entities were business family symbols and
locations used to socialize current and next-generation family members into their historical roots
and symbolize the business families' long-term commitment to their communities as explained
below by interviewee BFF:
… it’s always been important to the family members that had significant influence that
this business stay here and continue to employ people here and that it not be sold, that it
continue to make its incredible commitment to the province. And that commitment goes
way beyond just employing people. I mean, [G3 family ceo] was mayor; we’ve got two
MPs out of the BFF family…Even today, I mean, we’ve got the [BFF] Park that’s
downtown; we’ve got the [BFF] Park, which is an absolutely gorgeous piece of land that
[G3 family ceo] wanted left as a full-time nature park at the time of his demise. So,
there’s been an enormous integration between family members and the community over
the years, over the generations. And I’m not much different. Still got some real serious
activities in terms of trying to change up our town and so forth and so on… We formed
something called future [BFF founding city], with some goals to add to our population,
which hasn’t changed since [the country`s birth], and rebuild their downtown core…
(Interviewee BFF, QU: 42:33).
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4.2.6.2 Business family governance.
Business family governance is another important concept related to systems of
organization. Business family governance concerns three types of governance: 1) family
governance, which encompasses the family system of the business family; 2) ownership
governance, which is constituted for the owners of the business family fortune; and 3) corporate
governance, which addresses the governance needs of the business family`s operating entities
including the family office, family owned investment companies, and private foundations.
4.2.6.2.1 Family governance.
In this study, business families held family council meetings on a periodic basis. The
family council`s work in between meetings continued as family task forces were created to study
and report on specific issues, like dividend policy, tax planning, and ownership restructuring.
Family council meetings were conducted with an agenda and according to established rules of
order. Family council meetings included breakout sessions to enhance productivity:
[And is there…did they set up a formal agenda?] Oh, yes. Hell, they’ve got everything
you’d ever expect. Minutes, you know. It’s all done by…they’ve agreed to Robert’s Rules
of Order and…you know, you name it, we’ve been through it all (Interviewee BFD, QU:
41: 21).
The other thing I do in our family councils is I actually do a lot of break up sessions
because I can’t, I really can’t the whole family or the whole family council to really focus
all at the same time on one document or review, or brainstorm with me in-between
meetings so we actually use debates as actual working sessions when we are trying to get
real stuff done and move forward (Interviewee BFI, QU: 20:25).
Formalized family governance served many purposes. Although principally addressing
family needs, family governance served as another means to entwine family and fortune. Family
governance provided a context where the business family strategy evolved to bond the
psychological and legal ownership aspects of the dynastic business family membership:
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I mean sharing assets. And the other is the emotional connection to the business. I
basically think that families who are very focused they really get a big return on and not
only are they getting a financial return on their asset but they are getting an emotional
return, you know, being excited, educated about the business and feeling proud about it
and you get all of these kinds of emotional feelings, be a good employer and a good
environment and things like that. And then you get, it is a relationship where you are
actually able to develop relationships with family members who you would never know
otherwise (Interviewee BFI, QU: 20:4).
Since there are many family members in a family governance mechanism, like a family council,
that are not directly or indirectly legal owners of the business family fortune`s physical and
financial capital, family governance is purposeful, but its effectiveness depends on certain
conditions.
Family governance was effective in the presence of established familial goals. A family
governance mechanism, like a family assembly and a family council provided settings to set
goals, like cementing family relations, developing family leadership talent to support leadership
succession needs, and setting familial fortune distribution policy:
Owners meet and communicate with family members through the family council. Owners
inform family members about realism of family goals in light of business constraints.
There is a goal prioritization exercise which takes place (Interviewee BFK, QU: 1:
2022)
Family governance was effective because it was viewed by the family as a fair,
transparent, and inclusive means to reinforce the long-run advantages of entwining family and
fortune. However, family governance's utility was undermined by the divergence between
individual and family goals. Therefore, bonding family relations involved finding a delicate
balance between individuality and the familial collective. Bonding family relations also involved
finding space for spousal in-laws to be acknowledged and for their contributions to the business
family and the next generation to be recognized:
[In-laws/spouses] can… They come into the family council. They don’t necessarily have a
vote as a shareholder, but they do have some influence, that way, which I think has… If
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you manage that properly, you get more unison within the family. Usually, it’s very tough
to involve the cold side [in-laws], it can be quite risky, as well, but I think that if you do it
carefully, and I’ve implemented that factor in the family council, I think you need some
good manager and leaders in the family council. But I think it’s very good, because it
influences their children (Interviewee BFB, QU: 3: 44).
Family governance generally presented a safe setting for family members to respect and
to reconcile individual choices with those of the business family organization. Not all family
members wanted to or were expected to lead the business family. Some members chose
independent paths or begrudgingly entered an undesired business family role. Interviewee BFB
made the point that he and his father took over the presidency of the BFB operating company not
by choice, but as a result of their familial position and a sense a duty in the face of family crises.
There was no family governance mechanism that effectively balanced the needs of the individual
with those of the business family:
[Interviewee BFB`s father] didn’t have ambitions for a career with the company. His
elder brother died in Indonesia, typhus. He was working for the company then, and my
father wanted a military career. He was of the first groups going. It was independence
time, and the Japanese, and so on, during the war, where in Indonesia at that time. He
was the first military troops going into [Asia], he said: “no, I have to defend my
country!” He was a captain, or something like that down there in the cavalry so we went
there, he got shot, after a year and a half…And then, because his brother had died, also
1949, around that time – was the second in charge, second in line, so his father, my
grandfather said: “well, it’s your turn.” And he had no way of refusing, and that was it
(Interviewee BFB, QU: 3: 87).
I was working, but then my elder brother quits, at the family company. There were some
difficulties going on. My father being a pretty dominant person, and somehow, that
clashed. That happens in family companies. That was when he started to look in my
direction saying: “well, it’s your turn.” I said: “well…” Having experienced the clash
with my older brother, I thought: I’m not quite sure I want to have the same experience…
(Interviewee BFB, QU: 3: 98).
Until recently, in the case of the BFB business family, primogeniture ruled the succession
decision-making process, which did not guarantee the recruitment of the best business family
leadership successor:
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…but on the other hand, it doesn’t necessarily get the best out of the family. It’s could be
that the second, or third, or whatever is much more… Better up. It doesn’t exclude… him
or her… (Interviewee BFB, QU: 3: 23).
Family governance was a milieu to awaken and institutionalize the next generation to the
norms and expectations of the business family. This was not the case for BFD interviewee,
who`s family had no family governance in place and who learned of his business family’s special
economic and social position in a magazine:
And I had no idea of family background until I was away at university. In 1957, I was in
the infirmary with the Asian flu epidemic, and [XXX] Magazine wrote a story about [my
maternal grandfather], saying the guy with the most directorships in the [Country]…But
I was 17 at that point, and I just thought he ran the plant somehow, or the mill. And
money was never talked about at home… (Interviewee BFD, QU: 40: 67).
Family governance was valuable when opportunities existed to empower family members
to learn and appreciate the complexities of developing a dividend policy. Business family wealth
distribution policy influenced the sustainability of entwining family and fortune. However, a
family group that is not decisive in setting a dividend policy can create misunderstanding of
these complexities along with mistrust and suspicion:
[Do you see any family benefits from having restructured the way you structured, to
bring in family governance like you’ve done, from your perspective?] Well, I think it’s
necessary if we’re going to try to keep the family together. Just because some of the
younger people have what I would call more “modern views.” I put that in quotation
marks. That doesn’t mean it’s good. It just means it’s not realistic. [And modern views in
the sense of lifestyle or…?] No…well, lifestyle, corporate governance, and all those
things. They basically feel that…you know, their biggest issue at this point is…they all
want to live a lifestyle that doesn’t require them to do any work, by and large. We’re
paying out XXX,000 dollars a year to each family in dividends, but you see, our problem
is, we’re asset-rich and cash-poor (Interviewee BFD, QU: 41: 43).
Without a clear policy, acrimony can set in, which corrodes family bonds and distracts the
business family leadership from effectively managing the fortune. Business family BFF
experienced such acrimony for many years and it built to the point of bringing the operating
company to the brink of insolvency. A deep chasm was created between two classes of family
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shareholders due to conflicting goals: 1) the non-active family preferred shareholder who was cut
off from the recurring and periodic dividend income, and 2) the active and controlling family
common shareholder who eliminated dividends to conserve cash resulting from a concern for the
long-term performance of the business:
Uncle [brother of Interviewee BFF`s father], who was president at the time, decided that
probably instead of putting money into paying dividends, it should go into buying
equipment…discontinued the dividend, which as controlling shareholder, controlling the
board, he had the ability to do. The preferred shareholders did not have the vote…were
not on the board. But after missing eight quarterly dividends, they had the right to put a
director on…and it became very acrimonious, extremely acrimonious. [sister of uncle]
would stand up on the table in the front office in the old factory and lecture the office
staff on what miserable people their management was…So, the vice president of the
[largest bank in the country]stood up and said…this was a Friday… “If this issue is not
resolved by Monday morning, we’re calling the loan.” And we changed banks once not
long before. There was no way the company was going to change banks at that point in
time (Interviewee BFF, QU: 42:27, 31).
Family governance was useful when content that explained the purposefulness of
business family was created and communicated. Through such documentation, the business
family membership and its stakeholders were reminded of the need to manage family and the
commingling of family and fortune. Two such examples of explanatory content are the business
family logo and the family charter.
Business family BFH has a family logo and tagline as part of its content and
communications strategy. The logo and tagline are meant to clearly signal the family`s values
and position in society as a cohesive business family:
Yes, with a tag line that represents us and resonates well, it is: «Builder of family
values»…We found that is represented well the various aspects of the family. For me, yes
it is letterhead, business cards and it is a means to represent ourselves, and to
consolidate our connection with the external environment, and our business
partners…[French to English translation by researcher] (Interviewee BFHS, QU: 29:60).
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Business family BFC has a family charter that was created by its founder in the early 19th
century. It is a documented and temporal reminder about the virtues of a cohesive business
family:
Yes, we have a family charter. [What does the family charter say? Or what does charter
do for the family? We must remain united. [What purpose does the family charter serve?]
It is a reminder to the family membership that it is best to remain united. Not to disperse
the family members, and that the family trust the business family leaders who are tasked
with running the business [French to English translation by researcher]. (Interviewee
BFC, QU: 28: 3031).
Regarding the formalization of family governance, the situation was less clear from this
study`s sample of dynastic business families. Family governance formalization was evenly split
between the ten business families in the study. The reasons for not formalizing family
governance were varied. In the case of business family BFB, the oldest in the study sample, they
were considering instituting a family council following discussions with family leaders of
another multi-century-old business family who recently instituted a family council:
Well, family council is not a thing which… We are looking at institutionalizing the family
council. So far, we have added… We feel it was necessary, but I think it’s a good thing;
these days, certainly, it would be good to have a family council. Get more involvement,
institutionalize the involvement in a better way. People can… You know, let their voice be
heard, also through the family council, and that is one of the things I learned yesterday
from the [Multi-century business family] company, they have a very interesting way of…
How they set it up. Their family also includes, what we say: the cold side, the in-laws
(Interviewee BFB, QU: 3: 43).
Furthermore, Interviewee BFB stressed that the family council's success was reliant on
the strength of its leadership. His view provided more evidence regarding the importance to
develop family leadership talent: "The success of the family council will be dependent on the
strength of its leadership" (Interviewee BFB, QU: 4:13). Business family BFF saw no need to
formalize family governance because of a small and concentrated shareholder base:
You had mentioned earlier this idea of family council] that’s nonexistent. Never did it. [I
guess because share ownership is in such a small group or…for lack of a better
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term?]Yeah. Oh, there’s about 10. But I still hold about 65 percent. [G5 sister (CEO) and
brother (VP of Sales)…I’d given them a few shares; I’d helped them buy a few shares
(Interviewee BFF, QU: 42:70).
4.2.6.2.2 Ownership governance.
Ownership governance concerned those family members who possessed legal title to
various business family fortune components. Ownership governance was related to active and
non-active family owners. The ownership group, also known as the shareholder group, had
multiple characteristics that were idiosyncratic to each dynastic business family shareholder
group in this study. Table 19 summarizes some of the business family shareholder group features
identified in the study sample.
Table 19 Select Examples of Business Family Shareholder Group Features
Shareholder Group Features
Geographic/Jurisdictional Dispersion

Number of Shareholders

Types of Shareholder

Shareholder Concentration

Examples of Differences between
Business Families in Study
BFB: shareholders are globally dispersed
BFC: shareholders are dispersed nationwide
BFH: shareholders are concentrated in one greater metropolitan area
BFB: 45 shareholders
BFC: greater than 150 shareholders
BFH: 7 G3 shareholders, 14 G4 shareholders
BFB: multiple individual, corporate, and trust shareholders
BFC: multiple individual and corporate shareholders
BFH: multiple corporate shareholders
BFB: concentration of greater than 50% in one legal entity
BFC: 30 shareholders hold 50% controlling interest with a single
holding company
BFH: evenly divided by family branch

Source: Own, Atlas ti study database
Table 20 merely reveals a limited view of the multiplicity of business family shareholder
configurations. Differentiation between shareholder control and economic rights was not
investigated, but was observed in the case of business family BFG. The contents of this table are
point-in-time representation of an ever-evolving shareholder mix. The features of the business
family shareholder base change and are expected to vary because of numerous business family
life course events and external factors.
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An ownership governance mechanism that stood out in this study was the Council of
Owners. The Council of Owners was raised and only discussed by business family informant
BFK. Business family BFK favored a business family governance structure that provided a
distinct forum to accommodate the particular needs of their family ownership group, which
controlled a publicly listed operating company. The Council of Owners was constituted by the
business family owners, and acted as a coordination mechanism between the family council and
the board of directors of the business family's operating entities. The business family`s operating
company had non-family minority shareholders, which were represented and co-existed on the
family controlled operating company`s board of directors.
As part of its coordination responsibilities, the Council of Owners, which was made of
experienced business family owner representatives, was expected to engage a number of
functions. These functions were delineated by Interview BFK and are presented in Table 20.
Table 20 Business Family BFK Council of Owners Functions
•

Develop and communicate the business family ownership strategic guiding principles
to the family directors at the operating company board level;
• Make sure the voice and views of the Family Council are considered for integration
into the business family ownership strategic guiding principles;
• Preventing family members and non-active owners from interfering or spanning into
the operating company board or managerial levels because they might think they have
the right to do so;
• Formulate and communicate dividend policy expectations in line with principle of
financial conservatism to operating company`s board of directors;
• Manage dividend policy expectations with family council;
• Assist family council to prioritize philanthropic objectives and activities.
Source: Atlas ti study database, Interviewee BFK
Family BFK dismantled their Council of Owners when their family controlled company
was divested. This situation evidenced that a business family reconfigured its organizational
structure according to its evolving strategic choices and actions. The Council of Owners was
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used as a governance mechanism with good effect as is often suggested in the consultative
literature (Carlock & Ward, 2010; Renkert-Thomas, 2016).
4.2.6.2.3 Corporate governance.
This study's findings show that corporate governance was another component in dynastic
business families' systems of organization. Table 21 provides an overview of how the business
families in this study use a board of directors and their external non-family directors. With the
exception of BFG, all of the business families in the study had one or multiple boards of
directors governing the relationship between ownership and management groups of the business
family entities. BFG, a nascent dynastic business family, favored an informal approach.
Table 21 Board of Directors and External Non-Family Directors
Business
Family
BFA
BFB
BFC

BFD

Board of Directors
Yes  Operating company
Yes – Operating company
Yes – Operating companies
Yes  Family owned
investment company
Yes – Operating companies
Yes – Family owned
investment company
Yes – Operating company

Generational
Ownership
G10/G11
G14/G15

External Non-Family Directors
N/A
Yes – Operating company
Yes – Operating companies

G8/G9
No – Family owned investment company
Yes – Operating companies
G4/G5
No – Family owned investment company
Yes – Operating company

BFE

No – Family office

G4/G5

No – Family office

BFF

Yes – Private foundation
Yes – Operating company
No  Operating company

G4/G5

Yes – Private foundation
Yes – Operating company
No – Operating company

G1/G2

No – Family owned investment company

BFG

BFH
BFI
BFK

No – Family owned
investment company:
monthly investment
committee
Yes – Family office
Yes – G4 family owned
investment company
Yes – Operating company
Yes – Private foundations

No – Family office
G3/G4
G3/G4
G12/G13

No – G4 family owned investment company
Yes – Operating company
Yes – Private foundations

Source: Own, Atlas ti study database, N/A = not available
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Business family BFG used its strong sense of family cohesion to substitute for a formal
board in monitoring and supporting the business family`s strategic path. When they needed more
talent, they would draw from their social networks:
There is no formal board of directors, but when we need particular advice, it may happen
that we consult a tax specialist, a lawyer, and people with specialized knowledge,
individuals whom we have worked with for a very long time and know us very well. To
say we a formal structure of advisors that are part of our management committee, well
we are not really structured that way. The board of directors is the family. It is informal.
I would say from time to time, at certain stages, yes, we will have a board of directors, of
course because at certain times of the year it is required, but that is also done rather
informally (Interviewee BFGES, QU: 5: 58).
The study data revealed that a board of directors within a business family organization
existed for purposes beyond those of statutory requirements. The board of directors composed of
properly profiled individuals was viewed as a discussion and action forum:
That [the business family] have got the right kind of board of directors with the right kind
of profile of each one of the boards being able to contribute to making the business a
better place to be (Interviewee BFK, QU: 2: 54).
The issue of board composition, recruitment and selection of directors, and board tenure
was raised by business family informants BFB, BFD, BFF, BFI, and BFK. All of these business
families used external directors even though they are at different dynastic family control
timelines, from different industries, countries, and have different organizational configurations.
The goal of diversity motivated their drive to engage an external director selection process:
What we want to work for is diversity on the board. So, we’ve got somebody who’s
intimate with our customer base …We need, as a small company…we’ve never enough
money to go around for the things that you want to do, so the chief financial officer for [a
multinational company] is a perfect fit. One, he would have managed the commodity
risks, etc.…but also understands the challenges of dealing with the large retailers, which
is very challenging for any company…So, you’ve got this diversity of interests where
everybody isn’t all the same and can bring different things to the board table
(Interviewee BFF, QU: 42: 23).
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Another matter regarding a strong independent board was its ability to govern with a
level of insulation from family interference, particularly in the recruitment of the CEO. This
situation further reinforced the value of the family council or council of owners acting as a buffer
between family, owners, and management. This buffering became particularly important
according to informant BFI if the business family owners agreed to recruit non-family
successors. Some business family members believed that prospective non-family CEOs might be
uncomfortable in dealing with family group dynamics:
…when you look at the CEO of a family business and ask him or her what are the major
risks that you see to your business in five years, they are going to name market fracture,
competitors, and (inaudible) a whole list of thing, do you think they are going to name the
family? They won’t, will they? But your family is the thing that can take your business
down in weeks, your competitors cannot do that in a week. They are going to erode your
market share over time, your family can destroy your business in a matter of weeks and I
think that is really where you know, not only are you, the family council moving your
family forward into meeting your aspirations, but they are mitigating a risk of family
conflict. Because the last thing you want to do is, because what is going to happen is your
family is going to start having a flare up, what’s going to happen, management is going
to perceive this as a serious risk and they are going to spend time to resolve it? And that
basically, and I have talked with our outside directors and I say that is basically the
beginning of the end of your successful run as a business…And you lose a lot of your
employees because your employees look to the family to gauge the stability of the
organization (Interviewee BFI, QU: 20:37).
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CHAPTER 5: CONCEPTUAL MODEL DEVELOPMENT & DISCUSSION
5.1 Introduction
"A goal without a plan [strategy] is just a wish"
Antoine de Saint Exépury
This exploratory study proposed to shed light on the following questions: Is there a
family strategy that binds a dynastic business family and its activities? What are the components
of such a family strategy? Who might conceive it? How are the family strategy components
related? As discussed in the literature review, the answers to these questions may provide new
insight given the firm-level focus of extant literature on longevity, strategic management, and
family business.
To answer these questions, a research design based on the tenets of the grounded theory
approach was executed (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This study's data were
collected from a sample of ten business families located in five northern-hemisphere countries.
Semi-structured interviews with a total of 15 business family informants produced the study`s
main data set. Field notes and business family archives complemented the data sources to
conceptualize a dynastic business family strategy framework.
This doctoral dissertation's final chapter circumscribes the theoretical components of a
dynastic business family strategy framework. Furthermore, the theoretical and practical
implications of this grounded theory are expounded. The study's limitations and future research
pathways are then discussed.
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5.2 Dynastic Business Family Strategy Framework
The results of this study emerged into five components of a dynastic business family
strategy as explicated previously in Chapter 4. These components included family values, family
and fortune goals, strategic leadership, resources, and systems of organization. Furthermore,
from the findings it can be comprehended that a dynastic business family strategy operates
interdependently at the family and fortune levels to multigenerationally realize and maintain a
dynastic social position. Business family strategic leaders, like the business family champion,
conceive and enact the dynastic business family strategy.
As reviewed in Chapter 2, the strategic management literature explains strategy as the set
of thoughts and actions of leaders linking organizational goals setting, goals monitoring, and
attainment with resources and capabilities (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Finkelstein & Hambrick,
1996; Nag et al., 2007; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Teece, 2007). Furthermore, an
organization may possess multiple strategies that require some degree of fit or integration to
achieve or maintain the desired outcomes (Fuchs, P. H., Miffin, K., Miller, D., & Whitney, J.,
2000; Venkatraman, 1989). Values as beliefs and behavioral norms are connected to strategy
(Collis & Rukstad, 2008). Hence, it is posited that combining this study`s dynastic business
family strategic components with strategic management theory enables the conceptualization of a
dynastic business family strategy framework. The assembly of this framework is discussed next.

157

158
Figure 3 Dynastic Business Family Strategy Conceptual Framework

Source: Own
The dynastic business family strategy (DBFS) framework illustrated in Figure 3 is
conceptualized as a process theory. The framework, which identifies the key family strategy
components, is derived from the research findings and literature previously discussed in Chapters
2 and 4. A process theory is an explanation of how an organizational entity develops and evolves
(Van de Ven & Poole, 1995).
Van de Ven and Poole (1995) explain that an entity may be an organizational strategy, so
for the purposes of this discussion, the organizational entity is the dynastic business family
strategy. Values, strategic leadership, goal setting, resources, systems of organization, goals
monitoring, and attainment all interconnect to compose the dynastic business family strategy.
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Each component of the strategy can be threaded together in sequence, with some level of
strategic congruence as depicted by the dotted unidirectional horizontal arrow. The dotted arrow
illustrates the permeability in logics, roles, resources, and information flows between the family
and the fortune dimensions of the dynastic business family system (Marcus, 1985; Von Schlippe
& Frank, 2013). The horizontal arrow also highlights the binding of family and fortune levels
throughout. Within each strategic component, family and fortune dimensions are expected to
strategically cohere as shown by the solid double-headed vertical arrow. This vertical strategic
alignment considers the extent to which family and fortune are mutually reinforcing (Litz, 2008).
5.2.1 Conceptual model assumptions.
Given this research`s theory-building goal, it is relevant to discuss the boundary
conditions of the proposed dynastic business family strategy framework. Boundary conditions
are assumptions delimiting the applicability of the dynastic business family strategy framework
(Bacharach, 1989). The boundary conditions of this study`s framework include the interactions
with the dynamic contexts, generalization to the study sample, non-linearity of the dynastic
business family strategy process, and the business family level of analysis.
The components of the dynamic business family strategy framework are seen as
interacting with dynamic internal and external environments. This is a reasonable assumption
since the relationship between strategy and environment has long been established (Bourgeois,
1980). In the literature, the environment is generally typified in three ways: dynamism,
complexity, and munificence. Environmental dynamism, or turbulence, describes an
organization`s environment characterized by the rate and unpredictability of change be it, for
example, in technology, consumer preferences, logistics, and supply lines (Jansen, Vera, and
Crossan, 2009). Environmental complexity refers to the heterogeneity and dispersion of
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organizational activities (Dess & Beard, 1984). Environmental munificence refers the
environment`s capacity to support and fuel organizational stability and growth (Dess & Beard,
1984). The organization exchanges information and resources with its environments as a matter
of survival and performance. Therefore, each strategic component of the model interacts with
both its dynamic external and internal contexts.
This study is not about hypothesis testing with hopes of generalizing to the population.
Rather, the "grounded" theory process used for research is meant to structure and communicate
new understandings of relationship patterns between business family members within a sample
of dynastic business families. The understanding and recognition of the patterns emerge from the
researcher`s interpretation of the business family informants' socially constructed realities
(Charmaz, 2014; Suddaby, 2006).
Although depicted in Figure 3 as a linear model, the dynastic business family strategy
framework is not conceptualized as a linear process. The framework is meant to unfold as part of
a complex adaptive system that is the dynastic business family (Anderson, 1999). Figure 3
highlights the key features that are embedded in a dynastic business family strategy. Such
features include the integration of its parts and emergent behaviors like business family member
learning and feedback loops throughout the family strategy process to monitor strategic
alignment (Crumley, 2005; Vera & Crossan, 2004). Communication is another feature
underscoring the complexity of the dynasty business family strategy framework as there is
information sharing between strategy components and between family and fortune-related
entities (Crumley, 2005).
Theorizing about dynastic business families at a single level of analysis might limit our
appreciation of the complexity surrounding family strategy. Dynastic business family strategy is

160

161
a multi-level phenomenon comprised of individual-level, group-level, and organization-level
interplays. These multi-level phenomena are present within the family and fortune dimensions of
the dynastic business family. Findings from this study reveal that nested within the business
family is much heterogeneity amongst family members. Furthermore, the mix of family members
within the business families may form different sub-groups nested in different business family
organizational structures. These different dynastic business family organizational structures, like
the family owned investment company and the family council, are "nested in networks of
interorganizational relationships" (Hitt, Beamish, Jackson, and Mathieu, 2007, p. 1387) to
produce different family spending and status outcomes. Therefore, it is possible that future
research might consider the validity of this dynastic business family strategy as a multi-level
theory (Hitt et al., 2007).
5.2.2 Purposes of the dynastic business family strategy framework.
The proposed dynastic business family strategy framework emerges as a theoretical road
map for dynastic business families' goal attainment. The dynastic business family strategy is
understood as conceived and implemented at the business family level. A dynastic family
strategy is enacted to protect and promote family cohesion, identify and develop long-term
family leadership talent, and influence family fortune strategies. A goal of such a strategy is the
entwining of family and fortune for at least three and possibly beyond eight generations (Marcus,
1985; Sjogren, 2011). A family strategy that connects and integrates the owning family’s other
organizational strategies is novel considering the business-centric view prevalent in the family
business strategic management literature (Daspit, Chrisman, Sharma, Pearson, and Long, 2017).
This dynastic business family strategy framework offers a means to understand how the
family`s influence and involvement with the family fortune, including the family business (es), is
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conceived, structured, and implemented. By developing a first step towards a business family
strategic process, this research advances the idea that family is the primary system in the family
ownership-business triad (Moores, 2009; Steier et al., 2015). With family as the primary unit of
analysis, it is argued that this research's strategic process framework is potentially capable of
offering a more holistic view of the motivations behind emergent dynastic business family
behaviors.
The focus of these next sections is not to revisit the inner details of each strategic
component. Rather, the objective is to explain how the strategic components "hang together" in a
logical, consistent manner to form a dynastic business family strategy framework (Suddaby,
2010).
5.2.3 Values set the dynastic strategic course.
Business family values set the stage for building this dynastic business family strategy
framework. As discussed in Chapter 4, business family values comprise both family and fortune
values. Although family and fortune values are viewed as separate for discussion purposes, they
work inseparably to influence the business family's view of self and the expected behaviors of
family membership and other related stakeholders (Schwartz, 1999). The result is that shared
values within the dynastic business family support the entwinement of family and fortune for a
very long time. The long-term complicity of family and fortune is consistent with the established
family business scholarly view that family and business are inextricably intertwined (Aldrich &
Cliff, 2003; Zachary, 2011). However, for dynastic business families in this study, a business is
but one of many fortune entities.
Values are foundational to individual and organizational life (Schwartz, 1992). Values as
beliefs are powerful motivations that shape organizational behaviors (Eccles and Wigfield,
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2002). Values permeate and influence multiple facets of the dynastic business family and its
strategy (Collis & Rukstad, 2008). Values are linked to the interpretation of strategic priorities,
strategic change, and leadership decision-making (Bourne & Jenkins, 2013). Therefore, dynastic
business family values define the set of beliefs and aspirations held by family members regarding
how and why family and fortune should be entwined throughout the generations.
Creating and transmitting shared dynastic business values through the generations is not
seen as an easy process. Shared values are not the aggregate of individual family member values.
They are group values representing some level of common understanding about "what" the
dynastic family stands for, "where" it is heading, and "why" it is heading in a particular direction.
In effect, dynastic business family values set the view of a desired future for current and
subsequent generations. In the case of dynastic business families, this involves a cohesive
familial whole with multigenerational social leadership (Cramer & Leathers, 1981; Marcus,
1985).
A challenge for dynastic business families is managing the tensions between the needs
and aspirations of individuals and those of the dynastic collective (Marcus, 1985, 1988; Gilding,
2005). The values management process deals with various relational tensions to ensure there is
some level of group conformity while respecting individuality so as to avoid a sense of ostracism
and alienation as a result of individual failures to comply with dynastic behavioral standards.
Such a values management process, comprising aspects of conflict management, group
collaboration, socialization and learning about business family life, as well as the avoidance of
strong family branch thinking or allegiances, is congruent with the idea that a dynastic business
family can be considered a distinct type of complex adaptive system (McGrath, 1997).
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Clarity, consensus, and understanding about the value of dynastic business family values
in such a complex setting become unique family knowledge (Sorenson, 2013). The inimitable
appreciation of family members about the balancing act between the benefits of family unity and
the optimal and temporal allocation of the fortune for family consumption, growth investing, and
charitable giving imparts a dynastic business family mindset (Steier et al., 2015; Zellweger et al.,
2012). The dynastic business family mindset maps out shared cognitive and affective schemas
between family membership and its business family strategic leadership. This dynastic learned
knowledge evolving in a business family's mindset becomes a familial resource to sustain
organizational longevity (Habbershon et al., 2003; Tàpies & Moya, 2012).
The values management process required to set the dynastic business family strategy
becomes part of the dynastic business family's sense of self and its connection to the
organization`s strategic leadership (Ashforth & Mael, 1996; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). To
have no values would mean the dynastic business family has no world view and no view on its
current and desired position in the world. Such a situation would remove any purpose from
strategy (Mintzberg, 1987b, 1987c). So, to enact a family strategy that seeks to close the gap
between the family`s desired (goal setting) and future (goal attainment) position involves the
emergence, the recruitment, and agency of business family strategic leaders in the family and
fortune domains of the dynasty. Hence, business family strategic leaders are strategists
(Cummings, 1993; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999).
5.2.4 Business family strategic leadership.
Strategic leadership concerns individuals at the top of an organization (Finkelstein &
Hambrick, 1996). Strategic leaders should be concerned with the evolution of the whole
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organization including its culture, goals, and capabilities (Boal & Hooijberg, 2001). They may
bring to bear many of the elements of a strategy (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).
Business family strategic leaders, also known as business family champions in the
context of this strategic framework, represent a group of family members who have significant
organizational responsibility within the dynastic business family. Organizational leadership is
viewed not only as a single leadership actor, but more like a dynamic network of distributed
leadership (Kriger & Zhovtobryukh, 2013). The notion of significant organizational
responsibility refers to the level of control and/or influence over goal setting and strategic
processes (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) of the dynastic business family organization.
Strategic processes may include strategy formulation, strategy implementation and
monitoring, organizational structuring, and resource allocation at the family and fortune levels
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Steier et al., 2015; Suess, 2014). In the context of complex
adaptive systems, strategic leaders also play an important role in building and communicating the
business family's shared meanings within the organization and the external environment (Boal &
Schultz, 2007). In the case of dynastic business families, there are multiple organizations
originating and operating within the family and fortune levels (Sjogren, 2011).
Following the upper echelon literature, business family strategic leaders are assumed to
be rationally bounded individuals and embody their personal as well as the core family values of
the dynastic business family (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Tasked with driving
the family strategy process, strategic leaders on the family and fortune sides of the business
family embody the organization's values. Values shape their strategic thinking as the business
family's past, present, and uncertain future weighs into their decision-making (Steptoe-Warren,
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Howat, and Hume, 2011). Values of stewardship and long-term orientation of the strategic leader
are also shared values of dynastic business families.
A dynastic business family may understand and appreciate the organizational value of
grouping their leadership efforts toward initiatives involving family cohesion, business family
leadership development, and influence over the fortune strategy. Grouping of leadership efforts
and their respective "organizational know how" is consistent with the resource dependence
perspective that recognizes the importance of boundary spanning to acquire resources, transfer
knowledge, and improve environmental scanning (Hillman, Withers, and Collins, 2009).
Operating as a business family leadership group provides leadership resiliency and diversity to
better address the organizational complexities of a dynastic business family (Finkelstein &
Hambrick, 1996; Kriger & Zhovtobryukh, 2013; Sjogren, 2011).
Dynastic business family strategic leaders are represented simultaneously in both the
family and fortune domains of the dynastic business family system. The family assembly head
and the family council chairperson are business strategic leaders at the family governance level
(Suess, 2014). At the fortune level, business strategic leaders include family chairpersons and
CEOs of the family office, family controlled investment company and private foundations, and
family controlled companies. Although they are each responsible for their respective strategic
areas within the dynastic business family system, they are expected to share information to
facilitate the dynastic business family's strategic agenda.
This perspective of distributed dynastic business family strategic leadership consolidates
this study's leadership findings with those of the family business champion literature as offered
by Nacht (2015) on the role of the family champion, Salvato et al. (2010) on the concept of the
family champion of continuity, and the strategic planning champion as developed by Nordqvist
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& Melin (2008). From their respective organizational vantages, business family strategic leaders
exhibit stewardship and strategic thinking capabilities implying a systemic understanding and
long-term view of the dynastic business family. If the continuous entwinement of family and
fortune is a family goal, then the business family strategic leadership group is tasked with
balancing family cohesion, family leadership development and socialization, and the fortune's
financial distribution and reinvestment goals.
5.2.5 Dynastic business family goal setting.
As discussed previously, the business family strategic leadership group members are
organizational goal setters. Goals, be they individual, group, or organizational, are powerful
motivators for valued outcomes (Locke and Latham, 2002). Although related, goals are distinct
from values (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). Values tell us and others what is important or
undesirable about our goals (Locke and Latham, 2006), whereas goals are specific achievements,
which, once attained, serve to help realize a strategy (Raynor, 1998). Goals are targets of actions
(Locke & Latham, 2002). Therefore, goal setting gives purpose to a strategy and thus becomes
part of the strategic framework, helping to influence the achievement of the desired outcomes.
In this dynastic business family strategy framework, goal setting is focused at the
business family level. As understood from this study`s evidence and from the family business
goal-setting literature, goal setting is a multilevel organizational phenomenon (Basco, 2017;
Kotlar & Massis, 2013; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). There is a hierarchy of goals linking numerous
subgoals to higher-order goals in terms of value, abstraction, and actions (Eccles & Wigfield,
2002). Goal hierarchies are a way to understand long-range goals, like achieving a dynastic
status, into a manageable sequence of subgoals, sequentially guiding multiple connected social
actions over time (Gutman, 1997). Setting each goal or subgoal can be understood as the
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"planning of an act or sequence of acts directed toward reaching that goal" (Gutman, 1997, p.
548).
In the case of dynastic business families, there seems to be an overarching dynastic goal
of achieving and maintaining dynastic status. Then, there are more specific family and fortune
goals. This study reveals that there are subgoals, like family unity and harmony, next-generation
family member socialization and integration into business family life, and family member
fulfillment and talent development. Within each of these subgoals are finer-grained goals (see
Table 12 for list of goals). At the dynastic fortune level, subgoals include family ownership and
managerial control, long-term horizon in decision-making, and financial resilience.
Consistent with the family business goals literature, dynastic business families exhibit
goal diversity at the family and fortune levels (Basco, 2017; Kotlar & Massis, 2013; Williams,
2015). Some dynastic business family goals are more financially or business oriented, while
others are more non-financial in nature. Some goals are more short term and others more distal.
Goals may be set toward performance outcomes, like achieving an annual rate of return on the
investment portfolio. Goals may also be set to achieve learning outcomes that are related to
knowledge acquisition and transfer (Seijts & Latham, 2005). Learning about various business
family social processes and roles, traditions, or family history are but a few examples. Favorable
learning outcomes are required to better set and pursue performance objectives. Establishing
learning goals within dynastic business families is important given the positive relationship
between organizational learning and longevity (de Geus, 1997; Montuori, 2000). Furthermore,
pursuing learning goals is consistent with the family business literature that emphasizes the life
learning of stewardship values and behaviors expected of business family strategic leaders (Le
Breton-Miller & Miller, 2015a).
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An important dynastic business family challenge is setting and monitoring multiple
diverse goals. Goal diversity is expected to increase with the number of organizational entities
(e.g., family council, family assembly, portfolio of operating companies, family office) and the
number of multigenerational participants who may each hold a unique generational perspective.
Therefore, dynastic business family goal setting entails the coordination of multiple strands of
interdependent performance and learning goals and subgoals to effectively entwine family and
fortune for a long time.
The scope of goal diversity further reinforces the need for a business family strategic
leadership group. The business family strategic leadership group enlarges the bounded rationality
constraint of each leader by pooling capabilities. An increase in the dynastic business family's
cognitive capacity enables the leadership group to effectively manage multiple organizational
goals and their potentially ensuing goal conflicts. The dynastic business family leadership group
further understands that goals continuously evolve in a set-action-monitor-reset sequence due to
its dynamic context.
5.2.6 Business family capital.
Family capital is the bundle of resources possessed by the dynastic business family. The
bundle of resources comprises human, social, physical, financial, and cultural capital (Danes et
al., 2009; Light, 2004). In the case of dynastic business families, family capital can be much
more substantive and comprehensive than found in a founder or second-generation family
business. A dynastic business family likely has a much larger number of family members,
possibly spanning two to four generations at any point in time. Because of time constraints and
the goal of keeping family and fortune entwined, they likely would have accumulated greater
social relationships, and more physical and financial capital. The total family capital of the
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dynastic business family can be considered as the aggregation and accumulation, since the
founder generation, of all family affiliated resources available at the family and fortune levels.
A key goal for the dynastic business family is the acquisition, development, and
maintenance of cohesion of family capital through the generations. The business family strategic
leadership group plays an important role in managing the various processes to achieve the stated
family capital goals. The previously stated family goals of family cohesion and harmony, family
member socialization and integration, and family member fulfillment and talent development
concern the human and social capital aspects of the dynasty. On the other hand, fortune goals
relate to the overall ownership and managerial control of property rights and growth of financial
and physical capital of the dynasty (Marcus, 1985; Carney, Gedajlovic, and Strike, 2014).
Financial and physical capital may reside and be organized within various configurations of
operating companies, holding companies, family office and private foundations. Financial and
physical capital decisions may be circumscribed by the business families' values, goals, strategic
mindset, and their country's(ies) asset divisibility, heritability, and taxation laws (Carney et al.,
2014).
At the fortune level, family human and social capital components may also be present;
the dynastic business families in this study exercise their ownership of physical and financial
capital through high levels of family involvement in governance and management mechanisms.
However, in the case of the family office or family owned investment company, family
involvement was generally relegated to the board of directors, including the role of chairperson.
A non-family member generally occupied the role of CEO largely due to the dynastic business
family lacking the requisite technical knowledge, skills, and social capital within its family
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human capital pool. This organizational development is consistent with extant family office
literature (Kaye & Hamilton, 2004)
The lack of specific family human and social capital needed to lead and operate the
family office may increase the odds of using non-family professionals. However, the dynastic
business family may view the family office as a secondary activity compared to its family owned
or controlled operating companies. As such, the business family may prefer to direct time and
effort for the development of its family human and social capital toward the core operating
companies to ensure continuous family control over their property.
Dynastic business family capital is not just managed for growth. It is used to sustain the
family firm`s competitive advantage as explained by the strategic management perspective. It
also involves using family capital's components for the business family's organizational
longevity. Superior corporate performance does not necessarily equate to organizational
longevity. The dynastic business family`s strategic leadership may repurpose the family capitalentrepreneurship mix throughout its systems of organization at the fortune and family levels in
the pursuit of goals attainment.
5.2.7 Systems of organization.
Dynastic business families operate a number of systems of organization. Systems of
organization in the dynastic business family strategy framework include governance mechanisms
and organizational entities. These organizational components are central for coordinated action
by the business family's strategic leaders. Systems of organization are necessary as repositories
of family capital, for goal setting, and for goal monitoring and attainment (Ethiraj & Levinthal,
2009). Systems of organizations are the context, or the arenas, in which strategy is enacted
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(Fredrickson, 1986; Nordqvist, 2012). A number of systems of organization are expected to exist
at the family and fortune levels owing to dynastic business family complexity.
At the dynastic family level, systems of organization include the family charter, the
family assembly, and the family council. The family assembly and the family council are a
formalized form of family governance and are generally operated within a relational type of
governance framework (Mustakallio et al., 2002).
At the fortune level, systems of organization include the family controlled or family
owned operating company (ies), the family office or family owned investment company, and the
private foundation(s). These organizational entities have commercial and not-for-profit aims.
Formal corporate boards that operate within a contractual framework generally govern these
entities (Mustakallio et al., 2002).
The presence and desire for numerous organizational entities at both the family and
fortune levels in this study's sample is consistent with family business literature (Suess, 2014).
There is multi-country evidence in this study and extant family business literature that shows that
dynastic business families are organizationally complex (Bennedsen & Foss, 2015; Colli and
Colpan, 2015; Marcus, 1985; Gilding, 2005; Sjogren, 2011). Organizational complexity arises
because of a number of factors related to the dynastic business family's internal and external
dynamic contexts (Gimeno et al., 2010; Klein, 2010). Such factors include the business family's
values, goal diversity, and the family strategy mindset (Steier et al., 2015).
Unless the business family has pruned the family membership to reduce family
complexity, it is assumed dynastic business family membership will rise over time (Lambrecht &
Lievens, 2008). The need for coordination and communication of business family activities
among family members grows with the size of the family. By drawing from Sustainable Family
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Business Theory (SFBT), dynastic organizational entities can be seen as arenas to run internal
family resource exchanges in order to support the various business family systems' goals (Danes
et al., 2008; Stafford, 1999). Such internal family resource exchanges exist not only to dispatch
short-term family resources, but they also become part of the long-term strategizing process on
organizational perpetuation.
Each dynastic business family entity may be viewed as a network of internal exchanges.
The governance mechanism of each organizational entity is the ruling body of that entity, but
also the interface point with the dynastic business family`s other ruling bodies, which, together,
agree on "terms of trade" and information flows of and about family capital between
organizational entities. This reasoning regarding the dynastic business family's systems of
organization combines elements of the SFBT and of the Möbius Strip metaphor where the family
fortune interface is characterized by intersystem or inter-entity interdependency (Danes et al.,
2008; Litz, 2008). Intersystem interdependency refers to the following: "one system`s outputs are
transferred across systems to become the other system`s input" (Litz, 2008, p. 221).
5.2.8 Goals monitoring and attainment.
As part of the dynastic business family strategy framework, the business family and its
strategic leaders have set a variety of multilevel goals and sub-goals. Even though the goals are
set in multiple organizational arenas, they reflect the intersystem interdependency of family and
fortune. An essential subsequent process to goal setting is goal monitoring as a means to assess
progression toward goals attainment.
The group dynamics literature refers to goal monitoring as "tracking task and progress
toward mission accomplishment, interpreting system information in terms of what needs to be
accomplished for goal attainment, and transmitting progress to team members" (Marks, Mathieu,
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and Zaccaro, 2001, p. 366). Monitoring goals becomes a matter of performance measurement
and learning feedback loops. These two goal monitoring elements are needed to evaluate the
extent of the discrepancy between the actual and desired states and to inform decision-makers
(goal setters) on corrective courses of action (Burnette, O'boyle, VanEpps, Pollack, and Finkel,
2013; Vera & Crossan, 2004).
Organizational performance measurement is a foundational element of strategic
management (Combs, Crook, and Shook, 2005). To monitor progress in such a goal diverse
context, the dynastic business family is tasked with integrating multiple performance evaluation
approaches in order to collect and track the relevant goal monitoring data. At this point, the
dynastic business family literature has yet to propose such an integrated goal monitoring
approach. However, by drawing from various extant literatures, a high-level overview of a goal
monitoring approach is provided next.
From the discussion on dynasty status validation in Section 3.5, the dynastic goal
progression may be measured in terms of the following sub-goals: 1) conferment of dynastic
status by external parties; 2) dynastic familial control of fortune entities timeline; 3) dynasty
type; 4) level of significant social positions and influence; and 5) significant economic positions
and influence (Magee and Galinsky, 2008; Sjogren, 2011). The dynastic goal and its sub-goals
are consistent with those identified in this study and the extant dynastic business family literature
(Marcus, 1985; Hutcheson et al., 2003; Sjogren, 2011).
The first dynastic sub-goal relates to establishing the business family's dynastic status by
a third-party's subjective evaluation possibly as evidenced from multiple media sources (Magee
& Galinsky, 2008). The sub-goal of the dynastic familial control of fortune entities could be
assessed by using a modified F-PEC Power subscale (Astrachan et al., 2002; Klein et al., 2005).
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Modifications to the F-PEC Power subscale are necessary to better reflect the organizational
complexity of a dynastic business family. The scale modifications might include considerations
for the family`s influence, ownership, and management participation in all of the dynasty's
operating firms, the family office or family investment companies, and philanthropic entities.
Longitudinal data of the modified F-PEC Power scale may better inform the business family,
practice, and research on a dimension of a dynasty's current state and evolution.
To monitor the progress of the business family's level of social position and influence,
this dynastic business family strategy framework draws from the corporate social performance
(CSP) literature (Wood, 2010). Corporate social performance is defined as "a business
organization's configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes of social
responsiveness, and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm's
societal relationships" (Wood, 1991). Corporate social performance concerns the harm and the
benefit resulting from the organization's behaviors around social, cultural, legal, political,
economic, and ecological dimensions of its dynamic context (Wood, 2010). Philanthropy is a
subset of corporate social performance (Wood, 2010), and philanthropy can be practiced at both
the operating business entity and family levels (Feliu & Botero, 2016).
For the purposes of this discussion, corporate social performance may be extended from
the firm level to the business family level and can thus be termed business family social
performance. Like the family business literature, the corporate social performance literature finds
its theoretical roots in systems theory and complex organizations (Anderson, 1999; Tagiuri &
Davis, 1996; Wood, 2010). The organization`s systems are intricately connected to its dynamic
context in the exchange of resources. The corporate social performance framework proposed by
Wood (1991) rests on the three levels of social responsibility. The first level is the notion of
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legitimacy, which is where the organization must not abuse the power toward those institutions
that granted the organization's power to exist. The second level of social responsibility concerns
the idea that the organization is publicly responsible for secondary outcomes beyond their
primary outputs. The third socially responsible principle is managerial discretion, which is where
leaders and followers are moral actors embedded with a duty to exercise discretion toward social
and ethical outcomes (Wood, 2010). This last principle resonates with attributes of the dynastic
business family leaders studied here who think and behave strategically and steward-like.
Corporate social performance offers an interesting theoretical route to measure and
follow the dynastic business family`s influence on governments and society concerning
important national economic and social questions, and even influencing the “rules of the game”
in the business world (Sjogren, 2011). Over extended periods of time, dynastic business families
may engage in a number of activities focusing on the impact on and outcomes for stakeholders,
society, and constituent entities of the dynastic business family. In the case of dynastic business
families, social performance is evaluated at the family level as an aggregation of its social
performance as manifested through their operating companies, family office, and private
foundations.
Finally, the dynastic business sub-goal of significant financial position and influence is
monitored using accounting-like measures relating to objective returns, valuation, and growth
(Combs et al., 2005). However, like social performance, the financial performance of the
dynastic business family requires financial and accounting data aggregation from the operating
company (ies), the family office or family owned investment company, and the private
foundation(s). These data also serve to assess the dynastic business' financial resiliency to sustain
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the demands of family lifestyle consumption, re-investment into the business or entrepreneurial
initiatives, or for giving.
To be informative and relevant to the dynastic business family's strategy, goal monitoring
should provide answers to some key questions such as the following: What is the business family
measuring to inform them on their progress toward their family and fortune goals? For example,
is the right quality and quantity of family strategic leadership talent available to sustain its
dynastic business family strategy? What is the deviation from expectations? What coursecorrecting adjustments are required and at what level? How quickly is the business family
correcting course to resume its goal achievement path? Goal achievement may be the product of
several years or several generations of goal pursuit in the case of dynastic business families.
Furthermore, business family goals and sub-goals are expected to evolve and change over time
(Steier & Miller, 2010).
5.2.9 Strategic alignments.
The notion of the need for continuous entwinement of family and fortune is a central
precept of the dynastic business family strategy framework. Strategic fit, alignment, and
integration suggest that congruent linkages between organizational components and the
organization and context affects organizational outcomes (Fuchs et al., 2000; Venkatraman,
1989; Zajac et al., 2000). Therefore, to attain multiple organizational goals, it is theorized that
the dynastic business family strategic leadership group manages two types of internal business
family strategic alignments: family and fortune. For the sake of simplicity, the organizationexternal context linkage, although present and relevant, is not discussed.
Viewed as two separate, and yet inextricably, intertwined organizations, family and
fortune each have their own organizational strategy. As depicted in Figure 3, these include
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values, strategic leaders, goal setting, resources, systems of organization, goal monitoring, and
goal attainment. Family strategic leaders of the fortune component (e.g., family firm, family
office, and private foundation's heads of governance and top management team) operate three
capital allocation strategies related to family lifestyle consumption, business investment and
growth, and business family giving needs. Family strategic leaders of the family council or
family assembly operate three strategies related to managing family unity and harmony, family
membership integration and leadership development, and strategic influence over fortune
strategies.
There exists a hierarchy of strategies in the dynastic business family strategy framework.
Hierarchical strategies in organizations range from organizational to functional strategies
(Kathuria et al., 2007; Venkatraman, 1989). Consistent with the family centric logic of the
developing business family literature, the dynastic business family strategy is at the top of the
strategic hierarchy (Moore, 2009; Steier et al., 2015; Zellweger et al., 2012). For the business
family membership and ownership groups, the business family strategy is meant to answer the
question, "What are the family’s fortune related activities?" Based on Venkatraman (1989)`s
thinking on the multidimensionality of strategy, the family and fortune functional strategies are
meant to answer questions about how best to combine resources, including family capital, and
systems of organization to achieve diverse and sometimes competing goals.
The business family's strategic leaders also consider how each individual family strategic
component aligns with its fortune counterpart because of the intersystem interdependency
between family and fortune (Carlock & Ward, 2001, 2010). Hence, it is posited business
strategic leaders continuously strategize over the coherent integration of these linkages. As well,
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they foresee whether these linkages are potentially conflictual with or mutually supportive of
goals attainment (Beer, Voelpel, Leibold, and Tekie, 2005; Kathuria et al., 2007).
The strategic fit and goals attainment relationship is difficult to predict because of the
dynastic business family's organizational complexity. The ideal of perfect fit or alignment is not
achievable because ideal can exist only in a state of equilibrium (D. Miller, 1993). But more
importantly, achieving a state of equilibrium contradicts the very definition of a dynamic and
complex system (Anderson, 1999). So, the dynastic business family strategy framework proposes
a systems approach to strategic fit such that the business family strategic leadership group is
looking for internal consistency between strategic components (Van de Ven & Drazin, 1985).
Viewing strategic alignment as patterns of internal consistencies along the dynastic
business family strategy framework respects the dynamic, multivariate, and normative nature of
continuously entwining family and fortune (Van de Ven, 1985; Zajac et al., 2000). Considering
strategic alignment as patterns of internal consistencies can give clarity on goal prioritization and
eminent trade-offs to the business family membership and its leadership group (Kammerlander et
al., 2015). Observing patterns of internal consistencies within the business family strategy
framework recognizes the uniqueness of each business family in terms of its past, its current
state, and desired future (Boal & Schultz, 2007).
5.3 Implications for Theory
The existence and usefulness of strategy are central to strategic management and family
business literatures. Prior research has theorized and empirically tested family influence on firm's
goal setting and strategic processes in the pursuit of diverse financial and non-financial goals
(Astrachan, 2010; Daspit et al., 2017; Kotlar & De Massis, 2013; Basco, 2017). However, given
the complexity of certain business families, in particular dynastic business families, there is
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growing consensus that a strategic process may exist at the family level (Steier et al., 2015;
Suess, 2014). Therefore, more attention is required to untangle the elements present in such a
family level strategic process. As such, this study on dynastic business families provides a
number of theoretical implications to begin unraveling such a process.
The discussion below on this study's theoretical contributions is divided into two
principal sub-sections. The first sub-section examines the theoretical implications for family
business theory. It is argued this study contributes to a number of family business perspectives
including family influence and socioemotional wealth. The second sub-section presents the
theoretical contributions to the strategic management literature. Specifically, this study extends
our knowledge in the areas of strategic leadership and strategic fit.
5.3.1 Implications for family business theory.
5.3.1.1 Family strategy as family influence.
This exploratory study reveals the presence and elements of family strategy within the
context of dynastic business families. This is important as it suggests a business family group
articulates a business family strategy distinct from the family business strategy. The dynastic
family strategy framework proposes that business families actually reflect on the nature of their
family involvement and influence in all facets of the family fortune.
It seems that a business family strategizes to decide and manage the extent, timing, and
duration of its influence in the family fortune. Nascent, young, and old business family dynasties
alike cogitate about the continuity of their control over the entities that constitute the family
fortune. They also weigh their social interactions with communities in which they are embedded
as employers, benefactors, and public servants. Therefore, the dynastic business family strategy
framework potentially provides a more comprehensive perspective of family influence, as it is
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not only assessed as a quantum of ownership, of family governance or management positions
occupied, and intent of continuous control by family in the business (Astrachan et al., 2002;
Klein et al. 2005). The dynastic business family strategy framework also considers family values,
goals setting, monitoring and attainment, strategic leadership, and governance mechanisms at the
family and fortune levels.
The dynastic family strategic framework goes beyond the intent of the business family to
influence a family firm. The assemblage of all the components of a dynastic business family
strategy may actually demonstrate that the business family membership is purposefully
influencing their fortune in order to make a difference in its resources and capabilities.
Therefore, the dynastic business family strategy perspective may extend the components-ofinvolvement and essence approaches, not so much in how to define a family firm, but rather in
circumscribing the essence of a business family (Chrisman et al., 2005; Moores, 2009).
This study also extends or overlays on the current strategic management perspectives of
the family firm offered by Daspit et al. (2017) and Sharma et al. (1997). The outputs of the
dynastic business family strategy framework are positioned as possible inputs to the family firm's
strategy-making process. Family strategy results from an internal family process working to
provide strategic influence and guidance to all aspects of the business family system. The family
strategy framework has a family centric view of the business family instead of a business-centric
perspective of the family business (Astrachan, 2010; Chrisman, Chua, and Sharma, 2005; Harris,
Martinez, and Ward, 1994; Sharma, Chrisman, and Chua, 1997).
The current strategic management view in the family business literature unfolds formally
or informally at the firm level, be it at the board level or within the top management team. As
evidenced in this study, the dynastic business family strategy evolves within the family
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governance system, be it the family council, family assembly, or some less formal body. As a
result of dealing with strategy at the family level, the business family reflects and oversees the
evolution of capital allocation decisions of the overall fortune, not just the family firm. The
decisions influence the long-term sustainability of the family's lifestyle consumption patterns,
investments in future growth of financial and physical capital, and giving (Jennings, Horan,
Reichenstein, and Brunel, 2011).
5.3.1.2 Family entrepreneurial orientation.
Another possible contribution from this study to the family business literature is how the
dynastic family strategy framework provides additional support for the family entrepreneurial
orientation (FEO) concept (Zellweger et al., 2012). FEO represents a family level mindset to
engage in entrepreneurial activity to grow family wealth. In the context of dynastic business
families, the family entrepreneurial mindset may also represent the family group's motivation to
sustain and further entwine family and fortune. Dynastic business families in this study exhibited
entrepreneurial activity not only through new business models or product innovation, but also by
pushing themselves to find ways of better organizing and governing to manage the long-term
unity of family and fortune. The start-up of a new organization is consistent with the
entrepreneurship definition held by Shane and Venkataraman (2000). An example of an
organizational entrepreneurial act is the creation of a family office, and subsequently using the
family office as a new venturing platform (Rosplock & Hauser, 2014; Roure, Segurado, Welsh,
& Rosplock, 2013). In response to rising organizational complexity, excess financial and
physical capital, need for new leadership and managerial capabilities, the dynastic business
family develops its own internal wealth management business (Faktor, 2013). Once established,
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the family office, through its direct private equity investments, engages in numerous venturing
opportunities (Welsh, Memili, Rosplock, Roure, and Segurado, 2013).
5.3.1.3 Business family systems view.
Thirdly, this study enriches the systems view of business family. Business families in this
study are in effect ensembles of multiple heterogeneous families. Each family connected to a
dynastic business family is characterized by its own structure, functions, member interactions,
and events. The extant family science literature suggests that management theories currently
underexplore family heterogeneity as an explanatory dimension of family business strategy and
systems of organization (Jaskiewicz & Dyer, 2017; Jaskiewicz, Combs, Shanine, and Kacmar,
2017).
In this study, many of the dynastic business families evolved over many generations to
become organizationally configured as multiple family multiple fortune entities (MichaelTsabari et al., 2014; Zellweger et al., 2012; Rey-Garcia & Puig-Raposo, 2013). The multiple
family-multiple fortune entity configuration reflects the entwinement of family and fortune. The
findings of this research provide further evidence that the Cluster Paradigm is a useful
perspective to understanding the configurational evolution of the business family in terms of
owned firms (Michael-Tsabari et al., 2014). In effect, some dynastic business families, like
families BFA and BFF, evolved over multiple generations organically around the historical
founding firm, while other dynastic business families, like families BFB, BFC, BFD, BFK,
evolved as portfolio business families with multiple related and unrelated family controlled and
non-family controlled business holdings.
Although the Cluster Paradigm provides a more evolutionary systems perspective than
the Three Circle depiction of family business, the Cluster Paradigm still falls short of capturing
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certain organizational dynastic business family idiosyncrasies (Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). The
Cluster Paradigm does not consider the advent and integration of other strategic business units
like the family office, the family council, and the family foundation. This study's findings here
raise the possibility that the Cluster Paradigm could be further adapted to more greatly reflect the
organizational complexity of having multiple systems of organization in dynastic business
families.
5.3.1.4 Socioemotional wealth.
The findings from this study produced an unexpected contribution to the dynasty
literature, which may serve to enrich socioemotional wealth theory (Berrone et al., 2012; GómezMejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, and Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). In reviewing the dynasty
literature, a lexicon of dynastic terms surfaced (see Literature Review section). These terms were
classified according to a set of dynastic phases (See Table 2). Business families may experience
some or all of these dynastic phases, in time, which include conception, attainment, decline, and
renewal. These phases describe and differentiate a business family's dynastic position in terms of
socio-economic structure and interactions within the business family, and between the business
family and its fortune and society.
These dynastic phases may be helpful to evaluate, over time, a business family's changes
in stock and the degree of importance accorded to its socioemotional wealth (SEW) (Berrone et
al., 2012; Debicki, Kellermanns, Chrisman, Pearson, and Spencer, 2016). These phases may
offer a more comprehensive perspective to the current SEW discussion, which is focused on
investigating the phenomenon in the context of three family firm stages: Stage I (foundingfamily controlled and managed firm), Stage II (ownership and management by extended family),
Stage III (professionally managed firm) (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Different SEW
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measurements may be captured during each dynastic phase than those in the three family firm
stages.
The dynastic business family's fortune, hence their SEW, is not confined to a single
family firm as is assumed in the socioemotional wealth model (Berrone et al., 2012; Debicki et
al., 2016). The family firm may not be the sole source of affective endowments. To the contrary,
as business families occupy different dynastic phases they may have varying levels of SEW
because of differences in organizational complexity and family capital. A large family
constituency and various governance mechanisms may span a portfolio of family capital
producing and distributing organizations like operating companies, a family office, and private
family foundations. Or, in some cases, a dynastic business family may no longer have a family
firm or the founder's legacy firm as part of its dynastic fortune. Yet, the business family may
choose to perpetuate the entwinement of family and fortune to protect the social benefits derived
from its power and socially high position. For the dynastic business family, property ownership
confers a higher social status onto its owners, even more so in the case of dynastic owners since
inherited wealth is more honorific (Trigg, 2001; Veblen, 1899). So, the composition of SEW
may change depending on the dynastic business family`s internal and external contexts (Schulze
& Kellermanns, 2015).
Examining dynastic business families' SEW in dynastic phases may resolve a core issue
of SEW regarding the explanation as to why and when a family might risk SEW to gain more
SEW. For example, it may be that dynastic business families will risk SEW up to the point where
they achieve a dynastic status. It is the dynastic goal attainment that, from the outset, may
determine the inflexion point for when a business family goes from a SEW growth to a SEW
protection family strategy.
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Also, the dynastic business family strategy framework demonstrates that the SEW
concept may benefit from a broadened definition. Such a definition may incorporate the
following elements: integration of organizational complexity and longevity, aggregation of SEW
derived from multiple sources, and the relative valuation of SEW by source type. Varying
aggregated values of SEW may suggest a different family strategy, which in turn may produce
different business family performance and longevity outcomes.
5.3.2 Implications for strategic management.
5.3.2.1 Strategic leadership and family governance.
This study extends strategic leadership theory to the business family level. Business
family champions perform as strategic leaders in the execution of their roles. The extant strategic
leadership research generally studies the phenomenon at the top management team and board
levels of large non-family and family firms (Miller, Minichilli, and Corbetta, 2013; Minichilli,
Corbetta, and MacMillan, 2010; Simsek, Jansen, Minichilli, and Escriba‐Esteve, 2015; Wang,
Waldman, and Zhang, 2012). However, in this study, strategic leaders were identified at the
family level.
At the family level within the family governance system, business family champions
were identified, be they the family assembly head or family council chairperson. These business
family champions are characterized as strategic leaders who combine strategic thinking and
stewardship attributes (Boal & Hooijberg, 2001; Graetz, 2002; Hernandez, 2012; Steptoe-Warren
et al., 2011). Strategic thinkers are described as possessing the following five key elements: 1)
they have a mental model of how all the pieces of the system work together; 2) they are driven
by intent; 3) strategic thinkers integrate time by analyzing and synthesizing the interconnectivity
between the past, the present, and the future; 4) they are hypotheses driven  if this, then what?;
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and 5) strategic thinkers are intelligent opportunists such that they will exploit new opportunities
along the intended strategic path (Graetz, 2002; Liedtka, 1998).
Stewardship draws on the idea that an individual, the steward, reaps greater personal
utility from pro-organizational behaviors than from individualistic self-serving behaviors (Davis,
Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997; Hernandez, 2012). Stewards engage a covenantal relationship
with the organization, in this case with the dynastic business family, representing a moral
commitment to bind steward and the organization toward common goals (Hernandez, 2012). For
example, the family council chair seems tasked with the responsibility of formulating the family
strategy, manage intra-business family and family-fortune management relations, including an
active role in the fortune's corporate governance. These responsibilities require strategic thinking
capabilities and steward-like attributes.
Finally, on the matter of strategic leadership and family governance, this study offers
some initial observations about the possibilities of shared strategic leadership within dynastic
business families. Given the complexity and long-term orientation of dynastic business families,
these familial organizations seem to demonstrate some form of shared leadership between
strategic leaders within a dynasty's various systems of organization. This suggests that the
leadership structure of dynastic business families may evolve from the single hero founder
strategic leader to a group of strategic leaders selected from the family, ownership, and corporate
systems (Kriger & Zhovtobryukh, 2013). These strategic leaders may originate also from
different family generations. Such a leadership structure seems almost necessary to bridge the
family capital cumulated from the past, collected in the present, and seeded for the future.
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5.3.2.2 Strategic fit.
This study contributes to the strategic fit literature by extending the concept of strategic
alignment to the family level in the context of dynastic business families. This study suggests
that the strategic fitting process begins within the business family. This view complements the
extant literature, which is generally tilted toward the firm and its alignment with the external
environment (Fuchs et al., 2000; Venkatraman, 1989).
The business family seeks out strategic integration between the family fortune dyad
throughout each strategic component of the family strategy. The business family, as the
strategizing unit, is challenged to congruently connect its values, strategic goals, resources and
systems of organizations between family and fortune toward goals attainment. The family
fortune perspective is more complex than the family firm pair because fortune includes not just
the family firm but also a portfolio of socially and economically driven activities set in multiple
organizational entities, and most likely led by different leaders. There are many dynamic parts to
integrate and coordinate. So, the opportunity for strategic misalignment are many, and may
become potential sources of business family conflict resulting from misunderstanding or
disagreement regarding the various interconnected strategic goals.
To understand how fit or alignment may affect the formulation and coordination of goals,
systems and activities between each of the business families' related entities such as family
council, family office, philanthropy, and portfolio of direct commercial interests is important.
Each entity is ultimately owned and controlled by the business family, which is influenced by
family members, and each business family entity is constrained by its own governance, resources
and capabilities sets, and institutional settings (Kammerlander, Sieger, Voordeckers, and
Zellweger, 2015; Steier et al., 2015). In effect, the dynastic business family strategic framework
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offers an integrated view of the multiple possible levels and points of strategic integration in a
complex multi-entity organization. Such an integrated perspective is consistent with recent
literature that encourages such a view to better determine how and when family influences value
creation (Kammerlander et al., 2015).
This research adds a critical element to the complex idea of strategic fit. Business family
strategic fit encompasses the internal consistencies between family and business or fortune
strategies. The dynastic business family, and its strategic leaders, work to formulate and
implement a family strategy toward the goal of entwining family and fortune for a very long
time. The strategic-fitting process resembles a balancing act between business family values,
goals, capabilities, and resources. The balancing act can be even more challenging when
considering the multigenerational timeframe between setting and attaining the goal of dynastic
status (Marcus, 1985, 1988, Sjogren, 2011). However, the dynastic business family strategy
framework positions well the primacy of values and family strategy where strategic fit is
concerned.
5.4 Practical Implications
While exploratory in nature, the practical implications should be viewed with caution as
this research project offers new knowledge to the family business strategic management domain.
This new knowledge has practical implications for business families. The study`s findings offer
business families a means to help them shift their strategic management thinking and behaviors
from the family firm to the business family. For business families, this study offers a unique
window into the mindsets, inner workings, and motivations of dynastic business families. The
exploration results of a sample of diverse dynastic business families encourage other business
families to subscribe to a “family-as-strategy” mindset to better understand and influence their
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world (Steier et al., 2015). A family strategy perspective offers a more holistic and integrated
understanding of the many dimensions, issues and opportunities related to business family's
evolving organizational development and complexity. An integrated perspective of dynastic
business families exposes both business families and advisors to insights into the evolutionary
possibilities, like renewed entrepreneurship, and the implications of transforming from a family
business to a dynastic business family.
For business families, be they dynastic or not, this study offers a dynastic business family
strategy framework to engage in family learning. The longevity literature has painted a
consistently positive picture about the relationship between organizational learning and longevity
(De Geus, 1997; Montuori, 2000). Some family businesses use strategic planning as a family
firm management process and a learning opportunity for its next generation of family business
leaders (Mazzola, Marchisio, and Astrachan, 2008). The dynastic business family strategic
framework extends the learning benefits of strategic planning to the business family level.
From this study, we learn that business strategic leaders are present in the family,
ownership, and corporate governance systems. The dynastic business families are concerned
with their leaders' succession plans. Business family strategic leaders are in need of strategic
thinking and stewardship training as testified by several interviewees of this study. This study's
conceptual framework offers a learning solution for incumbent family leaders and their
successors to share their respective mental models of the business family system. Shared mental
models represent various types of knowledge such as know what, procedural knowledge, and
knowledge of context and application (Mohammed, Ferzandi, and Hamilton, 2010). The team
mental models research demonstrates that shared mental models increase the cognitive capacity

190

191
of the leadership team, which in turn increases its effectiveness in dealing with conceptual
complexity (Mohammed at al., 2010; Montuori, 2000).
The dynastic business family strategy framework also potentially offers a more inclusive
and participatory organizational learning experience in terms of discovering the many levels of
the business family's history, its current organizational state, and potential future business family
strategic paths. It may become a means to engage business family membership and all its
strategic leaders. The framework also provides the business family with a way to conceive and
implement its own family strategy adapted to its own values and goals sets. The family strategy
process becomes a training exercise in strategic thinking for present and prospective family
leaders. The output of the business family strategic planning process may serve as an antecedent
to the fortune entities' strategic planning process (Nordqvist & Melin, 2010).
The proposed strategic framework is an opportunity for the family membership to
organize and integrate its history and present into each of the model's strategic components and
understand the processual linkages between them. The model`s strategic factors and their
underlying categories become key comparative and historical organizational reference points for
the business family itself, but also relative to other dynastic business families like those who
participated in this study. These key reference points become business family checkpoints to
evaluate progress toward goals attainment.
5.5 Limitations
This study is believed to be a first in uncovering the components and the process of
family strategy in a dynastic business family context. However, given this study's qualitative
research design, it has notable limitations. These limitations restrict the generalizability and
possibly the validity of the findings.
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This study sought to capture multiple cultural contexts in designing its non-random
sample of dynastic business family informants from multiple countries. The study collected data
from interviewees in five different countries on two continents. However, the research sample of
ten families is small, and seven of the fifteen business family interviewees are concentrated in a
single North American country. Also eight of the interviewees considered the French language as
their native language.
Although all the business family interviewees were expert informants of their business
family, only two business families out of the ten had more than one informant. Data were
supplemented by field notes and archival information to triangulate with interviewee data.
However, since this research project aimed to interpret the socially constructed reality of these
business families, a greater number of informants per business family would improve the validity
of this study`s findings. More informed interviewees per business family would further minimize
the risk that the researcher`s interpretation of the business family informants' socially constructed
realities was not a fabrication (Charmaz, 2014; Suddaby, 2006).
This research project was focused on exploring family strategy within the context of
dynastic business families. Three business families that did not meet all of the dynastic criteria
were nevertheless retained in the final study sample (See Table 8 in Section 3.4). Business
family BFG fell short of the dynastic familial control timeline requirement of a young dynasty.
Business family BFH and BFI did not meet all of the criteria required of either dynastic
definitional approaches. However, business family BFH exhibited strong cohesion, investing,
and giving values, in addition to well-developed systems of organization at the family and
fortune levels. Business family BFI explicitly stated they had conceived and are managing a
family strategy. The inclusion of business families BFG, BFH, and BFI in the final study sample
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may have altered the validity of this study's findings. To what extent the research results were
affected is difficult to evaluate considering the study's exploratory objectives and qualitative
research design.
5.6 Future Research
Some compelling research topics emerge when dynastic family strategy is considered as a
continuous process of entwining family and fortune. First, there is a need for further exploration
of strategic leadership in complex organizations like dynastic business families. The family
business literature generally situates strategic leaders only in the family firm. This perspective
limits theory development about the possible interactions and relationships between the family
firm CEO and the other strategic family leaders like the heads of the family council and family
office. Could this group of strategic family leaders form some type of business family supra-top
management team (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996)?
Second, given the emerging research on family governance and the family office, further
research should examine the succession planning of family council chair and the family office
CEO. Such research is relevant considering these strategic leaders seem to be tasked with
conceiving and leading the family strategy process. Furthermore, the extant family business
succession literature principally focuses on the antecedents to family firm succession while
underexploring these organizational entities of a dynastic business family (Brockhaus, 2004;
Benavides-Velasco, Quintana-García, and Guzmán-Parra, 2013; Suess, 2014).
Recent goal theory work by Basco (2017) and Kotlar & De Massis (2013) further
highlight the complexity of goals diversity in the family business context. Kotlar & De Massis
(2013) offer new insights into the family centered goals setting process. Basco (2017) develops a
new multi-dimensional perspective of family business goals. But as explicated in this research,
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monitoring of multiple hierarchical goals and its associated processes have yet to be explored in
the business family context. What systems of organizations are in place to monitor family
centered non-economic goals? How are long-term business family goals monitored or
manipulated to avoid goal erosion? Who monitors business family goals progression? Future
research endeavors should pursue these questions in case studies to glean the processual data
required to understand what happens after goals setting and commitment.
5.7 Conclusion
Prior to this research, the notion of family strategy, as an organizational concept, a source
of influence, interactions, and longevity in family owned and controlled organizational entities,
lacked clarity and investigation by the strategic and family business management literatures
(Astrachan, 2010; Chrisman et al., 2005; Daspit et al., 2017). This is concerning for two critical
reasons. First, the family system is considered one of the oldest and most enduring organizational
forms (Zachary, 2011). Families, including dynastic business families, are a global source of
entrepreneurship and job creation (Aldrich & Cliff, 2003; Bennedsen, 2015; Zachary, 2011).
Dynastic business families are longevity outliers compared to other institutions (Daepp et al.,
2015; Morris, 2014; O'Hare, 2004). The second concern, strategy, like family, is an enduring and
useful organizational concept created and enacted by leaders to drive organizational renewal and
performance (Barney, 1991; Crook et al., 2008; Cummins, 1993; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000;
Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Strategy is an ensemble or pattern of purposefully fitted,
organizationally situated, and integrated social actions to mobilize capital in its many forms
toward goals attainment.
Business families are purposeful organizations characterized by their family values,
family capital, their leaders, their systems of organization, and their pursuit of goals. Hence, if all
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these components exist and are integrated at the family level could a family strategy not exist? If
all these strategic components are present how are they integrated together to form a family
strategy? If a business family strategy is formed, could it serve to influence other organizational
strategies within the business family system?
This study endeavored to answer these questions by exploring strategy in dynastic
business families. Given their organizational complexity and perpetuation, dynastic business
families provide a rich and evolving socio-economic canvas to explore the multidimensionality
of strategy at the family level. The goal of this research was not limited to finding the existence
of a family strategy in dynastic business families, but also the study pointed toward identifying
strategy components and explaining their relationships.
Strategy is observed as a socially enacted, multilevel, and temporal phenomenon. It is not
easy, if impossible, to observe its genesis in the mind of the strategist, or follow its many
interacting components and evolution since these may be simultaneously located in multiple
places with many individuals. The boundaries between the components of a strategy can be
ambiguous. Hence, the contextual fluidity of strategy is the reason why a qualitative groundedtheory influenced research design was used in this study (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Langley,
1999). Such a research approach enabled a deeper investigation of the underlying sources and
components of family strategy as they occur in the reality of dynastic business families. The
focus of this study was to generate new theory from the ground up, not to test or verify existing
knowledge.
Guided by the research goal, a purposeful sample of expert informants from dynastic
business families was created. Aware of the contextual nature of strategy, ten dynastic business
families from five different northern hemisphere countries were selected. Data were primarily
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collected from semi-structured interviews with fifteen dynastic business family members during
the summer and fall of 2016; and further supplemented from archival documents and field notes.
True to a grounded theory influenced research method, the dynastic business family strategy
theory emerged from the processes of intertwining data collection, data analysis, and theory
building (Charmaz, 2014). Also, extant literature was integrated with the data analysis and the
theory building exercises.
The verbatim interview transcripts were analyzed with the support of a leading computerassisted qualitative data analysis software ATLAS.ti 7.0 (Woods et al., 2016). From the analysis
emerged a number of core categories, their underlying characteristics, and their respective
relationships. The dynastic business family strategy framework provides explanations regarding
the make-up of a family strategy and how business families may attain a dynastic status or other
important goals (Figure 3).
An important finding from this study is that dynastic business families are preoccupied
by the continuous entwinement of family and fortune. They are cognizant of the economic and
social benefits they perceive at the individual and family levels by strategizing concurrently the
cohesion of family and fortune during a very long time. Fortune is a more comprehensive and
dynamic perspective of a dynastic business family's economic engine. Dynastic business families
are capital allocators to meet the demands of the family`s lifestyle consumption patterns, of the
family firm's operating and growth plans, and of the family's giving and community legacies.
The study found the components comprising a dynastic business family strategy. These
strategic components include family values, business family strategic leadership, goals setting
family capital, systems of organization, and goals monitoring and attainment. These strategic
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components are then fitted together for generations along and between the family and fortune
dimensions.
Family values carry the family shared beliefs and norms regarding the importance of
family unity through collaboration and conflict management all the while respecting individual
differences within the family membership. Family values frame the long-term orientation
mindset ensuring the continuity of family learning and socialization into the dynastic business
life. The family values are transposed into the business family strategic leaders.
Dynastic business strategic leaders are responsible for formulating and implementing the
family strategy at the family and fortune levels. Dynastic business strategic leaders are strategic
thinkers with steward-like mentalities as their thinking and behaving is shaped by their long-term
outlook of the family's collective wellbeing. Dynastic family leaders set, pursue, and monitor
diverse goals. They create organizational entities and governance mechanisms that serve to build
and allocate family capital between the family and fortune levels. Dynastic business strategic
leaders seem to operate as a distributed leadership team to expand the business family's
executive cognitive capacity to better integrate the organizational complexity of a dynastic
business family.
The findings of this family strategy research project confirm the existence and the
multidimensionality of the strategy concept in the context of dynastic business families. The
contributions of this study to family business theory building consists of four main points. First,
family strategy is uniquely positioned at the business family level. Family strategy interacts with
the strategies of the organizational entities at the fortune level. Furthermore, the individual or
individuals leading the family strategic planning effort are not necessarily the same as those
leading elsewhere in the dynastic business organization. This situation has implications regarding
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the development and selection of a larger number of family leader successors to maintain a
dynastic status.
The second contribution to family business theory refers to the fact that family strategy
reinforces the validity and importance of family level of analysis. Family strategy demonstrates
that business families may exhibit a strategic mindset continuum from family-in-business to
family-as-investor. The family strategy offers an opportunity to expand the Family
Entrepreneurial Orientation research within a more processual framework whereby following the
potential entrepreneurial pathways to grow the family`s fortune.
The third contribution to the family business literature regards a possible variant to the
Three Circle and the Cluster Paradigm views of the family business called the Dynastic Cluster
Paradigm. The Dynastic Cluster Paradigm better reflects the evidence collected during this study
regarding a more comprehensive systems view of the evolving complexity of dynastic business
families. The Dynastic Cluster Paradigm recognizes the organizational purposefulness of the
family office, the family foundation, and the family council.
As dynastic business families evolve the family firm may not be the sole source of
socioemotional endowments as currently suggested by the socioemotional wealth (SEW) model.
Family capital and influence is dispersed amongst several family owned or controlled entities.
This study`s fourth contribution to the family business body of knowledge pertains to a
broadened definition of SEW to capture the following elements: integration of organizational
complexity and longevity, aggregation of SEW derived from multiple sources, and the relative
valuation of SEW by source type.
The findings of this study also contributed to strategic management theory on two main
issues. First, strategic leadership is not confined to a firm or family firm; strategic leaders are
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present in the family system as manifested in the family governance roles they occupy.
Furthermore, in the context of dynastic business families, the strategic leadership structure may
evolve from a single hero founder strategic leader at a pre-dynastic phase to a more shared
strategic leadership structure once the dynasty status is achieved. Shared leadership may be more
favorable to meet the conceptual complexity demands of a dynastic business family strategy.
The study makes a second contribution to the strategic fit literature by extending the
concept to the family level in the dynastic business family context. Given the complexity of
dynastic business families and resulting multiplicity of contingencies, strategic alignment may
best be viewed as patterns of internal consistencies between each strategic component of the
family strategy at and between the family and fortune levels. The dynastic business family
strategic framework offers an integrated view of the multiple possible areas for tracking patterns
of internal consistencies in a complex multi-entity organization.
This research project may open some promising research pathways in the areas of
business family strategic leadership, succession planning in the family governance system and
the family office, and business family goals monitoring processes.
In a most modest way, this research project explored and uncovered the initial pieces of
family strategy in the realities of dynastic business families. This investigation was inspired by a
belief that the genesis and assured longevity of fortune resides in the family. In effect, the
displays and mechanisms of the fortune are manifestations, vehicles carrying the family`s desired
socio-economic states of the world activated and circumscribed by a family strategy. It is the
researcher`s hope that this study's findings will fuel further theoretical research and discussions
toward a family centric view of the family in business or business family domain.
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APPENDIX A
SEMI-SRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE
(Domains of Inquiry)
Date: ___________
Interview location: ___________
Interview start time: ______ Interview end time: ______ Interview duration: _______
Business Family: ____________
=====================================================================
Reminder: Consent Form Explained by Researcher and Signed by Participant
=====================================================================
Identify opportunities to become an observer at family meetings or family council
meetings.
=====================================================================
Identify opportunities to gain access to family archives: family council minutes, family
constitution, family protocol, family charter, family code of conduct, family
biographies/books.
=====================================================================
Apply F-PEC – Power subscale (Klein, Astrachan, and Smyrnios, 2005). See Appendix A.
=====================================================================
Family member name: _____________________
Family member gender: ____________________ Family member Age: _____
Family member education level: __________________ Family member marital status: _______
Family member business family status: ______Active

______Non-Active

Family member current business family role(s): _______________________
Family member previous business family role(s): ______________________
228
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=====================================================================
TOPIC AREA: FAMILY
1) How would you describe your view of family?
2) What does family mean to you?
3) Which individuals do you consider part of your family?
4) Do you have family goals?
5) Who sets these goals?
6) How do you set these goals?
7) Why do you need these family goals?
8) When are the goals set?
9) What type of family processes are in place to assess your progress?
10) What goals have the highest priority? And, why?
11) What do you aspire for yourself and your family?
12) What role does your family play in your pursuit of these aspirations?
13) What are the differences between family members whom are part of the family
governance? And those that are not.
14) Have those differences changed over time? If so, how and why?

=====================================================================
TOPIC AREA: BUSINESS FAMILY
1) Could you explain the process (es) by which a family member becomes part of the
business family?
2) What are your expectations regarding family members becoming involved in the business
family? Family interest?
3) How are those expectations communicated?
=====================================================================
TOPIC AREA: FAMILY GOVERNANCE
1) Do you have family meetings? Family Council? Family Constitution? Protocol? Charter?
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2) Who is generally present?
3) Who calls them?
4) Could you describe a recent meeting that went very well?
5) Could you describe a recent meeting that did not go well?
6) Who leads your governance process?
7) What is this person or group`s responsibility?
8) What events precipitated the creation of your family governance system?
9) How has the family governance system fulfilled its mandate?
=====================================================================
TOPIC AREA: FAMILY/FAMILY BUSINESS ADVISORS
1) Who are your family advisors?
2) Why do you need these advisors?
3) How do they contribute to the family`s success?
=====================================================================
TOPIC AREA: FAMILY INTERESTS
1) One or many business interests?
2) Ownership, governance, management involvement&
3) Which family generation? Selection process?
4) Related or unrelated diversification?
5) Family office? Structure? Size?
6) Foundation?
=====================================================================
TOPIC AREA: STRATEGY
1) How is strategy discussed at the family/business family level?
2) How do strategy discussions differ at the family and business levels?
=====================================================================
Appendix A of Interview Guide
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F-PEC: Power Subscale
1. Please indicate the proportion of share ownership held by family and nonfamily members:
(a) Family _________________________%
(b) Nonfamily _________________________%
2. Are shares held in a holding company or similar entity (e.g., trust)? 1. _ Yes 2. _ No
If YES, please indicate the proportion of ownership:
(a) Main company owned by:
(i) direct family ownership: ___________%
(ii) direct nonfamily: ___________% ownership: ___________%
(iii) holding company: ___________%
(b) Holding company owned by:
(i) family ownership: ___________%
(ii) nonfamily ownership: ___________%
(iii) 2nd holding company: ___________%
(c) 2nd holding company owned by:
(i) family ownership: ___________%
3. Does the business have a governance Board? 1. _ Yes 2. _ No
If YES:
(a) How many Board members does it comprise? ______________ Members
(b) How many Board members is family? ______________ Family members
(c) How many nonfamily (external) members nominated by the family are on the Board?
______________ Nonfamily members
4. Does the business have a management Board? 1. _ Yes 2. _ No
If YES:
(a) How many persons does it comprise? ______________ Members
(b) How many management Board members is family? ______________ Family members
(c) How many nonfamily Board members are chosen through them? ______________ Nonfamily
member
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APPENDIX B
CODE FAMILIES BY INITIAL THEORETICAL CODE
Initial Theoretical Codes

Family Values

Goals

Business Family Strategy

Business Family
Group Dynamics

Code Families by Initial Theoretical Code
Family values
Business Family Cohesion
Family Vision
Family Meaning
Family Identity
Business Family History and Narratives
Family Symbolism
Family Stewardship
Family Resilience
Multigenerational Family Mindset
Nepotism
Success
Genesis of Generational Timeline
Business Family Goals
Family Goals
Family business continuity
Family Office Goals
Business Family Longevity Ingredients
Business Family Continuity
Continuity Success Ingredients
Family Legacies
Intrapreneurship Legacy
Family Ownership Legacy
Business Strategy
Family Strategy
Business Family Investment
Strategy
Ownership Strategy
Business Family Dividend Policy
Ownership Strategy
Family Members Financial Dependence
Family Strategy Formulation
Family Longevity Strategy
Family Strategy Implementation
Business Family Strategic Thinking
Family Strategy Evaluation
Board dynamics
Business Family Communication Purpose
Business family decision making
Business family conflict
Business family crisis management
CEO board dynamics
Board faultlines and factions
Group effectiveness
Group learning
Business family learning
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Business Family Organization
and Structure

Family Capital

Intragenerational collaboration
Intergenerational collaboration
Family branch thinking and behaviors
Family communications
Family owners and board of directors' dynamics
Family power and status
Family relations climate
Power imbalances
Business family events & transitions
Ownership types and transition
Family business liquidity event
Family Enterprise to Business Family to Family
Enterprise Transitions
Family Business Succession
Business family professionalization
Leadership succession
Leadership succession process
CEO role transition
CEO tenure
CEO selection process
CEO duality
CEO functions family business
Board Composition Family Business
Board member tenure
Board compensation
Board member selection and recruitment process
Board member functions
Business family leadership roles
Business family ownership system
ownership system
Council of owners
Business family control
Business family control succession
Business family ownership and control separation
Business family shareholder dispersion
Family governance
Family member compensation
Family constitution
Family charter
Family Council
Family council chair
Family Assembly
Family meetings
Business family gatherings
Family office creation
Family office types
Family office operations
Family office functions
Family office clients
Family genealogy tools
Family philanthropy
Public policy influence
Business family venturing
Family Capital
Human Capital
Human resources evaluation
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Business Family Member
Socialization

Family talent development
Family talent transmission
Talent search
Social Capital
Banking Relationships
Business family Community
Business family advisors
Financial Capital
Business family member socialization
Business family member participation and involvement
Family member choices

Source: Own Atlas ti study database
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APPENDIX C
BFH BUSINESS FAMILY STEWARDSHIP MATRIX
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The captain of the family assembly occupies an office at the family office to ensure the
family office represents the interests of the family well.
Source: Family BFH
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APPENDIX D
DEFINITIONS OF BUSINESS FAMILY CAPITAL TYPES
Business Family
Capital Types
Human capital

Social capital

Cultural capital

Physical capital

Financial capital

Definitions
Comprises the stock of knowledge, skills,
and abilities of individual business family
members.
Comprises the opportunity and ability to
capture benefits by virtue of membership
in social networks or other social
structures.
Embodies the accumulated stock of
knowledge about artistic and intellectual
traditions learned through traditional
training and social upbringing.
Includes real assets owned by the business
family and less readily convertible into
cash like real estate, equipment, production
infrastructure.
Comprises the monetary assets, including
cash, owned by the business family held as
private or public securities which can be
converted into cash.
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